State v. DeflorioState v. Deflorio
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- Souter
The Concord District Court (Sullivan, J.) has transferred two questions without ruling: whether a minor charged with a misdemeanor traffic offense may be prosecuted and, upon convic*311tion, incarcerated as an adult under the authority of
The statutory context in which these questions arise may be outlined briefly. Acts that would be misdemeanors or felonies if committed by an adult are treated as acts of delinquency if committed by a minor,
There are two general exceptions to these provisions, however. First, when the minor’s act would be a felony if committed by an adult,
“to persons 16 years of age or over who are charged with the violation of a motor vehicle law, an aeronautics law, a law relating to navigation or boats, a fish and game law, a law relating to Title XIII or any town or municipal ordinance which provides for a penalty not exceeding $100 plus the penalty assessment.”
The events in this case began when the defendant was sixteen. He was charged under Title XXI (Motor Vehicles) of the Revised Statutes Annotated with operating a motor vehicle after suspension of his license,
*312The trials on these charges did not occur until the defendant had turned seventeen, when he was convicted of each offense and sentenced to serve concurrent terms of thirty days at the county house of correction. The court suspended twenty-seven days of each sentence during good behavior and scheduled a later hearing to determine whether the defendant’s intervening conduct would justify continued suspension. The defendant served the three days. Before the later hearing, however, he was convicted of two additional offenses. In response to these convictions, the district court imposed a further portion of the original sentences, by ordering the defendant to serve four consecutive weekends in the house of correction, with service of the remainder of the original sentences again deferred.
When the defendant presented himself to serve the first weekend, the staff of the house of correction expressed concern, for the first time, that the defendant was a minor, and they refused to admit him. Communications followed, among the county commissioners, the administrator of the house of correction, the county attorney, the Office of the Attorney General and the district court, all culminating in a hearing at which the pending questions were raised and transferred.
The district court treated the county as an intervenor, and in the proceeding before us the county argues that
Before reaching the merits, we note two issues that apparently were never raised before the district court. First, it is not self-evident that a county, or any other subsidiary governmental unit, has standing to oppose the State, represented by the attorney general, over the enforceability of a penal statute. See
The first substantive issue before us involves the scope of
On the basis of such premises, the defendant and the county argue that the legislature must have intended minors over sixteen to be treated as adults in motor vehicle cases only when charged with a violation, which carries no possibility of incarceration. See
First, the language of section 32 conditions its application on the subject of the offense, not on the penalty that may be imposed, and refers to offenses in addition to the motor vehicle laws that are punishable by incarceration. See, e.g.,
Second, the argument for narrow reading runs against State v. Doe, 116 N.H. 646, 365 A.2d 1044 (1976), which held that identical language in the predecessor statute was intended to subject minors over sixteen to adult process and penalties, including incarceration, in motor vehicle cases. In Doe, the court noted that such had been the legislative purpose since the enactment of Laws 1945, 23:1. Doe, supra at 648, 365 A.2d at 1045-46. The legislature has not manifested a change of mind since Doe was decided.
Third, the court stated in considered dictum only two years ago that “[i]t is only in those unusual situations when an offense is both a felony and arguably a ‘motor vehicle violation’ that the policies of RSA chapter 169-B .. . and
Given our construction of the statute, we now deal with the challenges to its constitutionality, starting with the claim that it violates the defendant’s right to the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by part I, article 12 of the Constitution of New Hampshire and by the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The equal protection claim rests on the fact that minors over sixteen who commit motor vehicle misdemeanors are treated differently from minors who commit most other misdemeanors or who commit felonies of any sort. Thus, minors who commit misdemeanors that are not violations of motor vehicle laws, or the other laws or ordinances listed in the section 32 exception, must be treated as juveniles under RSA chapter 169-B; there is no provision for treating them as adults under any circumstances. But see
Although the defendant appears to assume that the equal protection claim must be judged under the so-called middle tier test of Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (1980) (reasonable, not arbitrary, having fair and substantial relation to legislative object), we agree with the county that the rational basis *315test is the appropriate one to apply in assessing both the State and the federal claim. See State v. Scoville, 113 N.H. 161, 163-64, 304 A.2d 366, 368-69 (1973) (“reasonable, not arbitrary [having a] fair and substantial relation” test assumed to be equivalent to rational basis test; classification of seventeen-year-old violators as adult criminals is rational and consistent with constitutional principles). See also Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3049 (1983) (rational basis test applied to classification affecting liberty interests when challenged under equal protection aspect of fifth amendment); Stokes v. Fair, 581 F.2d 287, 289 (1st Cir. 1978) (“there is no constitutional right to any preferred treatment as a juvenile offender”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1078 (1979); United States v. Quinones, 353 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (D.P.R. 1973) (“reasonable . . . not arbitrary . . . having fair and substantial relation” test apparently assumed to be equivalent to rational basis test; statutory distinction between crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, in which attorney general lacks discretion to proceed against juvenile as juvenile delinquent, and other crimes does not violate equal protection), aff’d, 516 F.2d 1309 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852 (1975); State v. Hart, 89 Wis. 2d 58, 277 N.W.2d 843 (1979) (rational basis justifies separate classification of children over sixteen who violate the motor vehicle code and those who violate other provisions of the criminal statutes).
Applying that test, we ask whether the classification can be said to rest on any rationally justifiable distinction, see Peters v. University of N.H., 112 N.H. 120, 121, 289 A.2d 396, 397 (1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). We believe that such a justification is obvious. The State will license a driver who has reached sixteen and has taken a driver training course,
There remain the related claims that incarceration of a sixteen or seventeen-year-old minor with adult prisoners is cruel and unusual punishment, violating the eighth and fourteenth amendments, and is unreasonably disproportionate to the misdemeanor offenses charged, violating part I, article 18 of the State Constitution. In raising these claims, neither the defendant nor the county asserts that the conditions at the house of correction are inhumane or in any sense comparable to the reprehensible circumstances described in Swansey v. Elrod, 386 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1975), or in Inmates of Boys’ Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972), cited in the county’s brief. They argue, rather, that it is the mere exposure to adult county prisoners, and the lack of any juvenile rehabilitative services, that amount to State and federal constitutional violations.
We can only say that the” argument at best obscures the line between what may be undesirable and what is cruel, unusual or disproportionate. Given the societal interests that we have identified, it may or may not be wise to incarcerate older juvenile misdemeanants with adult offenders. But
“in assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the people.
This is true in part because the constitutional test is’ intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards.”
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
Nothing in the record before us even arguably overcomes this presumption of validity. Mixing older juveniles with adults can not reasonably be seen as a per se violation of “contemporary standards” or “basic notions of human dignity,” amounting to cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 302, 386 A.2d *317808, 812 (1978) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, supra at 182, and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)). If it were such a violation, it would be just as unconstitutional to treat a minor as an adult following certification under
There is no constitutional bar to the application of
Remanded.
All concurred.