State v. DellingerState v. Dellinger
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Johnson
Lead Opinion
Thе sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where a delinquent juvеnile commits a felony at age thirteen but turns sixteen before proceedings are instituted.
Jurisdiction in juvenile cases is governed by
The [district] court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent.... For purposes of determining jurisdiction, the age of the juvenile ... at the time of the alleged offense . . . governs.
G.S.
These statutes have been applied most recently in State v. Lundberg, 104 N.C. App. 543, 410 S.E.2d 216 (1991) and In re Stedman, 305 N.C. 92, 286 S.E.2d 527 (1982). In Lundberg, the defendant was indicted at age twenty-three. Prosecution of the defendant was attempted in superior court for unlаwful acts (arson) committed by defendant when he was thirteen and fifteen. Although this Court recognized that jurisdiction is determined under G.S.
Similarly in Stedman, the defendant aged out of the district court’s original jurisdiction upon turning eighteen at the time of his indictment for felonies occurring when he was age fifteen. Stedman, 305 N.C. 92, 286 S.E.2d 527. G.S. § 7A-524 terminated the jurisdiction of the district court over the juvenile and the subject matter of the juvenile petitions. Id.
*532In the instant case, defendant was only sixteen at the time of indictment for an offense he allegedly committed at age thirtеen. We agree with defendant that, under the express language of G.S.
Appeal dismissed.
. Judges JOHNSON consurs with a separate opinion. Judge MARTIN, Mark D., concurs.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I concur оnly because we are bound by this Court’s holding in State v. Lundberg, 104 N.C. App. 543, 410 S.E.2d 216 (1991), which relied upon In re Stedman, 305 N.C. 92, 286 S.E.2d 527 (1982). In Stedman, the Court held that an eighteen year old defendant could be indicted and tried as an adult for felony offensеs allegedly committed when he was fifteen years old. In Lundberg, the Court held that a twenty-three year old defendant could be indicted and tried as an adult for a felony offense allegedly committed when he was thirteen’ years old. In the instant case, we hold that defendant, who wás sixteen at the time of the indictment but who turned eighteen pending this appeal, could be indicted and tried as an adult for a felony offense allegedly committed when he was thirteen years of age.
Simply stated, the reasoning in Stedman, Lundberg and the case sub judice is that, having aged out of the district court’s jurisdiction over their person and the subject matter, the defendants who are now adults must be subjected to the jurisdiction of superior court for crimes they allegedly committed when the defendant in Stedman was fifteen, and the defendants in Lundberg and the instant case were thirteen years of age respectively. However, I find the facts of Stedman to be quite distinguishable from Lundberg and the instant matter in that the defendant in Stedman was fifteen years old at the time he allegedly committed the felony offenses.
*533
The [district] cоurt has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a .juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent^] . . . For purposes of determining jurisdiction, the age оf the juvenile ... at the time of the alleged offense . . . governs.
The court.. . may transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile 14 years of age or older to superior court if the juvenile was 14 years of age or older at the time he allegedly committed an offense which would be a felony if committed by an аdult. If the alleged felony constitutes a capital offense and the judge finds probable cause, the judge shall transfer the case to the superior court for trial as in the case of adults.
By providing that only juveniles of the age of fourteen or older (now thirteen or older) could be transferred to superior court, I believe the intent of the legislature was to preclude, under any circumstances, the trial of a juvenile below the age of fourteen (now thirteen) in superior court, or at any time in superior court for any offense committed by the juvenile (defendant) at the age of thirteen or younger. Since the age of the juvenile at the time of the alleged offense governs jurisdiction, it seems logical that the legislature’s intent with thе enactment of
*534This distinction becomes apparent in Stedman because at the time the defendant therein allegedly committed the offenses, he was fifteen and was therefore in that age category the legislature intended to be subject to the jurisdiction of the superior court under the transfer provisions of
To read the statutes otherwise would lend them to possible abuse and illogical results. For example, suppose a district court judge was faced with a fourteen year old juvenile who stood charged with having committed a felony offense at age eleven which was not lodged against the juvenile until the juvenile was age fourteen. Could the district court judge, considering the fact that the juvenile has aged out of the prоtective group of age twelve or younger, transfer the juvenile to superior court for trial? I think not. But this is the effect of what happened in Lundberg, and in thе instant case, i.e., the defendants were allowed to be indicted and tried in superior court for offenses allegedly committed by them at age thirtеen, an age at that time within a protected class that precluded-this result.
I realize that if the Lundberg Court had held that the defendant could not have been indicted and triеd in superior court, and the defendant had aged out of the jurisdiction of the district court, the crime, under the current law, would go unpunished. However, this is a matter that should be addressed within the province of the legislature and not our courts.