State v. . DensonState v. . Denson
Tbe ordinance affects three classes of persons: (1) residents; (2) nonresidents wbo conduct a business, practice a profession, or are employed in tbe city; (3) those wbo remain in tbe city for more than thirty days. Under tbe speciаl verdict, tbe defendants are treated as falling within tbe second class; their homes are outside tbe corporate limits, but they are employees of a railroad company, whose shops are within tbe city, and they regularly drive thеir cars to and from the place in which they work. When arrested they were driving upon tbe streets of tbe city without a license.
Tbe defendants, as we understand, do not controvert tbe power or authority of tbe aldermen to enact a valid ordinance regulating tbe grant of a chauffeur’s license (Private Laws 1907, ch. 209, sec. 39
et seq.; Thompson v. Lumberton,
They insist, first, that tbe ordinance is unreasonable, because, if a license may be required of them, it may be required of any person driving a car into tbe city for any cause or for any period of time; but this reasoning does not commend itself to our approval. It is obvious that tbe board of aldermen never contemplated tbe imposition оf an examination for a driver’s license upon all wbo might enter or pass through tbe city; and it is equally obvious that tbe ordinаnce does not apply to cases of this kind.
They further contend that, as tbe special verdict does not fix tbe durаtion of their employment, they occupy tbe position of those wbo casually drive their cars into tbe city for а temporary purpose, and are therefore not within either of the specified classes; but tbe test of inclusiоn is not tbe duration of their employment, but their .presence as employees and tbe 'operation of their cars in the city. They go there by virtue of a contractual obligation to do certain work which requires their presence at tbe railroad shops within tbe corporate limits day after day for a period definite or indefinite. Driving their cаrs inside the corporate limits is an incident, perhaps an essential incident, of tbe business relation which they have vоluntarily assumed; and if so, they may not successfully claim exemption from tbe inhibition of the ordinance
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merely on the ground thаt while their days are passed within, their nights are spent without, the corporate limits. In
Whitfield v. Longest,
The defendants say, in addition, that the ordinance is discriminatory and therefore unenforcible; but this position, we think, cannоt be upheld. Of course, if a municipal ordinance appears upon its face to be discriminatory, or oppressive, or unreasonable, it will not be enforced; but ordinarily there is no discrimination where the impeached рrovision relates to all of a class. McQuillin states the rule in this language: “Laws relating to persons and things as a class, аnd not to persons or things of a class, are common, and usually sustained. The law will be held valid if it operates equally uрon all subjects within the class for which the rule is applied. It thus follows that local police regulations are not tо lie condemned because not specifically aimed at all persons in whatever business engaged, as they may have an express design of reaching certain classes in certain characters of work.” Municipal Ordinances, sec. 193
et seq.
“The specific regulations for one kind of business, which may be necessary for the protection of thе public, can never be the just ground of complaint, because like restrictions are not imposed upon othеr business of a different kind. The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. It is only then that the discrimination can be said to impair that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the
laws.”
—Mr.
Justice Field,
in
Soon Hing v. Crowley,
It is contended tbat, owing to the provisions of the Public Laws of 1921, ch. 2, sec. 29, the ordinance is without legislative sanction. It will be noted, however, that the second proviso has rеference to the privilege of operating a motor vehicle, while the third provides for regulating, licensing and сontrolling chauffeurs and drivers. We cannot concur with the defendant in construing the words, “any such car,” in the third proviso, as restricting the driver’s license to cars on which the privilege tax is laid. This construction would make the one tax entirely dependent upon the levy of the others. In our opinion, this was not the legislative intent. See Thompson v. Lumberton, supra, p. 265.
We find.
No error.