STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SIRUS DIXON
(SC 20784)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued February 6—officially released September 16, 2025
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D‘Auria, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
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Syllabus
Convicted of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, the defendant appeаled to this court. The defendant‘s conviction stemmed from an incident in which he and two friends encountered the victim and his friend, G, whom the defendant had previously assaulted. G witnessed the defendant pull a gun from his waistband, and, as G and the victim fled, a shot was fired, which ultimately struck and killed the victim. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly allowed C, one of the state‘s witnesses, to testify as an expert about neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between neighborhoods in Stamford, the city in which the victim‘s killing occurred. Held:
The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his right to due process was violated insofar as C implicitly invoked racial stereotypes when he characterized the Black residents in certain Stamford neighborhoods as being engaged in firearms and drug trafficking, and in violent criminal activity, as C never testified before the jury regarding the demographics of the various Stamford neighborhoods, or regarding race in general, and, even though C did testify about firearms and drug trafficking in Stamford, he did not connect those activities to specific neighborhoods or the Black residents in those neighborhoods.
The trial court abused its discretion when it permitted C to offer expert testimony about various Stamford neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between them.
C‘s “neighborhood” testimony amounted to testimony about gang activity in various Stamford neighborhoods, and, because the state conceded that there was no evidence that the defendant was a member of a gang, such testimony had limited probative value, and any probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Moreover, C‘s testimony was not the proper subject of expert testimony simply because it may have been related to the defendant‘s motive, as the state was able to present evidence through fact witnesses to establish a possible motive for the shooting, and there was no indication that C had any peculiar knowledge or experience that would have aided the jury in determining motive.
Nevertheless, the court‘s error in admitting C‘s testimony was harmless because that testimony was not the only evidence admitted that established a possible motive for the shooting, the testimony was not particularly relevant to establishing the elements of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, the state‘s case was otherwise relatively strong, and the court instructed the jury on the limited use of C‘s testimony.
The trial court correctly determined that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the third-party culpability jury instruction that the defense requested because, contrary to the defendant‘s claim, there was not enough evidence to raise more than a bare suspicion that G, rather than the defendant, was the shooter.
The defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the adequacy of the police investigation into the victim‘s killing, as the evidence was not sufficiently compelling to mandate such an instruction, and defense counsel was afforded the opportunity to present evidence, to cross-examine the witnesses, and to argue to thе jury about any deficiencies in the investigation.
In connection with the defendant‘s claim that the jury‘s finding of not guilty with respect to the charge of criminal possession of a firearm was inconsistent with its finding of guilty with respect to the charge of first degree manslaughter with a firearm, this court declined the defendant‘s request to modify its holding in State v. Arroyo (292 Conn. 558) to permit review of legally inconsistent verdicts, as this court continued to find the analysis in Arroyo persuasive, especially in light of its recent adherence to Arroyo in State v. Henderson (348 Conn. 648).
There was no merit to the defendant‘s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree manslaughter with a firearm, as the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant‘s flight, in combination with other evidence, established consciousness of guilt, which, in turn, established the defendant‘s identity as the shooter, surveillance video footage placed the defendant at the scene of the shooting, G testified that the defendant had previously assaulted and robbed him, and G also testified that he saw the defendant with a gun moments before the victim was shot and that the gun was the same one the defendant was seen holding in a video that was created a few hours before the shooting.
(Three justices concurring separately in one opinion)
Argued February 6—officially released September 16, 2025
Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the jury before Blawie, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Denis J. O‘Malley III, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul Ferencek, state‘s attorney, Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state‘s attorney, and Margaret Moscati and Elizabeth K. Moran, assistant state‘s attorneys, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
McDONALD, J. The most significant issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court properly allowed the state‘s gang expert to testify as to “neighborhoods,” “neighborhood divisions,” and the “dynamics” between neighborhoods in the city of Stamford, despite the fact that the prosecutor conceded that the defendant, Sirus Dixon, was not in a gang. The defendant also raises various other claims, including that the court failed to provide certain proposed jury instructions, the jury returned an inconsistent verdict, and there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Although we agree with the defendant that the admission of the testimony from the state‘s gang expert witness was improper, we conclude that this error was harmless. We also reject the defendant‘s other claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
One night in May, 2018, the victim, Antonio Robinson, who was eighteen years old at the time, and his friend, Tyrik Gill, were walking from Connecticut Avenue in Stamford to a home in the “Southfield Village” housing complex.1 While under an Interstate 95 overpass on West Avenue, they encountered the fifteen year old defendant and his friends, seventeen year old Karl Davis and eighteen year old Jimmy Jean-Baptiste. Gill knew the defendant because the defendant, Davis, and another individual had previously attacked Gill as he walked home. When the teenagers encountered
After walking a few feet past each other, Gill turned and saw the defendant pull a silver gun from his waistband. After seeing the gun, Gill tried to grab Robinson and run. As they ran, Gill heard a gunshot. Gill then saw Robinson fall, stand back up, and keep running. Once they crossed the street, Gill saw that Robinson was bleeding. Robinson then collapsed on the side of the road, and Gill asked a passerby to call 911, before running away. Gill returned to the scene before the police arrived and found Robinson lying by the curb. By the time the police arrived, Robinson was unresponsive, and he died shortly thereafter.
Meanwhile, the defendant, Davis, and Jean-Baptiste had also run from the scene of the shooting. Several surveillance cameras tracked their movements. The surveillance footage showed the three teenagers quickly crossing a supermarket parking lot. Additionally, Stamford Police Officer Vito Sileo testified that he observed three teenagers enter that lot from the same direction from which he had heard a gunshot. Sileo advised dispatch about the individuals and followed them, noting that they went behind stores next to the supermarket and proceeded toward Whitmore Avenue. Stamford Police Officer Logan Pavia and his canine partner were
dispatched to the area. They tracked the defendant, Davis, and Jean-Baptiste to a residential backyard on Havemayer Lane.
The police tested the defendant‘s hands and clothes for gunshot residue particles. Analysis found lead—one of three elements that comprise gunshot residue—on the defendant‘s hands and jacket. Despite an exhaustive search that followed the path the three teenagers took from the scene of the shooting to where the defendant was arrested, the police did not recover a gun.
Over the course of several months following the shooting, the police conducted a series of interviews with Gill. The police first interviewed Gill the day after the shooting but failed to record the audio of the interview. According to Christian DiCarlo, who, at the time of the interview, was a sergeant with the Stamford Police Department, Gill said that he “never saw who shot . . . Robinson” and did not know the males beneath the overpass. After the police showed him surveillance footage of the incident, however, Gill identified the defendant, Davis, and Jean-Baptiste. That same day, Gill returned for a second interview with the police, this time with audio recording enabled. Gill told the police, among other things, that he saw what looked like a chrome gun in the defendant‘s waistband. After a detective pulled out and showed his service weapon, which was a semiautomatic pistol, Gill said that the gun he saw in the defendant‘s waistband was also a semiautomatic. When asked whether he had ever been assaulted or robbed by the defendant prior to the incident, Gill stated that he had not.
Approximately two weeks after the shooting, Gill returned for another interview with the police and was represented by counsel. During this interview, Gill disclosed that, following the shooting, he ran to Southfield Village and back to the scene before the police arrived on the night of the incident. Gill and his attorney returned for a fourth and final interview several months later. During that interview, the police showed Gill an image of the defendant holding a revolver that the police had retrieved from Davis’ cell phone. Despite his previous assertions that the gun in the defendant‘s waistband was a semiautomatic, after seeing the photograph, Gill told the police it was actually a revolver. Gill
Thereafter, the state charged the defendant with murder in violation of
On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court violated his federal due process right to a fair trial and abused its discretion when it admitted a gang expert witness’ testimony on “neighborhood” rivalries, (2) the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the jury on third-party culpаbility and investigative inadequacy, (3) the jury returned an inconsistent verdict when it found the defendant guilty of manslaughter with a firearm despite finding him not guilty of criminal possession of a firearm, and (4) the state failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant shot Robinson.2 We address each claim in turn.
I
EXPERT TESTIMONY
We first address the defendant‘s claims related to the admission of the testimony of the state‘s gang expert witness on “neighborhoods,” “neighborhood divisions,” and the “dynamics” between them. The defendant contends that the admission of this testimony violated his right to due process and constituted evidentiary error.
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our analysis. Prior to the start of trial, the prosecutor informed the trial court that the state was not going to allege that the defendant was a member of a gang because it “ha[d] no information to indicate he was . . . .” During trial, however, the last witness the state called was Sergeant Bryan Cooper, the Stamford Police Department‘s “certified gang instructor,” to testify as an expert witness. The foundation for Cooper‘s testimony was Gill‘s written statement to the police that mentioned a “beef between Connecticut Avenue [and] the West Side,” and the testimony of Robinson‘s sister that the defendant was from Connecticut Avenue, which the prosecutor argued meant that the defendant “repp[ed]” that neighborhood.3 For his part,
Gill testified that
Cooper was called as an expert to testify not on gangs per se, but on “Stamford neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between them.” The prosecutor claimed that this testimony would be relevant to the prosecutor‘s theory that Robinson‘s shooting was motivated by “the Connecticut Avenue versus West Side Village dynamic.” Specifically, the prosecutor‘s theory was that Gill had been the intended target, but the shot missed and killed Robinson. The prosecutor explained that “[the defendant] was a part of one neighborhood and . . . Gill was a part of another . . . .” Defense counsel objected to Cooper‘s testimony on the grounds that it was not relevant, overly prejudicial, and not a proper subject of expert testimony. Defense counsel noted that simply omitting the word “gang” does not change the prejudicial character of the testimony because the jury would understand the reference to “neighborhoods” to mean that Cooper was testifying about gangs.
The trial court overruled defense counsel‘s objection. It explained that, “even if we were using the ‘gang’ word, which we‘re not, which I think lessens its prejudicial impact, the courts have allowed this type of evidence.” The court reasoned that Cooper‘s testimony was not to demonstrate the defendant‘s criminal propensity or bad character but was “highly probative of possible motive to kill . . . Gill.”
During voir dire, outside the presence of the jury, Cooper explained that he had worked for the Stamford Police Department for ten years and was assigned to the Bureau of Criminal Investigations and Major Crimes Unit. When asked whether he had ever received any training, Cоoper stated that he had attended training sessions that were conducted by the Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association, part of which “was gang training.” Cooper also noted that he was “currently . . . the certified gang instructor for the Stamford [Police Department].” He explained that, “[as] [p]art of [the Police Officer Standards and Training Council (POSTC)] curriculum, we talk about the national gangs across the country, so I teach that to officers. And then I also specifically focus on the local neighborhood associations in Stamford and any gang association that‘s with it.” As to the neighborhood associations, Cooper explained that, “[d]epending on where you currently live, where you grew up or who you associate with, you might align with a certain neighborhood association . . . .” He also stated that the Connecticut Avenue area had a “large demographic of Haitians . . . [and] Spruce Street [had] . . . Hispanic and Black [residents], some Jamaicans, some Haitians, depending on the area.”
At the conclusion of Cooper‘s voir dire, defense counsel again objected to Cooper‘s testimony. The trial court again overruled the objection. It explained, “[t]he case law is quite clear that evidence of gang affiliation is admissible and relevant and probative on the issue of motive. . . . [A]ll crimes have a motive, and this one, I believe, given the testimony from the witnesses, is related somehow to a neighborhood riff. And, if [Cooper] confines his descriptors to the [term] ‘neighborhoods,’ rather than the word ‘gang,’ I think it actually lessens any prejudicial impact . . . .”
During his direct examination in the presence of the jury, Cooper reiterated his qualifications as a member of the Stamford Bureau of Criminal Investigations and the Major Crimes Unit, his training with POSTC, and that he is “currently . . . the certified gang instructor for the Stamford [Police Department].” When asked whether he had undergone any training specific to Stamford neighborhoods, Cooper responded
Cooper also learned “what neighborhoods align with other neighborhoods, what neighborhoods get along with other neighborhoods, and what neighborhoods don‘t get along with each other.” He explained that “rep[ping]” a particular neighborhood means “[t]hat you‘re aligned with that neighborhood, whether it‘s crim[inal] activity or noncriminal activity.” Cooper testified that one faction of the “West Side” of Stamford is comprised of Spruce Street, Richmond Hill and Rose Park. Cooper explained that, at the time of the shooting, “the South End, like Pacific and Ludlow, didn‘t get аlong with Southwood Square Housing Complex. Also, Spruce Street, Rose Park, [and] Richmond Hill, they refer to themselves as D-1 Boys, they were in an ongoing beef with Connecticut Avenue/Myano Lane, [and] they refer to themselves as GB Money Dollar Sign A . . . . That beef had been going on since 2014, had led to numerous shootings and shots fired incidents over the years.” He further testified that, if someone who associates with the West Side, either directly or through a friend, went to Connecticut Avenue, there would be a “[b]ig problem.” Finally, Cooper noted that, after the shooting at issue, the dynamics of the neighborhoods changed, “Connecticut Avenue/Myano Lane were no longer aligned with Southwood Square, and now Southwood Square is more aligned with Spruce Street.”
During her closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that Cooper‘s testimony established a motive—which was “loyalty, territories, a neighborhood beef. . . . And the evidence is there for [the jurors], that this was over a neighborhood beef. The defendant repped Conn[ecticut] Ave[nue]. Those were his friends. Those were where his loyalties lie. [Robinson and Gill] did not. That was enough, [that] was all it took for there to be bad blood between the two of them. And . . . Cooper [stated that the night of the shooting] changed the dynamics of that neighborhood.”
A
We begin with the defendant‘s constitutional claim that Cooper implicitly invoked racial stereotypes when he characterized the Black residents in certain Stamford neighborhoods as being engaged in firearms and drug trafficking, and associated violent crime simply because they lived in those neighborhoods. The defendant contends that the state secured a conviction “based on Cooper‘s implicit invocation of racial stereotypes about Black neighborhoods being dangerous, criminal hotbeds, and the young Black males who live there being violent ‘super predators.’ ” The defendant contends that the admission of this testimony violated his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial free from racial bias. The state contends that Cooper did not inject racial bias into the trial because he “never testified before the jury about the demographics of the neighborhoods . . . .” As a result, the state contends, “the jury never heard that any [of
This court has recognized that an evidentiary error may be constitutional in nature if “there is a resultant denial of fundamental fairness or the denial of a specific constitutional right . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Toccaline, 258 Conn. 542, 550, 783 A.2d 450 (2001); see also, e.g., State v. Crespo, 303 Conn. 589, 609 n.15, 35 A.3d 243 (2012). “This is consistent with federal jurisprudence, which recognizes that an evidentiary error may be of constitutional magnitude if the error was so pervasive as to have denied [the defendant] a fundamentally fair trial . . . . [T]he standard . . . [is] whether the erroneously admitted evidence, viewed objectively in light of the entire record before the jury, was sufficiently material to provide the basis for conviction or to remove a reasonable doubt that would have existed on the record without it. In short, it must have been crucial, critical, [and] highly significant . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Turner, 334 Conn. 660, 674, 224 A.3d 129 (2020). However, “[r]obing garden variety clаims [of an evidentiary nature] in the majestic garb of constitutional claims does not make such claims constitutional in nature . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Elmer G., 333 Conn. 176, 201, 214 A.3d 852 (2019).
Despite the defendant‘s contention to the contrary, Cooper never testified before the jury regarding the demographics of the neighborhoods at issue. Cooper testified about demographics only during voir dire, outside the presence of the jury. During that testimony, Cooper stated that the Connecticut Avenue area had a “large demographic of Haitians . . . [and] Spruce Street [had] . . . Hispanic and Black [residents], some Jamaicans, some Haitians, depending on the area.” That testimony was not repeated before the jury. The defen-dant has not identified, and our review of the record has not uncovered, any instance in which Cooper discussed the demographics of the neighborhoods, or race in general, in the presence of the jury. Moreover, although the defendant characterizes Cooper‘s testimony as calling on racial stereotypes regarding young Black males being violent ” ‘super predators,’ ” there is nothing in the record to support such a characterization. Indeed, the defendant does not explain how Cooper‘s testimony before the jury even implied that the neighborhoods had Black majorities. It is true that Cooper generally testified that he had learned of large-scale firearms and drug trafficking “within the city.” But Cooper never explicitly connected that conduct to specific neighborhoods or to the Black residents of those neighborhoods. Viewed in context, we cannot conclude that any of Cooper‘s testimony supports the defendant‘s claim that Cooper injected racial stereotypes into the trial.
We emphasize that prosecutors and trial judges must be ever mindful to guard
B
Having concluded that the defendant‘s claim regarding Cooper‘s expert testimony is not constitutional in nature, we now turn to the question of whether the admission of his testimony was evidentiary error because, as the defendant contends, the evidence was not relevant, was unduly prejudicial, and constituted improper propensity evidence. We agree with the defendant but conclude that the error was harmless.
“We review a trial court‘s decision to preclude [or admit] expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. . . . We afford our trial courts wide discretion in determining whether to admit expert testimony and, unless the trial court‘s decision is unreasonable, made on untenable grounds . . . or involves a clear misconception of the law, we will not disturb its decision. . . . Even [i]f we determine that a court acted improperly with respect to the admissibility of expert testimony, we will reverse the trial court‘s judgment and grant a new trial only if the impropriety was harmful to the appealing party. . . .
“The standards for admitting expert testimony are well established. Expert testimony should be admitted when: (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues. . . . [T]o render an expert opinion the witness must be qualified to do so and there must be a factual basis for the opinion. . . . [See]
Here, it is evident that Cooper‘s “neighborhood” testimony was used as a euphemistic term that enabled Cooper to testify about gang activity in neighborhoods within Stamford, something the prosecutor conceded the state had no evidence of regarding the defendant.5
We agree with the defendant that, contrary to Cooper‘s testimony, a “neighborhood” does not engage in “crim[inal] activity,” or “[l]arge-scale drug” and “firearm[s] trafficking” or “homicides, shootings, serious assaults and robberies.” Moreover, neighborhoods do not refer to themselves with names like “D-1 Boys” or “GB Money Dollar Sign A.” Neighborhoods do not “align” with other neighborhoods to conduct criminal activity, and they do not have “beef[s]” with other neighborhoods that “[lead] to numerous shootings and shots fired incidents . . . .” Neighborhoods, rather, are where people live. If resort to this transparent euphemism were not enough to make plain the purpose of Cooper‘s testimony, Cooper himself testified before the jury that he was the Stamford Police Department‘s “certified gang instructor . . . .” When asked whether he had undergone any training specific to Stamford neighborhoods, Cooper responded that he “did go through the POSTC certified basic certification course. During that course, you had to build a curriculum based on both national gangs, and then, [of] course, I also teach our officers specifically Stamford neighborhood current and past beef[s] and alignments.” (Emphasis added.) Cooper did not actually identify any specific training he received regarding Stamford neighborhoods.6 Rather, his testimony focused on this training related to gangs. As a result, we have little trouble concluding that it would have been readily apparent to the jury that Cooper‘s testimony regarding “Stamford neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between them” was really a reference to gang membership and activity, or at least the functional equivalent. The state сannot
acknowledge that a defendant is not a member of a gang and simultaneously present expert testimony about gangs dressed up in the rubric of neighborhood associations. Put simply, substituting the word “neighborhood” for the word “gang” does not render the inadmissible evidence
It is true, as the trial court noted, that this court has concluded that testimony regarding gang affiliation is admissible when certain evidentiary requirements are satisfied. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 351 Conn. 324, 333, 330 A.3d 118 (2025); State v. Bermudez, 341 Conn. 233, 250-52, 267 A.3d 44 (2021); State v. Wilson, 308 Conn. 412, 430-31, 64 A.3d 91 (2013); see also, e.g., State v. Crocker, 83 Conn. App. 615, 640, 852 A.2d 762, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 910, 859 A.2d 571 (2004). One such instance is when gang affiliation is relevant to motive. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, supra, 430 (properly admitting gang evidence to establish motive for killing). But we also recently cautioned courts to “carefully evaluate [the] probative value [of gang affiliation evidence] to ensure that it is sufficiently significant to overcome the potential for unfair prejudice.” State v. Jones, supra, 333. We have also explained that “courts must exercise caution whenever the state seeks to admit evidence of a defendant‘s affiliation with a gang” because gangs and gang activity invoke images of criminal behavior. State v. Bermudez, supra, 250.
In the present case, the prosecutor conceded that the state “ha[d] no information to indicate” that the
defendant was a member of a gang. For this reason, Cooper‘s testimony as an expert had limited probative value and was largely irrelevant. See
To the extent there was any probative value as to motive given the defendant‘s connection to Connecticut Avenue, it was plainly “outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”
The concurrence agrees that the “evidence relating to neighborhood beefs is akin to local gang disputes and should be considered as such for admissibility purposes . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) And, although the concurrence does not dispute the fact that the prosecutor readily conceded that the defendant was not a member of a gang, it nevertheless takes the incongruous position that “there was a sufficient factual basis on which the [trial] court could have reasonably con-
State v. Dixon
cluded that the portion of Cooper‘s testimony relating to Stamford neighborhoods and neighborhood beefs was a proper subject for expert testimony.”8 The concurrence reasons that testimony from Gill, DiCarlo, and Robinson‘s sister established the factual foundation for Cooper‘s expert testimony. It appears to reason that, on one hand, “neighborhood” experts are just gang experts by another name, but, on the other hand, it does not matter that the prosecutor conceded that the defendant was not in a gang because the evidence of the “neighborhood beefs” is relevant to motive and was, therefore, the proper subject of expert opinion. We disagree. First, we note that the argument advanced by the concurrence was never one that was advanced by the parties in this appeal; the state does not contend, even in the alternative, that only certain portions of Cooper‘s testimony were admissible. It does not contend that the trial court‘s ruling could be spliced into different components when determining the admissibility of Cooper‘s testimony. In fact, unlike the concurrence, the state disputes
Second, we disagree with the concurrence that there was a sufficient factual basis for Cooper‘s testimony given the limited evidence regarding the defendant‘s alleged involvement with Connecticut Avenue. The only evidence that connected the defendant to Connecticut Avenue was the testimony from Gill and Robinson‘s sister that “Connecticut Avenue [was] where, you know, where [the defendant is] from, I guess.” But, as Cooper conceded, one does not need to physically live in a particular neighborhood to “rep” the neighborhood and one can physically live in a neighborhood without “rep[ping]” it. In his written police statement, Gill stated that, “[i]n the past, there has been beef between the [W]est [S]ide and Conn[ecticut] Avenue.” Gill‘s statement, however, did not indicate that the defendant “repped” Connecticut Avenue. It is true that Robinson‘s sister testified that, although she did not know where the defendant was living at the time of the shooting, that night she referred to the three teenagers running through the parking lot as the “Conn. Ave. boys,” which she testified meant that they “rep[ped]” the neighborhood. But she did not testify as to what she meant by “rep[ping]” a neighborhood. Cooper explained that “rep[ping]” a particular neighborhood means “[t]hat you‘re aligned with that neighborhood, whether it‘s crim[inal] activity or noncriminal activity.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, even if Robinson‘s sister and Cooper had the same understanding of the meaning of “rep,” that does not mean that the defendant was therefore engaged in criminal activity with Connecticut Avenue. This, of course, is in addition to the prosecutor‘s concession that the state “ha[d] no information to indicate” that the defendant was a member of a gang. If a neighborhood affiliation operates as a gang, why did the prosecutor concede that the defendant was not in a gang? Taken together, we cannot agree that there was a sufficient factual basis to support Cooper‘s testimony.
Third, even if there was a sufficient factual basis for Cooper‘s testimony, contrary to the concurrence‘s assertion, Cooper‘s testimony was not the proper subject of expert testimony simply because it related to motive. It is true that the past interaction between the defendant and Gill was relevant to establish a possible motive. But that is factual evidence that is, and was, properly developed through fact witnesses, not expert witnesses. For example, Gill testified that the defendant had assaulted him one month before the shooting. Robinson‘s sister testified that the defendant was affiliated with Connecticut Avenue, which could serve as a motive for the shooting. DiCarlo testified that he was able to determine a possible motive through his investigation. He explained that the defendant had assaulted and robbed Gill one month prior to the shooting and that there was ongoing “beef” between Connecticut Avenue and the West Side. As it related to the area of the shooting or the neighborhoods, the admissible portion of Cooper‘s testimony was or could have been included in DiCarlo‘s testimony as a fact witness. Yet, Cooper was deemed an expert, with ten years of experience with the Stamford Police Department, and DiCarlo was not, despite being a twenty-six year veteran of the same police department. Indeed, when asked if he was familiar with “the downtown area of Stamford,” DiCarlo responded, “[p]retty familiar. I spent twenty-six years down there.” DiCarlo testified extensively about the geography and neighborhoods in the area of the shooting and the dynamics between the neighborhoods. As a result, the state was able to present evidence, properly through fact witness testimony,
There is no dispute that Cooper did not have any training specific to Stamford neighborhoods. He was a certified gang expert. Because the prosecutor conceded that the defendant was not a member of a gang, the only basis on which Cooper‘s expert “neighborhood” testimony would be admissible is his relatively limited experience patrolling Stamford in the ordinary course of performing his routine job functions.9 To be clear, there was no evidence presented at trial that Cooper has any admissible “peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the world” that would aid the jury in determining a possible motive. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fisher, supra, 342 Conn. 269. As already noted, Cooper did not possess any greater knowledge than DiCarlo regarding Stamford neighborhoods. If Cooper‘s experience patrolling Stamford was sufficient to qualify him as a “neighborhood” expert, it is hard to imagine why a person who has resided in Stamford for, say, thirty years, or even the mayor, would not also qualify as an expert on the city‘s neighborhoods. Thus, in the context of this case, we disagree that the term “neighborhood experts” is meaningfully distinct from the phrase “gang experts.” Given the prosecutor‘s concession that the defendant was not a member of a gang, any attempt to work around this fact is really just an effort to shoehorn expert gang testimony into the trial by another name. We conclude that any limited probative value was strongly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Having concluded that the trial court abused its discretion, we must now determine whether that error was harmful. See, e.g., State v. Bouknight, 323 Conn. 620, 626-27, 149 A.3d 975 (2016) (“a nonconstitutional error is harmless when an appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Cooper‘s testimony helped to more clearly frame a possible motive. But Cooper‘s testimony was not the only evidence regarding a possible motive. DiCarlo also testified regarding a possible motive, which was that “there was a beef between [Gill] and [the defendant] where [Gill] was beat up and robbed of his sneakers.”
Moreover, although helpful to establish a possible motive, Cooper‘s testimony was not particularly important to establishing the elements of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, аnd the state‘s case was otherwise relatively strong. The defendant‘s identity was readily established through eyewitness testimony, surveillance video that placed the defendant at the scene of the shooting, and the fact that he was tracked by a police canine to a nearby residential lot, where he was found hiding behind a fence, lying on the ground between two trees in the house‘s backyard, with Davis and Jean-Baptiste. A video extracted from
Moreover, as explained, the state relied on Cooper‘s testimony largely to establish motive. But motive is not an element of the charged offense, and the state was able to establish the defendant‘s intent from the evidence that the defendant shot at Gill and Robinson in close proximity. “Ordinarily, intent can . . . be inferred [only] by circumstantial evidence; it may be and usually is inferred from the defendant‘s conduct. . . . Intent to cause death may be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading to and immediately following the death.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444, 504, 180 A.3d 882 (2018). Gill testified that he saw the defendant pull a gun out of his waistband and that, five to ten seconds later, Robinson was shot. Moreover, when asked whether the police investigation uncovered a motive, DiCarlo testified that it did.10 He also testified that “Gill stated that there was an ongoing beef between Connecticut Avenue and the West Side. He was originally living on the West Side in the Village and had recently moved over to Conn[ecticut] Avenue. . . . [T]here was a beef between him and [the defendant] where he was beat up and robbed of his sneakers.” Given the weight of the evidence and the fact that Cooper‘s testimony was not the only evidence of motive, we have a fair assurance that Cooper‘s improperly admitted testimony did not substantially affect the verdict.
Finally, we note that the trial court instructed the jury on the limited use of Cooper‘s testimony. Cf. State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567, 590, 10 A.3d 1005 (“we find significant in mitigating any possible prejudice the limiting instructions . . . given by the trial court both during the testimony of relevant witnesses and during the final jury charge, which we presume the jury to have followed in the absence of any indication to the contrary” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908, 132 S. Ct. 314, 181 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2011). Specifically, the court explained, “expert testimony is permitted to assist you in your deliberations. No such testimony is binding [on] you and . . . you may disregard this testimony either in whole or in part. It is for you to consider this testimony with the other circumstances in the case and, using your best judgment, determine whether you will give any weight to it and, if so, what weight you will give to it. The testimony is entitled to such weight as you find the expert‘s qualifications in his or her field entitle it to receive.” Accordingly, we conclude that the admission of Cooper‘s expert
II
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A
The defendant next claims that the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the jury on third-party culpability. We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our analysis. Prior to the start of trial, the defendant filed a notice of intent to argue third-party culpability. He argued that Gill may have been the shooter because (1) Gill had a revenge motive to shoot the defendant based on the alleged prior assault and robbery, and (2) Gill‘s flight from the scene reflected consciousness of guilt and gave him an opportunity to hide the gun. The defense‘s request to charge urged the trial court to instruct the jury on third-party culpability. Based on Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 2.6-10, the defense asked the court to instruct the jury, among other things, that “[i]t is up to you, and you alone, to determine whether any of this evidence, if believed, tends to directly connect a third party to the crime[s] with which the defendant is charged. If, after a full and fair consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you have left in your minds a reasonable doubt indicating that the alleged third party . . . may be responsible for the crime[s] the defendant is chаrged with committing, then it would be your duty to [return] a verdict of not guilty . . . .” See
“In determining whether the trial court improperly [declined] a request to charge, [w]e . . . review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to supporting the . . . proposed charge. . . . A request to charge [that] is relevant to the issues of [a] case and [that] is an accurate statement of the law must be given. . . . If, however, the evidence would not reasonably support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court has a duty not to submit it to the jury. . . . Thus, a trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with a party‘s request to charge [only] if the proposed instructions are reasonably supported by the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Schovanec, 326 Conn. 310, 318-19, 163 A.3d 581 (2017).
We have previously stated that “the very standards governing the admissibility of [third-party] culpability evidence also should serve as the standards governing a trial court‘s decision of whether to submit a requested [third-party] culpability charge to the jury.” State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 608-09, 935 A.2d 975 (2007). As to the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence, a defendаnt must “present evidence that directly connects a third party to the crime. . . . It is not enough to show that another had the motive to commit the crime . . . nor is it enough to raise
“We note that, although Arroyo did not expressly state a particular standard of review for claims of instructional error related to third-party culpability, this court has previously reviewed such claims under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Ashby, 336 Conn. 452, 498, 247 A.3d 521 (2020).
Here, the defendant argues that the evidence established a “direct connection” between Gill and the shooting because it established Gill‘s motive to seek revenge for the earlier assault and an opportunity because he was there. We disagree that there was sufficient evidence to raise more than a bare suspicion that Gill was the shooter. As to the defendant‘s contention that Gill had a motive to shoot the defendant because of the earlier assault and robbery, we have said that “[i]t is not enough to show that another [individual] had [a] motive to commit the crime . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 634-35, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010); accord State v. Arroyo, supra, 284 Conn. 609. Similаrly, the defendant‘s argument that Gill was present at the scene of the shooting is also unavailing. Unlike the evidence introduced against the defendant, there is no evidence that Gill possessed a handgun. The defendant‘s argument boils down to, “he was there . . . .” But a third party‘s mere presence during the crime is not itself sufficient to require a third-party culpability instruction. See, e.g., State v. Baltas, 311 Conn. 786, 811-14, 91 A.3d 384 (2014) (no direct connection was established when third party‘s presence did not provide credible, alternative explanation for substantial forensic evidence against defendant). Although we understand the defendant‘s contention regarding the combined effect of Gill‘s potential motive and presence at the scene, we cannot conclude that the trial court incorrectly concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant a third-party culpability instruction.
B
The defendant also claims that the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the jury on the adequacy of the police investigation. The defense asked the court to provide the instruction in both its request to charge and during the charge conference. Pursuant to
On appeal, the defendant contends that the instruction was warranted given the investigator‘s failure to recover the gun, to search for the gun along the path Gill took when he fled the scene, to meaningfully question Gill on the night of the shooting, to perform gunshot residue tests on Gill, and to collect evidence from Gill the night of the shooting. We disagree.
We begin with the relevant legal principles. We have explained that, “[i]n the abstract, whether the [state] conducted a thorough, professional investigation is not relevant to what the jury must decide: Did the defendant commit the alleged offense? Juries are not instructed to [find] the defendant [not guilty] if the [state‘s] investigation was superficial. Conducting a thorough, professional investigation is not an element of the [state‘s] case. . . . A defendant may, however, rely [on] relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Collins, supra, 299 Conn. 599-600. Our case law “does not requirе a court to instruct the jury on the quality of police investigation, but merely holds that a court may not preclude such evidence and argument from being presented to the jury for its consideration.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gomes, 337 Conn. 826, 835 n.7, 256 A.3d 131 (2021). We review a trial court‘s decision not to instruct on investigative inadequacy for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Ashby, supra, 336 Conn. 497-98.
In Collins, this court rejected the defendant‘s challenge to the trial court‘s jury instruction, which provided “that the ultimate issue before you is not the thoroughness of the investigation or the competence of the police. The ultimate issue you have to . . . determine is whether the state in the light of all the evidence before you has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty on one or more of the counts for which he is charged.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Collins, supra, 299 Conn. 600. We concluded that “this instruction did not mislead the jury or violate the defendant‘s right to present a defense because it did not direct the jury not to consider the adequacy of the investigation as it related to the strength of the state‘s case, or not to consider specific aspects of the defendant‘s theory of the case.” Id., 600-601.
Here, the trial court declined to instruct the jury on the adequacy of the police investigation. But the court expressly permitted defense counsel to argue to the jury the weaknesses in the investigation. As in Collins, the trial court never instructed the jury that it could not consider the adequacy of the police investigation. The defendant “was not deprived [of] the right to a fair trial because he was given the opportunity to present evidence and [to] cross-examine the state‘s witnesses regarding the adequacy of the police investigation.” State v. West, 167 Conn. App. 406, 415, 142 A.3d 1250 (2016). The defendant does not contend otherwise for good reason. Among other things, defense counsel extensively cross-examined DiCarlo regarding his failure to obtain any potential evidence from Gill and other investigative inadequacies.
Moreover, the relevant evidence in the present case was not sufficiently compelling that it mandated the trial court to provide the instruction. As
III
INCONSISTENT VERDICT
We next turn to the defendant‘s claim that the jury returned an inconsistent verdict when it found the defendant guilty of manslaughter with a firearm despite finding him not guilty of criminal possession of a firearm. The defendant correctly notes that the parties drafted a stipulation for purposes of the charge of criminal possession of a firearm, stating that the defendant previously had been convicted of a serious juvenile offеnse. This stipulation was admitted as an exhibit. The defendant contends that, as a result of the stipulation, the only element remaining with respect to the charge of criminal possession of a firearm was whether the defendant possessed a firearm. It is the inconsistency between the finding of not guilty of criminal possession of a firearm and the finding of guilty of manslaughter with a firearm that the defendant now challenges on appeal. The defendant recognizes our holding in State v. Arroyo, 292 Conn. 558, 561, 973 A.2d 1254 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 911, 130 S. Ct. 1296, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1086 (2010), that “claims of legally inconsistent verdicts are not reviewable.” The defendant, however, asks us to exercise our inherent supervisory authority to review his claim and to modify our holding in Arroyo in cases in which “a binding stipulation resolves all but one element of a count in the information,” “[t]hat element also appears in another count of the information (a dependent offense),” and “[a]n acquittal of the single element predicate offense . . . [n]egate[s] the common element for purposes of the dependent offense . . . .” We decline to do so.
In Arroyo, we joined a majority of jurisdictions holding that “claims of legal inconsistency between a convic-tion and an acquittal are not reviewable.” State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 586. In reaching this conclusion, we found the United States Supreme Court‘s reasoning in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984), persuasive and adopted the rule articulated: “[I]nconsistent verdicts . . . should not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the [prosecution] at the defendant‘s expense. It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the [greater] offеnse, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense. But in such situations the [prosecution] has no recourse if it wishes to correct the jury‘s error; the [prosecution] is precluded from appealing or otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the [c]onstitution‘s [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause.”11 (Footnote omitted;
We recently had occasion to consider a challenge to our holding in State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 558. In State v. Henderson, 348 Conn. 648, 309 A.3d 1208 (2024), we concluded that “the defendant [had not] advanced the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic that would compel us to overrule or modify Arroyo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 657. We explained that we continued to “agree with the state and adhere to our conclusion in Arroyo that there is no appellate remedy for an inconsistent verdict. If there is anything for the parties or the trial court to do to address an inconsistency in a jury‘s verdict, it must be done before the jury has been discharged.” Id., 656. In arriving at this conclusion, we recognized that “[a]n undeniable tension exists when appellate courts confront inconsistent verdicts on appeal because they present a situation [in which] error, in the sense that the jury has not followed the court‘s instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclеar whose ox has been gored.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 658. We also recognized the limitations appellate courts face when remedying legal errors. “[W]hen a jury has [returned] legally inconsistent verdicts, there is no way for the reviewing court to know which charge the jury found to be supported by the evidence. . . . In most cases, we have no way of knowing if the jury‘s verdict was an unintentional error or a conscious choice of lenity. . . . Reviewing inconsistent verdicts on appeal risks unduly speculating about the jury‘s intent in delivering its decision, despite precedent establishing that the court should not insert itself into jury deliberations.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 658-59. We also explained that, unlike with inconsistent guilty verdicts, “[n]othing in the federal constitution prohibits a court from accepting the inconsistencies between guilty and not guilty verdicts . . . .” Id., 662. Finally, we noted that “this court never has set aside a verdict on the ground that a conviction on one charge was legally or logically inconsistent with an acquittal on another charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 660. We decline to do so today. Because we continue to find our analysis in Arroyo persuasive, especially in light of our recent reconsideration of its propriety, we decline the defendant‘s invitation to modify our holding in Arroyo.
IV
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Finally, we turn to the defendant‘s contention that the state failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm.
“We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .”
“Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multi-tude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating evidence, the [jury] is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that arе consistent with the defendant‘s innocence. . . . The [jury] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.”
“Finally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury‘s] verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 345 Conn. 354, 369-70, 285 A.3d 367 (2022).
The defendant was convicted of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of
Here, the defendant principally relies on his acquittal of criminal possession of a firearm to demonstrate that the jury necessarily concluded that there was insufficient evidence that he had a gun, which is an essential element of the offense of first degree manslaughter with a firearm. The
At bottom, the defendant contends that the fact that the jury found him not guilty of criminal possession of a firearm necessitates a conclusion that the jury also determined that there was insufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, given the common firearm element. This contention, however, is nothing more than a variation of the defendant‘s claim regarding State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 558. See part III of this opinion. We need not address it further, other than to reiterate that “[i]t has long been recognized that criminal juries in the United States are free to [return] not guilty verdicts resulting from compromise, confusion, mistake, lenity or other legаlly and logically irrelevant factors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 257 Conn. 587, 603, 778 A.2d 875 (2001). Moreover, as to Gill‘s credibility, it is well established that, “[w]hen reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not attempt to weigh the credibility of the evidence offered at trial, nor do we purport to substitute our judgment for that of the jury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Haughwout, 339 Conn. 747, 765, 262 A.3d 791 (2021). For this court to undertake an assessment of the jury‘s reasons for finding the defendant not guilty of criminal possession of a firearm would be nothing more than “pure speculation . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 585.
The defendant also contends that his flight from the scene of the shooting did not suggest consciousness of guilt because he is a “young Black male who understandably feared interactions with the police.” Even if we were to agree with the defendant that, in certain circumstances, flight might not be probative of guilt because a Black teenager‘s avoidance of the police may be due to the belief that interacting with them may be dangerous, this is an inference contrary to the defendant‘s guilt. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, “we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, supra, 345 Conn. 369. “Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to determining whether the inferences drawn by the jury are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan, 274 Conn. 790, 801, 877 A.2d 739 (2005). “[T]he [jury] is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant‘s innocence. . . . The rule is that the jury‘s function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence оr facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, 303 Conn. 760, 767-68, 36 A.3d 670 (2012). We cannot conclude that an inference that the evidence of the defendant‘s flight constituted consciousness of guilt is “so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan, supra, 801. The state presented evidence that the defendant, Davis, and Jean-Baptiste fled the scene
Finally, the defendant contends that the remaining evidence was not sufficient to prove his guilt.12 Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have reasonably found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. In addition to the consciousness of guilt evidence, surveillance video placed the defendant, Davis, and Jean-Baptiste at the scene of the shooting. Gill testified thаt, one month prior to the shooting, the defendant had assaulted and robbed Gill. Gill further testified that he saw the
mately two and one-half hours prior to the shooting.13 Analysis found lead—one of three elements that comprise gunshot residue—on the defendant‘s hands and jacket. From this testimony and other evidence, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had shot Robinson. Cf. State v. Robert R., 340 Conn. 69, 90, 262 A.3d 810 (2021) (“a single witness is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Construing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the jury “reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established [the defendant‘s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, supra, 345 Conn. 369.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion D‘AURIA and ECKER, Js., concurred, and MULLINS, C. J., and ALEXANDER