OPINION
We review here a Superior Court order granting the state’s motion to seize a blood sample from the petitioner, Jose Dearmas, as well as a search warrant issued by that same court to the same effect. The petitioner is a defendant in a pending criminal case charging him with two counts of first-degree child molestation. The state requested and obtained the blood-seizure order and search warrant because it sought to conduct tests on the petitioner’s blood to ascertain whether the petitioner’s DNA matched the DNA obtained from body-fluid evidence that the perpetrator left at the crime scene after he molested the victim. In asking us to quash the blood-seizure order and search warrant, the petitioner argues that the Superior Court exceeded its authority in granting the motion and issuing the warrant because a blood sample does not constitute “property” as that term is used in G.L. 1956 § 12-5-2, the statute that defines the grounds upon which trial-court judges may issue search *661 warrants for the seizure of certain types of evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the petitioner and hold that blood seized from an unconsenting person does not constitute “property” as that term is used in § 12-5-2. Accordingly, we reverse, quash the blood-seizure order and the warrant, and remand this case to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts and Travel
On August 27, 2001, a grand jury indicted petitioner, charging him with two counts of first-degree child molestation. 1 The Superior Court arraigned petitioner and he pled not guilty. Thereafter, on January 29, 2002, the state asked the Providence County Superior Court to issue an order “granting the seizure of blood” from petitioner. The petitioner objected to this request, and the court held a hearing on the state’s motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Superior Court granted the state’s request, issued a blood-seizure order, and instructed the state to apply for the issuance of a search warrant. After the state did so, the court issued the warrant, but stayed its execution pending our review of the legality of the order and warrant. On March 26, 2002, a duty justice of this Court stayed the Superior Court blood-seizure order. Thereafter, on March 28, 2002, this Court issued an order granting the petition for a writ of certiora-ri and continued the stay until further order of this Court.
Analysis
The narrow question before us today is whether the Superior Court exceeded its jurisdiction under § 12-5-2 by issuing an order granting the state’s motion to seize a sample of petitioner’s blood, authorizing the state to apply for a search warrant to effectuate this seizure, and then issuing a search warrant for the police to seize a vial of petitioner’s blood. In
State v. DiStefano,
Section 12-5-l(a) and G.L. 1956 § 8-3-6 vest the justices of the District and Superi- or Courts with the authority to issue search warrants. 2 Section 12-5-2 3 provides, in pertinent part, that a- warrant may issue “to search for and seize any property * * * (4) [w]hich is evidence of the commission of a crime.” Therefore, § 12-5-2 expressly limited the trial justice’s authority in this case to issue search warrants only to “search for and seize any property.” The trial justice did not have carte blanche to issue warrants and seizure orders permitting the state to seize any type of evidence if that evidence did not also constitute “property,” a term that the statute does not define.
“It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.”
Granoff Realty II Limited Partnership v. Rossi,
“[t]he body is not property in the usually recognized sense of the word, yet we may consider it as a sort of quasi property, to which certain persons may have rights, as they have duties to perform towards it arising out of our common humanity. But the person having charge of it cannot be considered as the owner of it in any sense whatever; he holds it only as a sacred trust * * Id. at 242-43. (Emphasis added.) See also Sullivan v. Catholic Cemeteries, Inc.,113 R.I. 65 , 68,317 A.2d 430 , 432 (1974).
*663 In addition, Black’s Law Dictionary defines property as: “The right to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing (either a tract of land or a chattel); the right of ownership!; or] * * * [a]ny external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised * * Black’s Law Dictionary, 1232 (7th ed. 1999). In our view, blood samples taken from a living person’s body without his or her consent do not fit into any one of these definitions. Indeed, ever since the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the consequent overruling of the infamous Dred Scott case, 4 no living person or people; nor their constituent living parts, can be lawfully considered as “property.” Thus, the plain and ordinary understanding of the word “property” excludes blood samples, forcibly taken from living human beings, from the ambit of that term as it is used in § 12-5-2.
In addition, although § 12-5-2 does not define “property,” in
DiStefano,
two justices of this Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Goldberg and joined by Chief Justice Weisberger, said that “we are not satisfied that one’s bodily fluid is ‘property’ or evidence of the commission of a crime,” even though “it is not the blood itself that is the ‘evidence of the commission of a crime,’ but rather the test results that are relevant in a criminal trial.”
DiStefano,
And so this case squarely and unavoidably presents the question that a majority in DiStefano addressed but did not decide: whether blood is “property” within the meaning of that term as it is used in § 12-5-2. On that issue, we believe the analysis of that statute that is set forth in the plurality opinion authored by Justice Goldberg in DiStefano remains sound, and that the state has not presented us with a compelling reason to deviate from it.
As that opinion elucidates, construing blood and other body parts seized from living human beings as “property” would raise a host of practical and interpretative problems. Similarly, as this Court observed over a century ago in Pierce with respect to dead bodies, we do not believe that living human beings own their bodies, body parts, and bodily fluids in a manner that would allow us to construe a person’s blood as property — at least in the absence of any evidence that the individual in question had consented to sell or transfer such *664 fluids to any authority seeking the involuntary seizure of-that person’s blood.
Moreover, were we to construe blood samples to be seized from unconsenting living people as “property,” then we would soon face arguments that courts can issue even more intrusive warrants for the seizure of other body parts and biological material, and, indeed, of even living persons themselves if needed to prove a criminal case. In
Rochin v. California,
In addition, public-policy concerns militate against construing blood samples as falling within the ambit of the search-warrant statute. Violent confrontations could result if the state were allowed to forcibly extract a blood sample from an unwilling suspect or defendant. See
DiStefano,
Finally, as was noted in
DiStefano,
although the General Assembly frequently has extended the scope of judicial authority to issue search warrants through specific statutes, it has declined to authorize the general search and seizure of a person’s bodily fluids whenever the state can articulate probable cause or even a rational reason to do so.
DiStefano,
In its brief, the state argues that State
v. Souza,
In any event, the issue in this case involves a Superior Court trial justice’s authority to issue not merely a blood-seizure order but also a search warrant authorizing the state to seize a sample of petitioner’s blood. We are not faced with the question of whether, as in Souza, a trial justice can issue a mid-trial order to seize a blood sample from the defendant after the court has quashed a search warrant to do so. Therefore, our disposition in this case is not controlled by Souza, in which the blood-seizure order did not involve the issuance of a search warrant. Moreover, a potentially significant distinction exists between court orders requiring the defendant to furnish a blood sample and an order or warrant authorizing the state to seize blood from an unwilling suspect or defendant. In the former situation, the defendant presumably still retains the right to defy the order by refusing to provide the sample, thereby placing himself or herself in potential contempt of the court. With respect to a blood-seizure order or a warrant authorizing the seizure of a blood sample, however, the person affected has no choice in the matter: the authorities can and will proceed to extract his or her blood by force, if necessary.
The state further contends that, even if a. blood sample does not constitute *666 “property” under § 12-5-2, Rule 41 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the Superior Court to issue a warrant for the search and seizure of a blood sample. Like § 12-5-2, Rule 41(b)(4), states that a warrant may issue “to search for and seize any property * * * [w]hich is evidence of the commission of a crime.” But unlike the statute, Rule 41(h) proceeds to define the term “ ‘property,’ * * * to include documents, books, papers and any other tangible objects.”
To support its Rule 41 argument, the state cites to decisions from other jurisdictions that interpret their analogue to Rule 41 as permitting a court to issue a search warrant to seize a blood sample.
E.g., United States v. Allen,
Although this Court often looks to the interpretation of analogous federal rules of procedure when construing and applying our own procedural rules, we are not bound by the federal courts’ interpretations.
See Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
We also endeavor to harmonize statutes and rules that address the same subject matter when we are asked to interpret them. Thus, we should attempt to construe both the statute and the rule in a manner that avoids a conflict between the scope of their respective authorizations. Likewise, when we are faced with statutory provisions that are in
pari materia,
we construe them in a manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent with their general objective scope.
E.g., Shelter Harbor Fire District v. Vacca,
835
*667
A.2d 446, 449 (R.I.2003) (per curiam);
In re Petition for Review Pursuant to § 39-1-30 of Ordinance Adopted by City of Providence,
Although it is well settled that when a statute conflicts with a rule of court, the rule controls,
Heal v. Heal,
The interpretive doctrines of
noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis
also support our conclusion that Rule 41’s definition of “property” does not extend to blood samples. “Under the doctrine of
‘noscitur a sociis,’
the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.”
Wigginton v. Centrac-chio,
Here, Rule 41(h) defines property as “documents, books, papers and any other tangible objects.” The general term, therefore, is “other tangible objects.” Applying the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis,
we associate the phrase “other tangible objects” with the preceding words “documents,” “books,” and “papers.” Recognizing that these terms “take color from each other,”
Sefsick,
We reach this same result when we apply the narrower doctrine of ejusdem gen-eris, which instructs us to interpret “tangible objects” as embracing only evidence that is of a similar nature to “documents, books, [or] papers.” Given the obvious distinctions and differences between “documents, books, [and] papers” and bodily fluids such as blood, we refuse to include blood samples involuntarily extracted from living human beings as falling within the *668 definition of “tangible objects” in Rule 41(h). Blood seized from a living human being is simply not an additional example of a tangible object “of a similar nature as those enumerated” in the preceding clause of the Rule (“documents, books, papers”).
The petitioner finally argues that even if the Superior Court had the authority to issue a search warrant authorizing the state to seize a sample of his blood, such a warrant would violate the Rhode Island Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination.
See
R.I. Const, art. 1, sec. 13 (“No person in a court of common law shall be compelled to give self-criminating evidence.”). Citing to one of the separate opinions in
DiStefano,
Conclusion
In sum, we hold that the word “property” in § 12-5-2 does not include blood samples seized involuntarily from criminal defendants or suspects. We also refuse to interpret Rule 41 in a manner inconsistent with § 12-5-2 and in contravention of our rules of statutory construction. And given the property-seizure limitation on the issuance of warrants under § 12-5-2, we also hold that the Superior Court lacked the authority to issue blood-seizure orders such as the one that the court issued in this case, authorizing the state to apply for a search warrant to seize a sample of the petitioner’s blood. Thus, we reverse, quash the blood-seizure order and search warrant in question, and remand the case to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The grand jury also indicted the petitioner's codefendant, Christopher Morales, and likewise charged him with two counts of first-degree child molestation. Both defendants petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. Because the petitions presented the same issue — -namely, whether the Superior Court possessed the authority to issue a blood-seizure order and search warrant authorizing the police to seize a sample of defendants’ blood — we also granted Morales’s petition and consolidated the cases for briefing and argument. Although our opinion speaks only in terms of petitioner Dearmas, what we say here applies equally to petitioner Morales.
In addition, a related issue arose in a different criminal case, State v. Feliciano, (22—2003—00399), now pending in the Second Division District Court in Newport. On March 28, 2003, we granted that defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari and stayed proceedings in his District Court case pending the outcome of this case. That stay shall continue until we rule separately on that case, which raises the issue of whether a court order authorizing the police to seize blood should be treated differently when it is not coupled with the issuance of a warrant to seize a blood sample from the defendant.
After oral arguments in this case, the state filed a post-argument memorandum stating that the Feliciano case did not actually involve the issue we are addressing today because the District Court only issued a court order, not a search warrant, to secure a sample of Feliciano’s blood. Whether that difference calls for a different result we leave for decision in that case or in another one raising that issue.
. General Laws 1956 § 12 — 5—1(a) provides as follows:
"A search warrant may be issued by any judge of the district court. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be so construed as to restrain the power of the justices of the supreme or superior courts by virtue of 8-3-6 to issue a search warrant.”
General Laws 1956 § 8-3-6 provides as follows:
"The justices of the supreme and superior court shall, by virtue of their office, be severally conservators of the peace throughout the state, and shall severally have the same power in criminal cases throughout the state that district courts have in their respective districts."
. Section 12-5-2 provides:
"Grounds for issuance. A warrant may be issued under this chapter to search for and seize any property:
(1) Stolen or embezzled, or obtained by any false pretense, or pretenses, with intent to cheat or defraud within this state, or elsewhere;
(2) Kept, suffered to be kept, concealed, deposited, or possessed in violation of law, or for the purpose of violating the law;
(3) Designed or intended for use, or which is or has been used, in violation of law, or as a means of committing a violation of law; or
(4) Which is evidence of the commission of a crime.”
.
Dred Scott v. Sandford,