19 Conn. App. 495 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1989
This case requires us to resolve the apparent conflict between General Statutes § 54-56
The defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant, and an information was filed against him charging him
The defendant moved to dismiss the information pursuant to Practice Book § 815 (9), which provides for a pretrial dismissal based on any grounds other than those specified in Practice Book § 815 (1) through (5). The trial court, however, granted the motion pursuant to § 54-56. This appeal followed.
The trial court specifically ruled that it had no authority to dismiss the information under Practice Book § 815 (9) because Practice Book § 816 prohibits a defendant who was arrested pursuant to a warrant from moving to dismiss under that subsection. See footnote 2, supra. Nonetheless, the court ruled that it did have authority to act on the defendant’s motion under § 54-56, and therefore treated the motion as having been made under that statute. The court further noted that a warrant had been issued, and stated that it had examined the contents of the warrant affidavit and was satisfied that it established probable cause.
First, the court noted that both the state and the defendant had earlier indicated that there were out-of-state witnesses who would have to be produced or whose depositions would have to be taken.
The state claims that the court erred because (1) § 54-56 did not apply to this case, (2) if § 54-56 did apply, the court abused its discretion in dismissing the information, and (3) to the extent that § 54-56 conflicts with Practice Book §§ 815 and 816, the statute violates
The state’s claim that § 54-56 did not apply to this case is dispositive. The state argues that the court relied on the “insufficient evidence” prong of § 54-56; see footnote 1, supra; and that that reliance was erroneous because the defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant. See State v. Bellamy, 4 Conn. App. 520, 527, 495 A.2d 724 (1985). The defendant responds that the court relied on the “insufficient cause” prong of the statute, and that the court properly exercised its power under State v. Corchado, 200 Conn. 453, 512 A.2d 183 (1986). We agree with the defendant that the trial court relied on the insufficient cause prong of § 54-56. We also agree with the state, however, that § 54-56 does not apply to this case.
General Statutes § 54-56 and Practice Book §§ 815 and 816 appear to conflict with each other. Section 54-56 permits the court to dismiss an information “at any time, upon motion by the defendant . . . if . . . there is not sufficient evidence or cause to justify a bringing or continuing of such information . . .’’Practice Book § 815 (5) mirrors § 54-56 by providing for a motion to dismiss an information for “(5) [insufficiency of evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information . . . .” Practice Book § 816, however, provides that “[n]o defendant . . . who has been arrested pursuant to a warrant may make a motion under [paragraph] (5) . . . of Sec. 815.” Thus, facially at least, the two provisions — legislative and judicial — present a constitutional issue of the separation of powers. See, e.g., State v. King, 187 Conn. 292, 296-98, 445 A.2d 901 (1982).
We are obligated, however, where reasonably possible, to read statutes so as to avoid calling their con
We begin with an analysis of the background against which § 54-56 must be read. It has long been the law in Connecticut that the state's attorney derives his authority from the common law, that it is his duty to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to proceed with a criminal charge, and that “[i]n the discharge of the functions of his high public office he has broad discretion in determining what crime or crimes to charge in any particular situation.” State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 473-74, 450 A.2d 828 (1982); see also, State v. Main, 31 Conn. 572, 576 (1863). “So long as he acts within the jurisdiction of his office it is not appropriate for a court to set policy for the performance of his prosecutorial function.” State v. Haskins, supra, 474. The criminal justice system vests him with broad discretion to determine whether to press a prosecution. State v. Corchado, supra, 460. “In the absence of statutory authority, the court has no power of its own motion to dismiss a criminal prosecution unless there is a fundamental legal defect in the information or indictment (such as want of jurisdiction or form of the information), or a constitutional defect such as denial of the right to a speedy trial . . . . ” State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 608, 610-11, 376 A.2d 74 (1977).
General Statutes § 54-56 constitutes a grant of such “statutory authority.” That does not mean, however, that it necessarily applies to this case. What may appear to be clear legislative language should not be read to preclude a legislative intent that is disclosed by the history or purpose of a statute. State v. Bellamy, supra,
Consistently with that purpose, we have held that the evidentiary insufficiency prong of § 54-56 “does not apply where a judge has found probable cause and authorized the issuance of an arrest warrant. In such a case, the judicial authority’s considered judgment has been interposed between the power of the prosecuting attorney and the rights of a defendant. The prosecutorial power is not unchecked; it has already been subject to the prior check of the judicial authority’s ‘independent determination that probable cause exists as to each element of every crime charged.’ State v. Heinz, [193 Conn. 612, 617, 480 A.2d 452 (1984)].” State v. Bellamy, supra, 527. In Bellamy, we read State v. Morrill, 193 Conn. 602, 605, 478 A.2d 994 (1984), to hold that, in the absence of an invocation of Practice Book § 816, the court may rely “on General Statutes § 54-56 to dismiss an information which is preceded by an arrest warrant . . . if it is conclusively established that the court has before it all the evidence which the state will be able to produce at trial.”
The insufficient cause prong of § 54-56 stands on a somewhat different footing, however, from the insufficient evidence prong. Whereas the insufficient evidence prong invites an inquiry into whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state, would support a guilty verdict; State v. Morrill, supra, 611-12; the insufficient cause prong invokes “the notion of fairness” that must “[permeate] the considerations to be given to the trial court’s decision .... Thus, a balancing process must occur which weighs the interests of the state and society . . . against the interest
An examination of the history of § 54-56, and the cases in which it has been employed to sanction dismissals for cause, also sheds light on its scope. It was first interpreted in a reported decision by Judge (later Chief Justice) Wynne, in State v. Carroll, supra. Judge Wynne stated that he had “personal recollection of the reasons urged when the law was enacted in 1921. . . . What the statute was designed for, the very purpose for which it is now invoked, is a matter of legislative and judicial history.
“In the spring of 1921 a case was tried involving a prominent lawyer before the Superior Court for Hartford County. The jury disagreed. The judge who presided, as well as counsel for the defense, saw the necessity for a law such as was passed. It was approved June 2, 1921. On June 17, 1921, a nolle pros was entered. The coincidence requires no comment.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 112.
In Carroll itself, Judge Wynne dismissed the information against the defendant after two juries had refused to convict him, where the court was confident that the defendant would be acquitted on a third trial. Id., 112-13. Thus, in Carroll, the court read the statute as aimed at permitting a court to dismiss an information after a trial ending in a mistrial, and applied the statute in such a situation.
Mindful of our obligation to interpret § 54-56 so as to avoid a constitutional collision with Practice Book § 816, of the judicial and legislative origins of the statute, and of the rare but consistent instances of the statute’s judicial application, we conclude that where, as here, no trial has yet been held and where Practice Book § 816 is invoked, the insufficient cause prong of the statute is an inappropriate basis for dismissal of an information preceded by an arrest warrant. There are, moreover, practical policy considerations that support this conclusion.
Dismissal under § 54-56 for insufficient cause to justify the prosecution requires the court explicitly to
Thus, the trial court in this case erred in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the state’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion under General Statutes § 54-56.
There is error, the judgment is set aside, and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 54-56 provides: “All courts having jurisdiction of criminal cases shall at all times have jurisdiction and control over informations and criminal cases pending therein and may, at any time, upon motion by the defendant, dismiss any information and order such defendant discharged if, in the opinion of the court, there is not sufficient evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or the placing of the person accused therein on trial.” (Emphasis added.)
Practice Book § 815 (5) provides: “The following defenses or objections, if capable of determination without a trial of the general issue, shall, if made prior to trial, be raised by a motion to dismiss the indictment or information ... (5) Insufficiency of evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or indictment or the placing of the defendant on trial. ...”
Practice Book § 816 provides: “No defendant who has been indicted by a grand jury or who has been arrested pursuant to a warrant may make a motion under paragraphs (5) or (9) of Sec. 815.”
The defendant does not challenge that determination on appeal.
The state, in response, informed the court that it had determined that it did not need to produce any out-of-state witnesses as part of its case.
This referred to the defendant’s claim that, subsequent to the defendant’s stop payment order, Atlantech traced the boat to Maryland, where agents of Atlantech illegally removed some of the equipment it had installed on the boat.
This referred to the fact that the defendant had followed the court’s earlier recommendation to put a sum of money in escrow with his attorneys, and to submit to service of civil process by Atlantech.
We note that subsequently, in State v. Daniels, 209 Conn. 225, 236, 550 A.2d 885 (1988), the court acknowledged that the issue of whether § 54-56 applies to a death penalty proceeding was “a serious question”; id.; but adhered to its earlier ruling under the law of the case doctrine. Id., 237.