History
  • No items yet
midpage
State v. Dess
602 P.2d 142
Mont.
1979
Check Treatment

*1 MONTANA, The STATE OF Respondent, Plaintiff Appellant. DESS, THOMAS Defendant No. 14616. Sept. 1979. Decided Oct. 602 P.2d 142. *2 Donovan, Falls, & Great Richard W.

Lang argued, Great Lang Falls, for defendant and appellant. Gen., Asst.

Mike Allen B. Chronister argued, Atty. Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Bourdeau, Michael G. Barer County Atty., Fred J. Falls, and re- for plaintiff Great argued, Deputy County Atty., spondent. of the Court.

MR. HARRISON delivered opinion JUSTICE Defendant from appeals District Court judgment District, Eighth Cascade the Honorable H. County, Judicial William Coder him of the crimes of presiding, finding misde- guilty theft, meanor criminal and three trespass, felony counts of felony criminal mischief. The criminal trespass conviction related ap- pellant’s allegedly & unlawfully entering remaining LJ Tire in Great Company Falls. The stemmed from felony charges theft and destruction appellant’s alleged property belonging Bison Motor in Great Falls and the Company Great Falls. City

At a.m. 6:00 approximately two Great January Falls officers police alarm at the & responded burglar L Tire J Falls, in Great Montana. Company On investigation, they discovered two individuals behind the bathroom hiding door tire One' company individuals was building. Thomas Dess. The police officers observed leukemia poster lying on the floor of the area of the with no in it. shop building money officers arrested police and his companion.

Sometime in the hours of the same early morning day, pickup truck was removed from the premises of Bison Motor Company, *3 the Ford in dealership The truck Great Falls. was driven through addition, fence In and premises. antennas of lightbars two cars on the Bison Motor police lot were Company damaged. Great Falls police recovered the truck later that south pickup day of Great Falls. found the They driven off the and pickup highway stuck in some snow. The truck had been as result be- damaged driven lot ing the car fence. through 19, At a.m. 10:30 on while in in approximately January custody the Great Falls made a statement to Lt. jail, appellant allegedly Cook to theft confessing participation pickup James Bush, and cars. Lou Ann damaging police stenographer for the Great Falls Police recorded the statement. Department, 3, 1978,

On an in- Cascade filed February County attorney formation District Court with theft charging appellant burglary, criminal mischief. on arraigned February Appellant to entered of not all District Truman G. pleas charges. Judge guilty On March for March trial in the matter set Bradford was con- The trial date on bail. from jail was released appellant 11, 1978, Bradford. On of Judge due to the illness to tinued April ill, accepted Coder Judge being Bradford still Judge April date for July a new trial later set of the case. He jurisdiction filed a mo- Ferguson Cameron defense counsel 1978. On June of his resigna- trial date because continuing tion for an order 30, 1978, effective defender County public tion as Cascade June to the case assigned subsequently that the attorney and requested with the case. Judge familiar a month to become at least given 4, 1978. trial for September an resetting entered order Coder reset because the trial be attorney requested On the county July the trial for Coder set Judge 4 was a legal holiday. September held on that date. was subsequently and trial September 19, 1978, a was held con- suppression hearing On September made on the morning the statement cerning allegedly by appellant that he did not recall with talking of his arrest. testified Appellant Cook, Cook, from Lt. or máking Lt. his Miranda receiving warning his activities arrested. On being statement any concerning prior cross-examination, exhibited a recollection of other good 19, and stated a on a events that occurred on January signature waiver of form looked like his He rights signature. consistently Cook, however. The State called denied statement Lt. making at the Based on hearing. no witnesses suppression Coder, on concern that nothing while Judge expressing testimony, Miranda the fact his given the record supported on the record to ap- found no credible evidence support warnings, motion to the statement. and denied his suppress pellant’s position trial, read the into evidence over appellant’s At Ms. Bush statement objection. issues are raised appeal:

The following motion District err in denying appellant’s 1. Did the Court to be the statement allowing confession his alleged suppress at trial? read into evidence *4 speedy denied his constitutional

2. Was appellant trial?

Addressing issue of the of the suppression alleged confes sion, we find the District Court erroneously admitted appellant’s First, statement for two reasons. State failed to the volun prove tariness of confession at a suppression hearing by as preponderance of evidence required by case law. prior See State Grimestad 183 Mont. 598 P.2d 36; State v. Smith 164 Mont. 523 P.2d record,

Looking there be appears to no evidence intro- duced at the suppression hearing that made appellant voluntarily the statement. The witness at the On only hearing appellant. direct examination he testified that he had no recollection sign- a waiver of his Miranda or a ing rights to Lt. making statement On Cook. cross-examination the State established appellant that recalled that many events occurred specific night morning of his arrest and that the on a waiver of signature rights form not, however, looked like his did signature. State introduce any evidence he refuting appellant’s that did make a testimony not statement to Lt. Cook or receive his Miranda warnings.

While the testimony introduced the State tends show by that statement, a it appellant capable making voluntary does not a show by of the evidence he a preponderance that made voluntary as statement the case law. required by Even the trial court’s though at a will not be reversed judgment suppression hearing normally when State fails to show that was advised appeal, his Miranda made rights, the statement attributed to him, or evidence other any than had the mental .appellant capacity statement, to make voluntary the State has carried its finding burden to prove voluntariness of the evidence preponderance is clearly against evidence must over- weight turned on appeal. reason confession should

The second appellant’s purported not been admitted is of the the Miranda warn have inadequacy The warning given appellant. allegedly ap ing allegedly given “We have no way giv- included following language; pellant

121 for if and when you, one will be appointed but ing you lawyer, to court.” go you of a warning on the Miranda adequacy

A exists split authority held courts have warnings nearly this Several containing language. v. here invalid. Commonwealth to the one challenged identical 112; 349, 111, ex 399 A.2d United States 484 Pa. Johnson 1250; 1248, (7th 1972), 467 F.2d Twomey rel. Williams v. Cir. (9th 1970), 431 F.2d 134. In Williams United v. Garcia Cir. States the court reasoned: was not an ‘effective and

“We hold that the here given warning to the was am- equivocal it contrary, express explanation;’ was he had the one breath informed that biguous. In breath, In next to counsel right during questioning. appointed was that not be until later. In other he told counsel could provided words, at the mo- the statement that no can be lawyer provided ment and can be obtained if and when the accused reaches only to court restricts the absolute counsel right previously substantially stated; that an it alternative in- conveys contradictory message first entitled to an in court at is counsel digent upon appearance unknown, is, therefore, some time. at warning future The entire best, worst, and at a subtle constitutes misleading confusing to the accused to forego temptation unsophisticated, indigent at this critical moment.” 467 F.2d at 1250. to counsel right to the one given Other courts have similar upheld warnings very 1973), (4th here. Carolina Cir. F.2d State North Wright denied, 936, 1452, cert. 415 U.S. 94 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1972), (1974); (2nd 463 F.2d Massimo v. United States Cir. 1171, 1174, denied, cert. 93 S.Ct. 34 L.Ed.2d 700; (5th 1971), 446 United States v. Cir. F.2d Lacy conclusion a Those courts the rationale that adopted only reaching would be defendant given warnings justified that, have a present “. . . since he was entitled to lawyer clearly now he and since no could be lawyer provided, during questioning Massimo, 463 F.2d at 1174. could now be not questioned.” is invalid more consistent warning that holding The with Miranda and based a better rationale than the holding Miranda contrary. requires be effective and ex- interrogators press explaining appointed counsel defendant. Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 86 St.Ct. L.Ed.2d 694. out Williams correctly points the language here is challenged neither effective nor but rather express, equivocal ambiguous, defendant informing right to ap- counsel in pointed one breath and him counsel cannot be telling in the provided next. The rationale that defendant would only justified in one reaching conclusion based on the warning given here the courts adopted by under holding warning adequate Miranda is unconvincing. is confus- language warning *6 and several ing, conclusions as its could be envisioned meaning with it. person presented We therefore find the Miranda warning de- given appellant fective and the District Court admitted improperly con- appellant’s fession over his on this objection basis. determined

Having 19 statement inadmissi- appellant’s January ble, we must reverse conviction the appellant’s felony charges alleged from theft of the stemming appellant’s from Bison pickup of Motor and the the and the two damaging police cars. The pickup confession in the the undoubtedly weighed minds of heavily jurors in of those finding appellant guilty offenses. conviction

Concerning for misdemeanor appellant’s however, criminal we do not find reversal warranted. trespass, This Court will not reverse the District if an Court error by District Court constitutes harmless error. State v. Rozzell 443, 450-51, 881; 486, 877, 157 Mont. P.2d State v. Straight 255, 265, 482, 136 Mont. 347 488. When P.2d the error is error, federal constitutional with the as admission of improper ap confession, the error cannot pellant’s be considered harmless unless the court finds it v. harmless reasonable doubt. beyond Chapman 18, 23-24, 824, (1967), 386 U.S. 87 S.Ct. 17 L.Ed.2d California 705. The United Court has found harmless con Supreme States stitutional error when the inadmissible evidence was cumulative

123 showed the defendant’s guilt. evidence overwhelmingly and other 1056, (1972), 405 31 Florida U.S. S.Ct. Schneble v. 340; (1969), 395 U.S. L.Ed.2d Harrington California is the case here. 23 L.Ed.2d 284. That S.Ct. to the criminal relating The of the confession portion & inside the L Tire charge merely places appellant trespass J arrived. of both testimony policemen when building police in We building. the break-in places appellant who investigated er confession was harmless conclude admission ror conviction. his criminal regards trespass for criminal trespass conviction misdemeanor

Appellant’s stand, therefore, claim unless trial has appellant’s speedy must out This Court test set balancing merit. employs four-part (1972), 407 Barker v. S.Ct. Wingo 101, to determine the trial claim. L.Ed.2d validity speedy (1979), Mont., State v. Bretz 185 P.2d 253. In making speedy determination, trial the Court considers the length delay, reason for defendant’s assertion delay, his trial speedy Bretz, rights, and to the defendant. at prejudice St.Rep. None of these four factors is regarded as either in all cir necessary cumstances or in and of sufficient itself determine the depriva Rather, tion trial. all must considered speedy with together other relevant circumstances. The must Court Bretz, in a difficult sensitive engage balancing process. at P.2d 263-269. *7 test, 249

Under the of of the Barker the length delay prong and shift the between arrest his trial days passed appellant’s reason and the absence of delay burden of for explaining to to the State. State v. appellant Cassidy prejudice 738. Mont. P.2d

The reason for a of the delay approximately majority — one-half of months—was State inability six and the eight to a to hear the and the inadvertent judge scheduling case provide of for This constitutes unintentional delay the trial Labor Day. than in determining must be less intentional weighed heavily delay aof claim. validity speedy 578 P.2d at Cassidy, 738. The re- maining seven weeks of the followed delay motion for continuance and must be attributed to appellant. met his burden of to a

Appellant asserting right speedy trial action taking affirmative regarding right, making motion to of a dismiss for lack trial between time the speedy matter was for set trial and the trial date. 578 P.2d at Cassidy, State v. Steward 168 Mont. citing 543 P.2d To ascertain the of presence the fourth element of the Barker to the because of prejudice must delay test— —we (1) consider the interests of following of appellant: prevention op incarceration; (2) pretrial minimization of or con pressive anxiety accused; (3) cern of the limitation of the defense will possibility Bretz, be impaired. Barker, 185 P.2d at at quoting Here, 92 S.Ct. 2182. appellant spent days jail before be bond, released ing on not an oppressive length of He time. faced a possible 40-year prison sentence. In we noted Cassidy, the defend ant was with charged crimes carrying possible 20-year prison said, sentence and “. . . and concern on the [ajnxiety of part defend ant, under such circumstances and the ‘death in considering time’ volved, can be presumed.” at Cassidy, P.2d 740. Under Cassidy, anxiety concern on the of part can be defense, toAs presumed. impairment none existed because ap pellant presented no defense. all these factors as we

Considering together, must we ultimately resolve this issue find the here length delay barely exceeds shortest held sufficient delay previously trigger trial speedy inquiry. attributable to the portions delay are State institutional less than intentional delays given weight Seven weeks of the can be delays. delay imputed appellant. Ap asserted his trial on one pellant only occasion. speedy Ap rests rather pellant’s proof prejudice judicial presumption than concrete evidence actual harm through oppressive pretrial incarceration, concern, or of his defense. impairment anxiety *8 facts, of actual sufficient we do not “... find showing these Given of of harsh dismissal remedy invoke the extremely prejudice Bretz, P.2d at 268. v. supra, cause.” State and conviction theft charges felony felony Appellant’s reversed. The misdemeanor criminal criminal mischief is trespass is affirmed and remanded to the District Court for conviction on that matter. sentencing SHEA, coneur. and SHEEHY

MR. DALY JUSTICES in and dis- concurring MR. CHIEF HASWELL part JUSTICE senting part: theft and

I concur in convictions reversing appellant’s felony I dissent criminal mischief for the reasons stated majority. by conviction. from the affirmance of criminal appellant’s trespass hold that admission of confession majority appellant’s error insofar as his conviction of criminal is harmless trespass (1) The basis of the is threefold: the con- ruling concerned. majority (2) & L fession inside the Tire merely places appellant building; J cumulative; (3) over- this evidence is and other evidence merely shows whelmingly guilt. far beyond placing ap-

In view confession my goes simply his confession building. inside the & L Tire In pellant J & in between and “. . . went L Tire stated that he Dale Gladue J tire other That coin There building. laundry. place two was broken out on sides. in the door and garage glass hole big Sambo’s, said in. We went sat there Dale some- We looked an system back. told him there was alarm about I thing going coins off the and took the desk through there. We went back it. is when the showed policeman up.” that is about That is “whether constitutional harmless error The test federal complained the evidence there is a reasonable possibility v. Connecticut Fahy conviction.” contributed have might Or, stated L.Ed.2d 171. S.Ct. a reasonable beyond was harmless another whether error way, doubt. Chapman 386 U.S. 87 S.Ct. California 17 L.Ed.2d 705.

The elements of the (1) crime of criminal are a trespass knowing, (2) (3) unlawful entering into the premises another. Section *9 45-6-203, MCA The quoted of the confession part estab- clearly lishes the first two elements of the crime. It is the direct only evidence of unlawful knowing, entry. I cannot fairly say there is no reasonable that the possibility inadmissible confession contributed to appellant’s conviction or that the error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt.

I would therefore remand for a new trial free from the taint the unlawful confession.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Dess
Court Name: Montana Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 30, 1979
Citation: 602 P.2d 142
Docket Number: 14616
Court Abbreviation: Mont.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.