STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEANGELO M., Child-Appellant.
NO. 31,413
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
November 4, 2014
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF ROOSEVELT COUNTY, Drew D. Tatum, District Judge
Pranava Upadrashta, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C.
Robert E. Tangora
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
KENNEDY, Chief Judge.
{1} DeAngelo M. (Child) appeals his convictions for second-degree murder, burglary, larceny, and tampering with evidence. Child appeals the district court‘s denial of his motion to suppress statements he made during an interrogation by three investigating officers and contends that the State did not overcome the rebuttable statutory presumption that his statements were inadmissible against him because he was thirteen years of age. See
{2} We evaluate whether the State successfully rebutted the presumption of inadmissibility of statements made by a thirteen-year-old child under
{3} Child was eight days past turning age thirteen when he was interrogated by three investigators in connection with the murder of Angel Vale. The officers interviewed neighbors and witnesses, including Child‘s mother. On July 23, two retired police officers, who were acting as agents of the district attorney, and a uniformed police officer drove Child and his mother to the Roosevelt County Law Enforcement Complex where they questioned him. His mother was present throughout the interrogation. One officer read and explained Child‘s Miranda rights to him, which, according to the officer‘s testimony, Child appeared to understand. During the interrogation, Child made inculpatory statements to the officers regarding the burglary of Vale‘s home. Child was arrested.
{4} Child filed a motion to suppress his statements. Two of the investigators and Child‘s teacher at the Curry County Juvenile Detention Center testified at the suppression hearing. The district court found that Child had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights and denied his motion to suppress his statements. Child also filed a motion to sever the murder, aggravated burglary, one count of tampering with evidence from larceny, and the second count of tampering, a motion for a bill of particulars, and a motion to compel the State to allow the case to be heard
II. DISCUSSION
A. Child‘s Motion to Suppress His Statements
{5} Prior to trial, Child filed a motion to suppress his statements that were obtained during the interrogation by the two district attorney investigators and a police officer based on the State‘s failure to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility for a thirteen-year-old child‘s statements under
{6} Child argues that the standard created in Adam J. for the State to rebut the “presumptive inadmissibility” of statements by a child under the age of fifteen years is contrary to legislative intent because it requires comparison of the accused‘s ability to give a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights to an average of other protected young children, instead of requiring an individualized determination of whether the child has the ability to understand legal consequences and not to be unduly influenced by authority figures. Child further argues that, even if Adam J. was
{7} The State argues that the Adam J. standard is appropriate and that the State rebutted the presumption that Child‘s statements were inadmissible by presenting evidence from the two investigating officers and his teacher regarding his personal traits that supported the district court‘s finding that he had the ability to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights.1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Adam J., while equating a particular age to a legislative line between children who do or do not have the developmental maturity to make a valid waiver, nevertheless significantly expands the range of inquiry to assess factors “particular to an individual child.” Id. ¶ 8. Viewing this case in light of the expansive evaluation of circumstance and personal characteristics that Adam J. and
{8} The capacity to waive Fifth Amendment rights is assumed for children over fifteen and for adults. See State v. Jonathan M., 1990-NMSC-046, ¶ 8, 109 N.M. 789, 791 P.2d 64; see also Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 7 (requiring the same assessment for adults and children when determining the legitimacy of a Miranda waiver); State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 14-15, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718 (determining that the factors used in evaluating a waiver of constitutional rights for juveniles over the age of fourteen are essentially the same as those used for an adult). This is because
{10} The child‘s “[a]ge is particularly pertinent because
{12} Even while “an analysis of the circumstances may assist the children‘s court in understanding the child‘s personal traits, such analysis is secondary to, and does not substitute for, an analysis of the child‘s personal traits” under
{13} For the state to make such a distinction, the characteristics of an average fifteen-year-old child must be established by the evidence, as well as the individual characteristics of the child. We note that, upon the question of competency being raised by the adult defendant in a criminal case, evaluating his or her competency to stand trial “must be professionally evaluated by a qualified professional.” State v. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, ¶ 17, 138 N.M. 636, 124 P.3d 1175. We do not regard
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence is Required to Rebut the Presumption
{14} The question of the proper standard of proof is generally a matter for judicial resolution. In re Valdez, 1975-NMSC-050, ¶ 12, 88 N.M. 338, 540 P.2d 818. Although the parties did not raise the issue of the level of evidence required to show that Child did not have the ability to waive his rights, we take this opportunity to clarify the law.
{15} For persons older than fifteen years where a valid waiver is presumed by law, waiver may be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 7. For children thirteen or fourteen years old, there is a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility, which, by providing “heightened protection” of constitutional proportions to those children, necessarily alters the level of proof required for the state to meet its burden. Our Supreme Court has held that where fundamental
{16} Thus, we hold that rebutting the presumption in
3. The District Court Erred in Denying Child‘s Motion to Suppress His Statements to Police Officers
{17} Child‘s statements cannot be properly admitted unless the State proves that, by clear and convincing evidence, he was capable of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights.3 We need to go no farther in this case than examining the evidence presented concerning Child‘s individual attributes to conclude that he was not capable of effectively waiving his rights in this instance. The State presented evidence from three persons during the suppression hearing: two of the three
{18} Agents Blair and Aguilar testified that, based on their experience interviewing children of similar age, Child was articulate, inquisitive, and aware of his constitutional rights, was more mature and intelligent than average and, in their opinion, had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. Agent Blair testified about Child based only upon the contact he had with Child during the interrogation. He did not review any school or other records concerning Child. Agent Blair stated that Child engaged in conversations with adults, seemed interested in learning, was aware of his surroundings, and asked questions about his rights and stated he understood. Agent Blair also testified initially that Child‘s mother had stated that he was an “A” and “B” student, but mentioned, on cross-examination, that she had also stated that he had “C” and “D” grades in some classes and had not told Agent Blair about an “F” grade. No evidence of Child‘s actual grades was presented. Agent Blair stated that Child was articulate and had checked out a young adult book of over four hundred pages from the library on the day before the interrogation.
{19} Agent Aguilar testified that Child was more inquisitive about his rights as compared to other children he had interviewed, was more independent, understood the officers’ questions, and appeared to understand his rights. Any statement relating Child‘s capacity specifically to the standard we employ was not provided to the district court. He testified that Child seemed more advanced than the average thirteen-year-old child with whom he had come into contact as a detective in crimes against children. Agent Aguilar felt that Child was actively involved in the explanation of his rights. This testimony was similarly inadequate.
{20} Allen, Child‘s teacher, testified that Child was well-read, inquisitive, and readily corrected the grammar and vocabulary of the other juveniles in the detention center and, in his opinion, Child was more intelligent than the average detainees in
{21} However, Allen did not mention Child‘s school records, nor was he asked to testify regarding Child‘s grades or testing scores prior to being in custody, or otherwise asked to conclude that Child had the maturity and discernment of an average fifteen-year-old child. See Moreno v. State, 510 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. App. 1974) (evaluating extensive records, including psychiatric diagnostic reports, to determine that the sixteen-year-old child had average intelligence and was more socially mature than average). Nor did Allen make any conclusion regarding Child‘s ability to understand complex legal rights and having sufficient capacity to waive
{22} Evaluating the evidence against Adam J. and the standards we have enunciated here, we note first that Child‘s age is at the very lowest possible end of the age range at which his statements can be used at all. Particularly important is the proximity of his age to that which would render his statements conclusively inadmissible. Adam J., 2003-NMCA-080, ¶ 5; Francesca L., 2000-NMCA-019, ¶ 6 (holding proximity to age thirteen to be of possibly conclusive significance). Comparing him to other thirteen-year-old children, or other children whose ages and developmental levels are either not stated or irrelevant, does not provide evidence that he is as advanced as a fifteen-year-old child, leaving the presumption of
{23} We conclude that the evidence presented by the State through answers to a significant number of leading questions did not amount to clear and convincing evidence of Child‘s ability to waive his legal rights. The testimony of the investigating officers was based solely on their single interaction with Child during the interrogation. Each officer provided no more than the knowledge they had about Child based on the interaction during the interrogation and some statements from his
{25} Child filed a motion to sever the murder, aggravated burglary, and one count of tampering with evidence charges from larceny and the second count of tampering. The district court denied the motion to sever on the grounds that the courses of conduct alleged in all five charges were based on a connected series of acts, the evidence would have been cross-admissible, and Child failed to show sufficient prejudice to warrant severance of the charges. The denial of a motion to sever is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Lovett, 2012-NMSC-036, ¶ 10, 286 P.3d 265.
{26} Child argues that the evidence of the larceny, primarily his confession, would not be cross-admissible because it was improper evidence under
{27}
{28} The first step of this inquiry requires determination of whether the evidence pertaining to each charge would be cross-admissible in separate trials. Id. ¶ 19. The defendant may be prejudiced by admission of evidence that would be otherwise inadmissible. Id. “On the other hand, cross-admissibility of evidence dispels any inference of prejudice.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
{29} Cross-admissibility is determined through an analysis of
{30} The evidence in this case would have been cross-admissible because the evidence was proper other act evidence in accordance with
C. Child‘s Motion for Bill of Particulars/Statement of Facts
{31} Child argues that the denial of his motion for a bill of particulars violated his due process rights because he required an understanding of the State‘s theory for connecting the crimes charged and the specific evidence that would be used in order to adequately prepare his defense. The State argues that Child was able to adequately prepare his defense because the delinquency petition described the offenses. He was given a witness list and had access to 1200 documents due to the State‘s open file policy. We review the district court‘s denial of a motion for a bill of particulars for an abuse of discretion. State v. Mankiller, 1986-NMCA-053, ¶ 18, 104 N.M. 461, 722 P.2d 1183.
{32} As our precedent indicates, “[t]he object of a bill of particulars . . . is to enable [an accused] to properly prepare his defense[.]” State v. Mosley, 1965-NMSC-081, ¶ 4, 75 N.M. 348, 404 P.2d 304; State v. Archuleta, 1970-NMCA-131, ¶ 32, 82 N.M. 378, 482 P.2d 242. The bill of particulars must “give [the accused] and the court reasonable information as to the nature and character of the crime charged.” State v. Shroyer, 1945-NMSC-014, ¶ 70, 49 N.M. 196, 160 P.2d 444; see Mosley, 1965-NMSC-081, ¶ 4. However, these requirements do not require the state to “plead
{33} In his request for a bill of particulars, Child asked for the following:
- Each fact, stated with specificity and particularity, upon which the State relies to prove each element of the offense charged.
- The theory of the case.
- Each witness or exhibit that will prove the facts described.
- A description with as much detail and precision as possible, and the manner in which the alleged offense was committed.
- A description with as much detail and precision as possible, and the means by which the alleged offense was committed.
As the State indicates, Child was previously furnished with the State‘s witness list and all of the State‘s 1200 documents and, as a result, appears to have had access to all material relevant to the State‘s case against him. The delinquency petition stated with particularity each of the crimes charged, including the dates and locations of the alleged offenses, the crimes charged and the relevant statutory provisions, and the
{34} Child asserts that “simply knowing what was in the State‘s file was not enough.” However, our precedent indicates that access to the state‘s files normally is enough for the accused to prepare a defense. Other cases have considered similar requests to Child‘s and have determined that knowledge of the evidence on which the state would rely, the particular acts that were being relied on, and the means, manner, or method were not necessary for the accused to adequately prepare a defense. Archuleta, 1970-NMCA-131, ¶ 33 (stating that providing the defendant with the evidence on which the state would rely would require it to plead evidence, which is not necessary); State v. Coulter, 1973-NMCA-019, ¶ 9, 84 N.M. 647, 506 P.2d 804 (holding that the defendant was not prejudiced when the state had made available all the information in its files to defense counsel). This is especially true when the state maintains an open file because the child already has access to the entirety of the evidence and the witnesses the state will use against him. Coulter, 1973-NMCA-019, ¶ 11. In the present case, Child‘s request, including that he “needed to know how the State intended to connect all the crimes charged” and the theory of the case, if not within the documents already in Child‘s possession, would require the State to plead evidence, which is not required to satisfy due process. We fail to see how Child was
{35} The district court was in the best position to assess the whole record and determined that Child had sufficient information to prepare his defense. See Archuleta, 1970-NMCA-131, ¶¶ 33-34. Because Child had access to the entirety of the State‘s documents and witness list, and the delinquency petition stated with particularity the charges against him, we hold that Child had enough information to prepare his defense in accordance with due process. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Child‘s motion for a bill of particulars. We affirm the district court.
D. Child‘s Motion to Compel the State to Allow a Twelve-Member Jury
{36} Child filed a motion to compel the State to allow the case to be heard by twelve jurors instead of six. The district court denied the motion to compel. An appellate court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Schuster v. State Dep‘t of Taxation & Revenue, 2012-NMSC-025, ¶ 9, 283 P.3d 288.
{37} Child argues that, under State v. Lorenzo P., 2011-NMCA-013, ¶ 11, 149 N.M. 373, 249 P.3d 85, he is entitled to a twelve-member jury because an adult facing the
{38} “A child . . . is entitled to the same basic rights as an adult, except as otherwise provided in the Children‘s Code[.]”
III. CONCLUSION
{39} We hold that the State is required to present clear and convincing evidence that Child had an above-average ability based on his personal traits and understanding of the situation to waive his rights in order to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility under
{40} IT IS SO ORDERED.
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge