State v. DixonState v. Dixon
Convicted of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant’s conviction stemmed from an incident in which he and two friends encountered the victim and his friend, G, whom the defendant had previously assaulted. G witnessed the defendant pull a gun from his waistband, and, as G and the victim fled, a shot was fired, which ultimately struck and killed the victim. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly allowed C, one of the state’s witnesses, to testify as an expert about neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between neighborhoods in Stamford, the city in which the victim’s killing occurred. Held:
The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his right to due process was violated insofar as C implicitly invoked racial stereotypes when he characterized the Black residents in certain Stamford neighborhoods as being engaged in firearms and drug trafficking, and in violent criminal activity, as C never testified before the jury regarding the demographics of the various Stamford neighborhoods, or regarding race in general, and, even though C did testify аbout firearms and drug trafficking in Stamford, he did not connect those activities to specific neighborhoods or the Black residents in those neighborhoods.
The trial court abused its discretion when it permitted C to offer expert testimony about various Stamford neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between them.
C’s ‘‘neighborhood’’ testimony amounted to testimony about gang activity in various Stamford neighborhoods, and, because the state conceded that there was no evidence that the defendant was a member of a gang, such testimony had limited probative value, and any probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Moreover, C’s testimony was not the proper subject of expert testimony simply because it may have been related to the defendant’s motive, as the state was able to present evidence through fact witnesses to establish a possible motive for the shooting, and there was no indication that C had any peculiar knowledge or experience that would have aided the jury in determining motive.
Nevertheless, the court’s error in admitting C’s testimony was harmless because that testimony was not the only evidence admitted that established
The trial court correctly determined that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the third-party culpability jury instruction that the defense requested because, contrary to the defendant’s claim, there was not enough evidence to raise more than a bare suspicion that G, rather than the defendant, was the shooter.
The defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the adequacy of the police investigation into the victim’s killing, as the evidence was not sufficiently compelling to mandate such an instruction, and defense counsel was afforded the opportunity to present evidence, to cross-examine the witnesses, and to argue to the jury about any deficiencies in the investigation.
In connection with the defendant’s claim that the jury’s finding of not guilty with respect to the charge of criminal possession of a firearm was inconsistent with its finding of guilty with respect to the charge of first degree manslaughter with a firearm, this court declined the defendant’s request to modify its holding in State v. Arroyo (292 Conn. 558) to permit review of legally inconsistent verdicts, as this court continued to find the analysis in Arroyo persuasive, especially in light of its recent adherence to Arroyo in State v. Henderson (348 Conn. 648).
There was no merit to the defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree manslaughter with a firearm, as the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant’s flight, in combination with other evidence, established consciousness of guilt, which, in turn, established the defendant’s identity as the shooter, surveillance video footage placеd the defendant at the scene of the shooting, G testified that the defendant had previously assaulted and robbed him, and G also testified that he saw the defendant with a gun moments before the victim was shot and that the gun was the same one the defendant was seen holding in a video that was created a few hours before the shooting.
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the jury before
Opinion
McDONALD, J. The most significant issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court properly allowed the state’s gang expert to testify as to ‘‘neighborhoods,’’ ‘‘neighborhood divisions,’’ and the ‘‘dynamics’’ between neighborhoods in the city of Stamford, despite the fact that the prosecutor conceded that the defendant, Sirus Dixon, was not in a gang. The defendant also raises various other claims, including that the court failed to provide certain proposed jury instructions, the jury returned an inconsistent verdict, and there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Although we agree with the defendant that the admission of the testimony from the state’s gang expert witness was improper, we conclude that this error was harmless. We also reject the defendant’s other claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
One night in May, 2018, the victim, Antonio Robinson, who was eighteen years old at the time, and his friend, Tyrik Gill, were walking from Connecticut Avenue in Stamford to a home in the ‘‘Southfield Village’’ housing
After walking a few feet past each other, Gill turned and saw the defendant pull a silver gun from his waistband. After seeing the gun, Gill tried to grab Robinson and run. As they ran, Gill heard a gunshot. Gill then saw Robinson fall, stand back up, and keep running. Once they crossed the street, Gill saw that Robinson was bleeding. Robinson then collapsed on the side of the road, and Gill asked a passerby to call 911, before running away. Gill returned to the scene before the police arrived and found Robinson lying by the curb. By the time the police arrived, Robinson was unresponsive, and he died shortly thereafter.
Meanwhile, the defendant, Davis, and Jean-Baptiste had also run from the scene of the shooting. Several surveillance cameras tracked their movements. The surveillance footage showed the three teenagers quickly crossing a supermarket parking lot. Additionally, Stamford Police Officer Vito Sileo testified that he observed three teenagers enter that lot from the samе direction from which he had heard a gunshot. Sileo advised dispatch about the individuals and followed them, noting that they went behind stores next to the supermarket and proceeded toward Whitmore Avenue. Stamford Police Officer Logan Pavia and his canine partner were
The police tested the defendant’s hands and clothes for gunshot residue particles. Analysis found lead—one of three elements that comprise gunshot residue—on the defendant’s hands and jacket. Despite an exhaustive search that followed the path the three teenagers took from the scene of the shooting to where the defendant was arrested, the police did not recover a gun.
Over the course of several months following the shooting, the police conducted a series of interviews with Gill. The police first interviewed Gill the day after the shooting but failed to record the audio of the interview. According to Christian DiCarlo, who, at the time of the interview, was a sergeant with the Stamford Police Department, Gill said that he ‘‘never saw who shot . . . Robinson’’ and did not know the males beneath the overpass. After the police showed him surveillance footage of the incident, however, Gill identified the defendant, Davis, and Jean-Baptiste. That same day, Gill returned for a second interview with the police, this time with audio recording enabled. Gill told the police, among other things, that he saw what looked like a chrome gun in the defendant’s waistband. After a detective pulled out and showed his service weapon, which was a semiautomatic pistol, Gill said that the gun he saw in the defendant’s waistband was also a semiautomatic. When asked whether he had ever been assaulted or robbed by the defendant prior to the incident, Gill stated that he had not.
Approximately two weeks after the shooting, Gill returned for another interview with the police and was represented by counsel. During this interview, Gill disclosed that, following the shooting, he ran to Southfield Village and back to the scene before the police arrived
Thereafter, the state charged the defendant with murder in violation of
On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court violated his federal due process right to a fair trial and abused its discretion when it admitted a gang expert witness’ testimony on ‘‘neighborhood’’ rivalries, (2) the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the jury on third-party culpability and investigative inadequacy, (3) the jury returned an inconsistent verdict when it found the defendant guilty of manslaughter with a
I
EXPERT TESTIMONY
We first address the defendant’s claims related to the admission of the testimony of the state’s gang expert witness on ‘‘neighborhoods,’’ ‘‘neighborhood divisions,’’ and the ‘‘dynamics’’ between them. The defendant contends that the admission of this testimony violated his right to due process and constituted evidentiary error.
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our analysis. Prior to the start of trial, the prosecutor informed the trial court that the state was not going to allege that the defendant was a member of a gang because it ‘‘ha[d] no information to indicate hе was . . . .’’ During trial, however, the last witness the state called was Sergeant Bryan Cooper, the Stamford Police Department’s ‘‘certified gang instructor,’’ to testify as an expert witness. The foundation for Cooper’s testimony was Gill’s written statement to the police that mentioned a ‘‘beef between Connecticut Avenue [and] the West Side,’’ and the testimony of Robinson’s sister that the defendant was from Connecticut Avenue, which the prosecutor argued meant that the defendant ‘‘repp[ed]’’ that neighborhood.3 For his part,
Cooper was called as an expert to testify not on gangs per se, but on ‘‘Stamford neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between them.’’ The prosecutor claimed that this testimony would be relevant to the prosecutor’s theory that Robinson’s shooting was motivated by ‘‘the Connecticut Avenue versus West Side Village dynamic.’’ Specifically, the prosecutor’s theory was that Gill had been the intended target, but the shot missed and killed Robinson. The prosecutor explained that ‘‘[the defendant] was a part of one neighborhood and . . . Gill was a part of another . . . .’’ Defense counsel objected to Cooper’s testimony on the grounds that it was not relevant, overly prejudicial, and not a proper subject of expert testimony. Defense counsel noted that simply omitting the word ‘‘gang’’ does not change the prejudicial character of the testimony because the jury would understand the reference to ‘‘neighborhoods’’ to mean that Cooper was testifying about gangs.
The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection. It explained that, ‘‘even if we were using the ‘gang’ word, which we’re not, which I think lessens its prejudicial impact, the courts have allowed this type of evidence.’’ The court reasoned that Cooper’s testimony was not to demonstrate the defendant’s criminal propensity or bad character but was ‘‘highly probative of possible motive to kill . . . Gill.’’
During voir dire, outside the presence of the jury, Cooper explained that he had worked for the Stamford Police Department for ten years and was assigned to the Bureau of Criminal Investigations and Major Crimes Unit. When asked whether he had ever received any training, Cooper stated that he had attended training sessions that were conducted by the Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association, part of which ‘‘was gang
At the conclusion of Cooper’s voir dire, defense counsel again objected to Cooper’s testimony. The trial court again overruled the objection. It explained, ‘‘[t]he case law is quite clear that evidence of gang affiliation is admissible and relevant and probative on the issue of motive. . . . [A]ll crimes have a motive, and this one, I believe, given the testimony from the witnesses, is related somehow to a neighborhood riff. And, if [Cooper] confines his descriptors to the [term] ‘neighborhoods,’ rather than the word ‘gang,’ I think it actually lessens any prejudicial impact . . . .’’
During his direct examination in the presence of the jury, Cooper reiterated his qualifications as a member of the Stamford Bureau of Criminal Investigations and the Major Crimes Unit, his training with POSTC, and that he is ‘‘currently . . . the certified gang instructor for the Stamford [Police Department].’’ When asked whether he had undergone any training specific to Stamford neighborhoods, Cooper responded that, in addition to his experience with narcotics, he ‘‘did go through the POSTC certified basic certification course. During
Cooper also learned ‘‘what neighborhoods align with other neighborhoods, what neighborhoods get along with other neighborhoods, and what neighborhoods don’t get along with each other.’’ He explained that ‘‘rep[ping]’’ a particular neighborhood means ‘‘[t]hat you’re aligned with that neighborhood, whether it’s crim[inal] activity or noncriminal activity.’’ Cooper testified that one faction of the ‘‘West Side’’ of Stamford is comprised of Spruce Street, Richmond Hill and Rose Park. Cooper explained that, at the time of the shooting, ‘‘the South End, like Pacific and Ludlow, didn’t get along with Southwood Square Housing Complex. Also, Spruce Street, Rose Park, [and] Richmond Hill, they refer to themselves as D-1 Boys, they were in an ongoing beef with Connecticut Avenue/Myano Lane, [and] they refer to themselves as GB Money Dollar Sign A . . . . That beef had been going on since 2014, had led to numerous shootings and shots fired incidents over the years.’’ He further testified that, if someone who associates with the West Side, either directly or through a friend, went to Connecticut Avenue, there would be a ‘‘[b]ig problem.’’ Finally, Cooper noted that, after the shooting at issue, the dynamics of the neighborhoods changed, ‘‘Connecticut Avenue/Myano Lane were no longer aligned with Southwood Square, and now Southwood Square is more aligned with Spruce Street.’’
During her closing argument, the prosecutor emрhasized that Cooper’s testimony established a motive—
A
We begin with the defendant’s constitutional claim that Cooper implicitly invoked racial stereotypes when he characterized the Black residents of certain Stamford neighborhoods as being engaged in firearms and drug trafficking, and associated violent crime simply because they lived in those neighborhoods. The defendant contends that the state secured a conviction ‘‘based on Cooper’s implicit invocation of racial stereotypes about Black neighborhoods being dangerous, criminal hotbeds, and the young Black males who live there being violent ‘super predators.’ ’’ The defendant contends that the admission of this testimony violated his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial free from racial bias. The state contends that Cooper did not inject racial bias into the trial because he ‘‘never testified before the jury about the demographics of the neighborhoods . . . .’’ As a result, the state contends, ‘‘the jury never heard that any [of the] neighborhoods had Black majorities.’’4 We agree with the state.
Despite the defendant’s contention to the contrary, Cooper never testified before the jury regarding the demographics of the neighborhoods at issue. Cooper testified about demographics only during voir dire, outside the presence of the jury. During that testimony, Cooper stated that the Connecticut Avenue area had a ‘‘large demographic of Haitians . . . [and] Spruce Street [had] . . . Hispanic and Black [residents], some Jamaicans, some Haitians, depending on the area.’’ That testimony was not repeated before the jury. The defen
We emphasize that prosecutors and trial judges must be ever mindful to guard against the possibility of ethnic stereotyping, deliberate or not, implicit in Cooper’s voir dire testimony relating to the city’s ‘‘demographics . . . .’’ Implicit bias is, by its nature, a pervasive problem that one must be mindful of or else succumb to its negative effects. See, e.g., J. Kang & K. Lane, ‘‘Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law,’’ 58 UCLA L. Rev. 465, 473 (2010) (‘‘Implicit biases—by which we mean implicit attitudes and stereotypes—are both pervasive (most individuals show evidence of some biases), and large in magnitude, statistically speaking. In other words, we are not, on average or generally, cognitively colorblind.’’). In this case, however, the jurors were instructed to recognize their own implicit biases and to remove them from their consideration of an accused person’s culpability. The trial court also instructed the jurors on techniques they could use to check whether any unconscious biases were influenc
B
Having concluded that the defendant’s claim regarding Cooper’s expert testimony is not constitutional in nature, we now turn to the question of whether the admission of his testimony was evidentiary error because, as the defendant contends, the evidence was not relevant, was unduly prejudicial, and constituted improper propensity evidence. We agree with the defendant but conclude that the error was harmless.
‘‘We review a trial court’s decision to preclude [or admit] expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. . . . We afford our trial courts wide discretion in determining whether to admit expert testimony and, unless the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, made on untenаble grounds . . . or involves a clear misconception of the law, we will not disturb its decision. . . . Even [i]f we determine that a court acted improperly with respect to the admissibility of expert testimony, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant a new trial only if the impropriety was harmful to the appealing party. . . .
‘‘The standards for admitting expert testimony are well established. Expert testimony should be admitted when: (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues. . . . [T]o render an expert opinion the witness must be qualified to do so and there must be a factual basis for the opinion. . . . [See] Conn. Code Evid. § 7-2 ([a] witness qualified as an
Here, it is evident that Cooper’s ‘‘neighborhood’’ testimony was used as a euphemistic term that enabled Cooper to testify about gang activity in neighborhoods within Stamford, something the prosecutor conceded the state had no evidence of regarding the defendant.5
If resort to this transparent euphemism were not enough to make plain the purpose of Cooper’s testimony, Cooper himself testified before the jury that he was the Stamford Police Department’s ‘‘certified gang instructor . . . .’’ When asked whether he had undergone any training specific to Stamford neighborhoods, Cooper responded that he ‘‘did go through the POSTC certified basic certification course. During that course, you had to build a curriculum based on both national gangs, and then, [of] course, I also teach our officers specifically Stamford neighborhood current and past beef[s] and alignments.’’ (Emphasis added.) Cooper did not actually identify any specific training he received regarding Stamford neighborhoods.6 Rather, his testimony focused on this training related to gangs. As a result, we have little trouble concluding that it would have been readily apparent to the jury that Cooper’s testimony regarding ‘‘Stamford neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between them’’ was really a reference to gang membership and activity, or at least the functional equivalent. The state cannot
It is true, as the trial court noted, that this court has concluded that testimony regarding gang affiliation is admissible when certain evidentiary requirements are satisfied. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 351 Conn. 324, 333, 330 A.3d 118 (2025); State v. Bermudez, 341 Conn. 233, 250–52, 267 A.3d 44 (2021); State v. Wilson, 308 Conn. 412, 430–31, 64 A.3d 91 (2013); see also, e.g., State v. Crocker, 83 Conn. App. 615, 640, 852 A.2d 762, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 910, 859 A.2d 571 (2004). One such instance is when gang affiliation is relevant to motive. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, supra, 430 (properly admitting gang evidence to establish motive for killing). But we also recently cautioned courts to ‘‘сarefully evaluate [the] probative value [of gang affiliation evidence] to ensure that it is sufficiently significant to overcome the potential for unfair prejudice.’’ State v. Jones, supra, 333. We have also explained that ‘‘courts must exercise caution whenever the state seeks to admit evidence of a defendant’s affiliation with a gang’’ because gangs and gang activity invoke images of criminal behavior. State v. Bermudez, supra, 250.
In the present case, the prosecutor conceded that the state ‘‘ha[d] no information to indicate’’ that the
To the extent there was any probative value as to motive given the defendant’s connection to Connecticut Avenue, it was plainly ‘‘outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3. ‘‘There is no question that evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation is potentially prejudicial and inflammatory, as it poses the risk that the jury will associate gang membership with a propensity for committing crimes and find the defendant guilty by association.’’ United States v. Ozuna, 674 F.3d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 2012); see also, e.g., United States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 2005) (‘‘[although] [e]vidence of gang membership is admissible if relevant to a disputed issue . . . gang
The concurrence agrees that the ‘‘evidence relating to neighborhood beefs is akin to local gang disputes and should be considered as such for admissibility purposes . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) And, although the concurrence does not dispute the fact that the prosecutor readily conceded that the defendant was not a member of a gang, it nevertheless takes the incongruous position that ‘‘there was a sufficient factual basis on which the [trial] court could have reasonably con-
Second, we disagree with the concurrence that there was a sufficient factual basis for Cooper‘s testimony given the limited evidence regarding the defendant‘s alleged involvement with Connecticut Avenue. The only evidence that connected the defendant to Connecticut Avenue was the testimony from Gill and Robinson‘s sister that “Connecticut Avenue [was] where, you know, where [the defendant is] from, I guess.” But, as Cooper conceded, one does not need to physically live in a
Third, even if there was a sufficient factual basis for Cooper‘s testimony, contrary to the concurrence‘s assertion, Cooper‘s testimony was not the proper subject of expert testimony simply because it related to motive. It is true that the past interaction between the defendant and Gill was relevant to establish a possible motive. But that is factual evidence that is, and was, properly developed through fact witnesses, not expert witnesses. For example, Gill testified that the defendant
There is no dispute that Cooper did not have any training specific to Stamford neighborhoods. He was a certified gang expert. Because the prosecutor conceded that the defendant was not a member of a gang, the only
Having concluded that the trial court abused its discretion, we must now determine whether that error was harmful. See, e.g., State v. Bouknight, 323 Conn. 620, 626–27, 149 A.3d 975 (2016) (“a nonconstitutional error is harmless when an appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Cooper‘s testimony helped to more clearly frame a possible motive. But Cooper‘s testimony was not the only evidence regarding a possible motive. DiCarlo also testified regarding
Moreover, although helpful to establish a possible motive, Cooper‘s testimony was not particularly important to establishing the elements of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, and the state‘s case was otherwise relatively strong. The defendant‘s identity was readily established through eyewitness testimony, surveillance video that placed the defendant at the scene of the shooting, and the fact that he was tracked by a police canine to a nearby residential lot, where he was found hiding behind a fence, lying on the ground between two trees in the house‘s backyard, with Davis and Jean-Baptiste. A video extracted from Davis’ cell phone, taken approximately two and one-hаlf hours before the shooting, depicts the defendant holding a gun, which Gill testified was the same gun used in the shooting. In the video, the defendant can be seen wearing distinctive jeans with holes and bleached areas in the front. Surveillance footage recorded the defendant wearing the same jeans minutes before the shooting. Robinson‘s sister also recalled the defendant wearing a “bomber jacket” while he crossed through the supermarket parking lot following the shooting. Later that night, near where the police had located the defendant hiding, the police discovered a discarded green bomber jacket.
Moreover, as explained, the state relied on Cooper‘s testimony largely to establish motive. But motive is not an element of the charged offense, and the state was able to establish the defendant‘s intent from the evidence that the defendant shot at Gill and Robinson in close proximity. “Ordinarily, intent can . . . be inferred [only] by circumstantial evidence; it may be and usually is inferred from the defendant‘s conduct. . . . Intent to cause death may be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the
Finally, we note that the trial court instructed the jury on the limited use of Cooper‘s testimony. Cf. State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567, 590, 10 A.3d 1005 (“we find significant in mitigating any possible prejudice the limiting instructions . . . given by the trial court both during the testimony of relevant witnesses and during the final jury charge, which we presume the jury to have followed in the absence of any indication to the contrary” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908, 132 S. Ct. 314, 181 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2011). Specifically, the court explained, “expert testimony is permitted to assist you in your deliberations. No such testimony is binding [on] you and . . . you may disregard this testimony either in whole or in
II
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A
The defendant next claims that the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the jury on third-party culpability. We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our analysis. Prior to the start of trial, the defendant filed a notice of intent to argue third-party culpability. He argued that Gill may have been the shooter because (1) Gill had a revenge motive to shoot the defendant based on the alleged prior assault and robbery, and (2) Gill‘s flight from the scene reflected consciousness of guilt and gave him an opportunity to hide the gun. The defense‘s request to charge urged the trial court to instruct the jury on third-party culpability. Based on Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 2.6-10, the defense asked the court to instruct the jury, among other things, that “[i]t is up to you, and you alone, to determine whether any of this evidence, if believed, tends to directly connect a third party to the crime[s] with which the defendant is charged. If, after a full and fair consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you have left in your minds a reasonable doubt indicating that the alleged third
“In determining whether the trial court improperly [declined] a request to charge, [w]e . . . review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to supporting the . . . proposed charge. . . . A request to charge [that] is relevant to the issues of [a] case and [that] is an accurate statement of the law must be given. . . . If, however, the evidence would not reasonably support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court has a duty not to submit it to the jury. . . . Thus, a trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with a party‘s request to charge [only] if the proposed instructions are reasonably supported by the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Schovanec, 326 Conn. 310, 318–19, 163 A.3d 581 (2017).
We have previously stated that “the very standards governing the admissibility of [third-party] culpability evidence also should serve as the standards governing a trial court‘s decision of whether to submit a requested [third-party] culpability charge to the jury.” State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 608–609, 935 A.2d 975 (2007). As to the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence, a defendant must “present evidence that directly connects a third party to the crime. . . . It is not enough
“We note that, although Arroyo did not expressly state a particular standard of review for claims of instructional error related to third-party culpability, this court has previously reviewed such claims under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Ashby, 336 Conn. 452, 498, 247 A.3d 521 (2020).
Here, the defendant argues that the evidence established a ” ‘direct connection’ ” between Gill and the shooting because it established Gill‘s motive to seek revenge for the earlier assault and an opportunity because he was there. We disagree that there was sufficient evidence to raise more than a bare suspicion that Gill was the shooter. As to the defendant‘s contention that Gill had a motive to shoot the defendant because of the earlier assault and robbery, we have said that “[i]t is not enough to show that another [individual] had [a] motive to commit the crime . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 634–35, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010); accord State v. Arroyo, supra, 284 Conn. 609. Similarly, the defendant‘s argument that Gill was present at the scene of the shooting is also unavailing. Unlike the evidence introduced against the defendant, there is no evidence that Gill possessed a handgun. The defendant‘s argument boils down to, “he was there . . . .” But a third party‘s mere presence
B
The defendant also claims that the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the jury on the adequacy of the police investigation. The defense asked the court to provide the instruction in both its request to charge and during the charge conference. Pursuant to Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 2.6-13, the defense requested, among other things, that the court instruct the jurors that, “[i]f you find that any omissions in the investigation were significant and not reasonably explained, you may consider whether the omissions tend to affect the quality, reliability, or credibility of the evidence presented by the state . . . .” As evidence of investigative inadequacy, the defense relied on the lack of gunshot residue testing of Gill‘s hands and clothing and the failure by the police to record Gill‘s initial statement to them. The court declined to instruct the jury, reasoning that it did not “see enough inadequacies to warrant a charge on the police investigation.” The court noted, however, that defense counsel was “free to argue what [the defense] believe[d] werе certain aspects of the case that might create a reasonable doubt as to what the police did or didn‘t do.”
On appeal, the defendant contends that the instruction was warranted given the investigator‘s failure to
We begin with the relevant legal principles. We have explained that, “[i]n the abstract, whether the [state] conducted a thorough, professional investigation is not relevant to what the jury must decide: Did the defendant commit the alleged offense? Juries are not instructed to [find] the defendant [not guilty] if the [state‘s] investigation was superficial. Conducting a thorough, professional investigation is not an element of the [state‘s] case. . . . A defendant may, however, rely [on] relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Collins, supra, 299 Conn. 599–600. Our case law “does not require a court to instruct the jury on the quality of police investigation, but merely holds that a court may not preclude such evidence and argument from being presented to the jury for its consideration.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gomes, 337 Conn. 826, 835 n.7, 256 A.3d 131 (2021). We review a trial court‘s decision not to instruct on investigаtive inadequacy for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Ashby, supra, 336 Conn. 497–98.
In Collins, this court rejected the defendant‘s challenge to the trial court‘s jury instruction, which provided “that the ultimate issue before you is not the thoroughness of the investigation or the competence of the police. The ultimate issue you have to . . . determine is whether the state in the light of all the evidence before you has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty on one or more of the counts
Here, the trial court declined to instruct the jury on the adequacy of the police investigation. But the court expressly permitted defense counsel to argue to the jury the weaknesses in the investigation. As in Collins, the trial court never instructed the jury that it could not consider the adequacy of the police investigation. The defendant “was not deprived [of] the right to a fair trial because he was given the opportunity to present evidence and [to] cross-examine the state‘s witnesses regarding the adequacy of the police investigation.” State v. West, 167 Conn. App. 406, 415, 142 A.3d 1250 (2016). The defendant does not contend otherwise for good reason. Among other things, defense counsel extensively cross-examined DiCarlo regarding his failure to obtain any potential evidence from Gill and other investigative inadequacies.
Moreover, the relevant evidence in the present case was not sufficiently compelling that it mandated the trial court to provide the instruction. As we have explained, a defendant “does not have an unfettered right to elicit evidence regarding the adequacy of the police investigation,” and a defendant “must do more than simply seek to establish that the police could have done more.” State v. Wright, 322 Conn. 270, 284, 140 A.3d 939 (2016). Defense counsel was free to argue—and did in fact argue—that there were deficiencies in the investigation that raised the “specter of reasonable doubt . . . .” State v. Collins, supra, 299 Conn. 600. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury was not misled, and
III
INCONSISTENT VERDICT
We next turn to the defendant‘s claim that the jury returned an inconsistent verdict when it found the defendant guilty of manslaughter with a firearm despite finding him not guilty of criminal possession of a firearm. The defendant correctly notes that the parties drafted a stipulation for purposes of the charge of criminal possession of a firearm, stating that the defendant previously had been convicted of a serious juvenile offense. This stipulation was admitted as an exhibit. The defendant contends that, as a result of the stipulation, the only element remaining with respect to the charge of criminal possession of a firearm was whether the defendant pоssessed a firearm. It is the inconsistency between the finding of not guilty of criminal possession of a firearm and the finding of guilty of manslaughter with a firearm that the defendant now challenges on appeal. The defendant recognizes our holding in State v. Arroyo, 292 Conn. 558, 561, 973 A.2d 1254 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 911, 130 S. Ct. 1296, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1086 (2010), that “claims of legally inconsistent verdicts are not reviewable.” The defendant, however, asks us to exercise our inherent supervisory authority to review his claim and to modify our holding in Arroyo in cases in which “a binding stipulation resolves all but one element of a count in the information,” “[t]hat element also appears in another count of the information (a dependent offense),” and “[a]n acquittal of the single element predicate offense . . . [n]egate[s] the common element for purposes of the dependent offense . . . .” We decline to do so.
In Arroyo, we joined a majority of jurisdictions holding that “claims of legal inconsistency between a convic
We recently had occasion to consider a challenge to our holding in State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 558. In State v. Henderson, 348 Conn. 648, 309 A.3d 1208 (2024), we concluded that “the defendant [had not] advanced the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic
that would compel us to overrule or modify Arroyo.”
IV
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Finally, we turn to the defendant‘s contention that the state failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm.
“The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether [on] the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multi
“Finally, [a]s we have oftеn noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury‘s] verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 345 Conn. 354, 369–70, 285 A.3d 367 (2022).
The defendant was convicted of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of
At bottom, the defendant contends that the fact that the jury found him not guilty of criminal possession of a firearm necessitates a conclusion that the jury also determined that there was insufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, given the common firearm element. This contention, however, is nothing more than a variation of the defendant‘s claim regarding State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 558. See part III of this opinion. We need not address it further, other than to reiterate that “[i]t has long been recognized that criminal juries in the United States are free to [return] not guilty verdicts resulting from compromise, confusion, mistake, leniency or other legally and logically irrelevant factors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 257 Conn. 587, 603, 778 A.2d 875 (2001). Moreover, as to Gill‘s credibility, it is well established that, “[w]hen reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we dо not attempt to weigh the credibility of the evidence offered at trial, nor do we purport to substitute our judgment for that of the jury.” (Internal
The defendant also contends that his flight from the scene of the shooting did not suggest consciousness of guilt because he is a “young Black male who understandably feared interactions with the police.” Even if we were to agree with the defendant that, in certain circumstances, flight might not be probative of guilt because a Black teenager‘s avoidance of the police may be due to the belief that interacting with them may be dangerous, this is an inference contrary to the defendant‘s guilt. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, “we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, supra, 345 Conn. 369. “Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to determining whether the inferences drawn by the jury are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan, 274 Conn. 790, 801, 877 A.2d 739 (2005). “[T]he [jury] is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant‘s innocence. . . . The rule is that the jury‘s function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, 303 Conn. 760, 767–68, 36 A.3d 670 (2012). We cannot conclude that an inferеnce that the evidence of the defendant‘s flight constituted consciousness of guilt is “so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan, supra, 801. The state presented evidence that the defendant, Davis, and Jean-
Finally, the defendant contends that the remaining evidence was not sufficient to prove his guilt.12 Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have reasonably found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. In addition to the consciousness of guilt evidence, surveillance video placed the defendant, Davis, and Jean-Baptiste at the scene of the shooting. Gill testified that, one month prior to the shooting, the defendant had assaulted and robbed Gill. Gill further testified that he saw the defendant pull a silver gun from the waistband of his pаnts moments before Robinson was shot. Gill also identified a gun the defendant is seen holding in a video extracted from Davis’ cell phone as being the same gun the defendant possessed during the shooting. Metadata established that the video was created approxi-
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion D‘AURIA and ECKER, Js., concurred, and MULLINS, C. J., and ALEXANDER and DANNEHY, Js., concurred in part and in the judgment.