State v. DickersonState v. Dickerson
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: DISMISSED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-14-585521-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Russell S. Bensing, for appellee.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the trial court’s denial of the state’s motion to reinstate the conviction of the defendant-appellee, Oscar S. Dickerson (“Dickerson”). Upon a review of the record, we find that the trial court’s
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On May 15, 2014, Dickerson, along with his codefendant, Michael J. Jenkins (“Jenkins”) were indicted on five counts relating to a sexual assault that occurred on July 2, 1994. Both were charged with two counts of rape, two counts of complicity, and one count of kidnapping. On November 5, 2014, six days before the trial, Dickerson filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of preindictment delay. The trial court denied the motion as untimely. Both Dickerson and Jenkins were found guilty, and Dickerson was sentenced to five years in prison.
{¶ 3} The state appealed the sentence, and Dickerson filed a cross-appeal. This court in State v. Dickerson, 2016-Ohio-807, 60 N.E.3d 699, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.) (“Dickerson I”) held that “[h]aving found that trial counsel was ineffective by not filing a timely motion to dismiss on the ground of preindictment delay, the conviction against Dickerson is vacated.” The state appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court decided “judgment vacated and cause remanded to the court of appeals for application of State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5105.” State v. Dickerson, 146 Ohio St.3d 1493, 2016-Ohio-5585, 57 N.E.3d 1172. On remand and after applying Jones, this court again held “[h]aving found that trial counsel was ineffective by not filing a timely motion to dismiss on the ground of preindictment delay, the conviction against Dickerson is reversed.” State v. Dickerson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102461, 2017-Ohio-177, ¶ 64 (“Dickerson II”).
I. The trial court erred in denying the state’s motion to reinstate convictions because such an order granted the defendant a new trial where no error justifies a new trial and the taint of the remand has been neutralized.
II. Final Appealable Order
A. Whether this Court has Authority to Review the Trial Court’s Decision to Deny Reinstatement of Convictions
The state contends that the trial court’s denial of its motion to reinstate Dickerson’s convictions is a final appealable order.
The requirement of a final, appealable order is equally important in both civil and criminal cases. “An appellate court can review only final orders, and without a final order, an appellate court has no
The state argues that because the trial court denied its motion to reinstate Dickerson’s conviction, it effectively grants Dickerson a new trial, which is a final appealable order.
As a general rule, the state may not file an appeal except as provided by
State v. Colon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103150, 2016-Ohio-707, ¶ 8.
In addition,
[a]nother interlocutory order that may become final and appealable upon ruling is an order that grants a new trial.
Id. at ¶ 13.
It is important to note that the trial court, in its July 6, 2018 journal entry, did not grant Dickerson a new trial, and there is not an order from the trial court that grants Dickerson a new trial. Therefore, the state incorrectly argues that
We cannot review the state’s claim of error, even if the state’s argument has merit regarding an automatic retrial, because we do not have the trial court’s reasoning for granting a retrial. “The basis for the new trial must be specifically stated in order to allow a reviewing court to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. Antal v. Olde Worlde Prod., Inc., 9 Ohio St.3d 144, 459 N.E.2d 223, syllabus (1984).” 425 Partnership v. Weston, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 68386 and 68498, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 844 (Mar. 7, 1996). See Chaney v. Chaney, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 70679 and 70653, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1063 (Mar. 19, 1998) (“The basis for granting a new trial must be specifically stated in order to allow a reviewing court to determine whether the trial court erred * * *.”). Without an order from the trial court expressly granting Dickerson a new trial and its reasoning for doing so, this court cannot review the state’s assignment of error because there is not a final appealable order.
{¶ 10} For the foregoing reasons, it is our determination that the trial court’s denial of the state’s motion to reinstate Dickerson’s convictions does not satisfy the requirements of a final order under
[a]n appellate court’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing, affirming, modifying or reversing judgments or final orders. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. See also
State v. Patchin, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-00-1103, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4972 (Oct. 27, 2000).
{¶ 11} Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR