200 Conn. 224 | Conn. | 1986
The defendant was charged in an indictment with the crime of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). The charge resulted from the stabbing death of his grandmother, Antoinette DeAngelis, with whom he shared an apartment at 10 Clark Street in New Haven. After a jury trial the defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 53a-55 (a) (2),
On appeal the defendant claims that the trial court erred in: (1) finding the defendant competent to stand trial; (2) refusing to suppress certain statements of the defendant; (3) allowing the state to cross-examine a character witness concerning his knowledge of a complaint made to the New Haven police by the defendant’s father; and (4) denying the defendant’s motion for an examination to determine his competency to be sentenced. We find no error.
Two residents in the apartment building had heard the victim scream at about 7:30 that morning. Another neighbor saw the defendant leave his apartment at about 10 o’clock the previous night wearing dark clothes and next saw him the morning of November 21 at about 8 a.m. wearing different clothing. When the police arrived, the defendant, neatly dressed, was pacing in a parking area adjacent to 10 Clark Street. Clothing later seized from the defendant’s room had blood stains on it consistent with the victim’s blood and incon
I
The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court erred by finding him competent to stand trial. Prior to trial, the defendant, by order of the court pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 54-56d (d),
An accused is not competent to stand trial “if he is unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.” General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 54-56d (a); see State v. Pastet, 169 Conn. 13, 26, 363 A.2d 41, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937, 96 S. Ct. 297, 46 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1975). Competence to stand trial is a legal question which must ultimately be determined by the trial court. General Statutes § 54-56d (f); see United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 49 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 1966); Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States v. Turner, 602 F. Sup. 1295, 1311 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); State v. Pastet, supra, 26. It is not a question to be determined by the number of psy
The expert psychiatric testimony at the pretrial hearing pointed toward a conclusion that the defendant suffered from a mental disorder diagnosed as chronic paranoid schizophrenia. Competence to stand trial, however, is not defined in terms of mental illness. An accused may be suffering from a mental illness and nonetheless be able to understand the charges against him and to assist in his own defense; Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1969); and the fact that the defendant was receiving medication and would require medication during the course of the trial does not render him incompetent. State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 403, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969); People v. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. 124, 144-45, 362 N.W.2d 787 (1984).
Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant called four psychiatrists and the state only one, the trial court was entitled to credit and rely on Fenton’s testimony. “Despite the quantity of the defendant’s evidence tending to show [incompetence], the weight to be given the opinion evidence of expert witnesses ... is for [the trier of fact] to determine. State v. Kenyon, 134 Conn. 43, 49, 54 A.2d 585 (1947).” State v. Ontra, supra, 484; State v. Vennard, 159 Conn. 385, 404, 270 A.2d 837
II
The defendant next claims that certain statements made to Officer Dean Runlett of the New Haven police department on November 21,1979, which were admitted at trial, should have been suppressed because they were not made voluntarily. The defendant makes no claim that he was not informed of his Miranda rights or that a waiver of those rights could not have been found. Nor does he argue that he was illegally detained or abused, that physical or overt psychological force was exerted upon him or that any threats, promises or offers were made to him. This case is, therefore, readily distinguishable on its facts from Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961), cited by the defendant. Rather the defendant argues that because of the length of his interrogation, his mental and physical condition, his emotional state, his limited intelligence, and his isolation, his will was overborne and his statements therefore could not be considered voluntary.
The evidence the defendant sought to suppress consisted principally of contradictory statements made by the defendant to Runlett concerning his activities on the night of November 20 and the early morning of November 21,1979. Runlett testified that the defendant had told him that when he arrived home, after being out all night, he found his grandmother’s body lying on the kitchen floor. The defendant later said, however, that when he had come home his grandmother prepared breakfast for both of them. Runlett also testified that the defendant told him he had been to a movie the previous evening, but later said he had stood outside the theatre and had not actually seen the show. The defendant
“The ultimate test of the admissibility of such statements is their voluntariness.” State v. Stankowski, 184 Conn. 121, 131, 439 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1052, 102 S. Ct. 596, 70 L. Ed. 2d 588 (1981). “The issue of whether [admissions are] voluntary and admissible is, in the first instance, one of fact for determination by the trial court in the exercise of its legal discretion.” State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 162, 434 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1064, 101 S. Ct. 789, 66 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1980); see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 395, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964). Our usual deference to the trial court’s finding on questions of this nature is qualified by the necessity for an independent examination of the entire record to determine whether the trial court’s finding of voluntariness is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 576, 504 A.2d 1036 (1986); State v. DeForge, 194 Conn. 392, 398, 480 A.2d 547 (1984). The state is required to prove as a prerequisite to admissibility that, under all the circumstances, admissions by an accused were voluntarily made. State v. Vollhardt, 157 Conn. 25, 34, 244 A.2d 601 (1968). “In meeting that burden, the state need only prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence, and need not satisfy the test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S. Ct. 619, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972).” State v. Derrico, supra, 162. “ ‘ “[T]he test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of ‘law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s]
The testimony elicited at the pretrial suppression hearing was that the defendant was requested by Runlett to accompany him to police headquarters. The defendant agreed to do so and was driven to headquarters by Runlett who was in civilian clothes in an unmarked police vehicle. When the defendant arrived at police headquarters shortly before 10:30 a.m., he was read his Miranda warnings, read them himself and signed the back of the warning card. According to Runlett, the defendant was not a suspect, was not under arrest and would have been allowed to leave police headquarters at any time if he had expressed a desire to do so. The defendant’s interview with Runlett lasted from approximately 10:30 a.m. until 9 o’clock that evening. It appears, however, that most of the statements sought to be suppressed had been made in the late morning or afternoon. During the day the defendant’s mother and brother visited him and gave no indication that they wished the police to terminate
At approximately 9 p.m., the defendant was asked by Runlett to give a formal written statement concerning what they had discussed during the interview. The defendant refused, saying that he wished to talk to a lawyer first. Shortly thereafter, at the request of his mother, the defendant was taken to Yale-New Haven Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. He remained at the hospital for approximately thirty to forty-five minutes and was transported back to police headquarters where he was requested to submit to fingerprinting for comparison purposes. He refused to do so and left headquarters. He returned of his own volition the following day and was fingerprinted.
The defendant submitted, as an exhibit during the hearing on his motion to suppress, the report of Wayne Fenton dated April 13,1982. The report had been prepared pursuant to a court ordered competency examination. Fenton’s report concluded that although the defendant was suffering from a psychiatric disorder “he displays a good understanding of the proceedings against him and appears adequately able to assist his
The mere fact that admissions are made by an accused after a long period of interrogation by a police officer does not necessarily mean those admissions are involuntary. State v. Malm, 142 Conn. 113, 120, 111 A.2d 685 (1955); State v. Poole, 44 N.C. App. 242, 248, 261 S.E.2d 10 (1979); 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 529. Nor does the fact that the defendant was somewhat deficient in mental ability, had a psychiatric disorder, and was upset emotionally, necessarily render his statements inadmissible. State v. Jones, 193 Conn. 70, 84-85, 475 A.2d 1087 (1984); State v. Poole, supra, 248. The court must make a determination of voluntariness based on all the circumstances. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52, 55, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1962); State v. Staples, 175 Conn. 398, 408, 399 A.2d 1269 (1978).
In this case the trial court had evidence before it that the defendant went to and remained at police headquarters voluntarily, was visited by his mother and brother, was apparently well treated and was cooperative and coherent throughout the day. Further, at the end of the interview, he refused to give a written statement to the police and later refused to be fingerprinted. His refusals are persuasive evidence that, despite his deficiencies and the length of the questioning, the defendant was in control of the situation and his will was not subverted to that of his interrogator. We cannot say, therefore, that the trial court erred when it concluded that the defendant’s admissions were voluntarily made and admitted them in evidence.
The defendant also claims that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine his brother, Norman DeAngelis, concerning a complaint made to the New Haven police department by the defendant’s father.
The defendant offered the testimony of his brother on direct examination to prove his claimed character trait of peacefulness and nonviolence. On cross-examination the state’s attorney asked Norman DeAngelis: “Do you know whether your father filed a complaint with the New Haven Police Department on November 9,1979, less than two weeks before the crime charged in this case wherein your father complained that the accused was acting very strangely and gets upset over anything that happens?” The witness answered that he did not. Objection was made to the question and an exception was taken to the court’s ruling allowing it.
The question asked by the state’s attorney is analogous to a question concerning specific acts of prior misconduct by an accused. Such a question may not be asked of a witness to elicit testimony that the defendant is a violent person in order to prove his guilt of the crime charged; State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431, 461, 426 A.2d 799 (1980); or to disprove the character trait in question. State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116, 126, 422 A.2d 749 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S. Ct. 661, 62 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1980); State v. Martin, 170 Conn. 161, 163, 365 A.2d 104 (1976). The opinion of a witness who testifies that an accused is peaceful, passive and nonviolent, however, must have some basis and the state is allowed to test that basis. “When a character witness has given his opinion as to a particular trait, the state may cross-examine that witness
The obvious purpose of the state’s question on cross-examination was to test the accuracy of Norman DeAngelis’ assessment of the defendant’s character and “the good faith with which he testified.” State v. Martin, supra, 165; State v. Turcio, supra, 125-26. The witness had worked at the family market with the defendant and their father and being a family member was ostensibly in a position to know the family’s affairs. His answer that he was unaware that his father had contacted the police concerning his brother’s conduct might have caused the jury to believe that he was not cognizant of an important factor that could affect his assessment of the defendant’s character. The defendant claims, however, that the question was not relevant because his father’s complaint had nothing to do with peacefulness and nonviolence. Rather his father complained only that the defendant was “acting very strangely” and “getting upset.” “When the prosecutor attacks the basis of the witness’ opinion by questioning him as to knowledge of specific acts, such acts must be relevant to those traits.” State v. Martin, supra, 165-66. It is, however, hard to imagine a father making a complaint to the police about his son unless he fears some dangerous action. The question was reasonably designed to elicit evidence of behavior on the part of the defendant which, if the witness were aware of it, would seriously discredit his opinion of the defendant’s character as nonviolent and if he was not aware of it, the basis for his opinion.
The determination, on cross-examination, of the relevance of evidence to test the credibility and the basis of the opinion of a character witness must be made
The defendant put his character in issue through his brother’s direct testimony. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the state to question the brother concerning the basis for his testimony and his good faith in testifying.
IV
The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court erred by denying his motion that he be examined to determine his competency to be sentenced. The defendant, after he was found guilty, did not move for an examination under General Statutes § 54-56d (c) to determine his competence. Rather he moved for an examination under General Statutes § 17-244.
Section 17-244 (a) allows the trial court in its discretion to order an examination of a convicted defendant by the commissioner of mental health if it appears to the court that such person is “mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others.” (Emphasis added.) The psychiatric reports submitted as exhibits at the hearing on April 4, 1983, while they indicate that the defendant was suffering from a mental illness and that imprisonment in a conventional prison setting might be detrimental to him, contain nothing to indicate that he was presently a danger to himself or others. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order an examination under § 17-244 as requested by the defendant. See State v. Gates, 198 Conn. 397, 404, 503 A.2d 163 (1986).
The defendant’s brief appears to claim, however, that the psychiatric reports submitted in connection with the defendant’s motion for a hearing under § 17-244 were sufficient to alert the trial court to the question of the defendant’s competence to be sentenced, and the trial court, apparently sua sponte, should have ordered a competency examination. “A defendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while he is not competent. For the purposes of this section, a defendant is not competent if he is unable to understand the proceeding against him or to assist in his own defense.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 54-56d (a); State v. Lloyd, 199 Conn. 359, 364-65, 507 A.2d 992 (1986).
On the basis of the record, therefore, the trial court did not have before it such substantial evidence of the alleged lack of competence of the defendant to be sentenced to require it, sua sponte, to undertake an evidentiary inquiry or order a competency examination. The trial court, therefore, did not violate the defendant’s right to due process by proceeding with sentencing.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1979)] § 53a-55 (a) (2) provides in pertinent part: Sec. 53a-55. manslaughter in the first degree: class b felony. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as provided in subsection (a) of section 53a-54a, except that the fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subsection
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1983)] Sec. 54-56d. (Formerly 54-40). competency TO STAND TRIAL, (a) COMPETENCY REQUIRED. DEFINITION. A defendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while he is not competent. For the purposes of this section, a defendant is not competent if he is unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.
“(b) PRESUMPTION OF competency. A defendant is presumed to be competent. The burden of proving that the defendant is not competent by clear and convincing evidence and the burden of going forward with the evidence are on the party raising the issue. The burden of going forward with the evidence shall be on the state if the court raises the issue. The court may call its own witnesses and conduct its own inquiry.
“(c) REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY. If at any time during a criminal proceeding it appears that the defendant is not competent, counsel for the defendant or for the state, or the court, on its own motion, may request an examination to determine the defendant’s competency.
“(d) examination of defendant, report. If the court finds that the request for an examination is justified and that, in accordance with procedures established by the judges of the superior court, there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the crime for which he is
“(e) hearing, waiver. The court shall hold a hearing as to the competency of the defendant no later than ten days after it receives the written report. Any evidence regarding the defendant’s competency, including the written report, may be introduced at the hearing by either the defendant or the state. If the written report is introduced, at least one of the examiners must be present to testify as to the determinations in the report, unless his presence is waived by the defendant and the state. Any member of the clinical team shall be considered competent to testify as to the team’s determinations. A defendant and his counsel may waive the court hearing only if the examiners, in the written report, determine without qualification that the defendant is competent.
“(f) continuation of criminal proceedings. If the court, after the hearing, finds that the defendant is competent, it shall continue with the criminal proceedings. If it finds that the defendant is not competent, it shall also find whether there is substantial probability that the defendant, if provided with a course of treatment, will regain competency within the maximum period of any placement order permitted under this section. . . .”
“[General Statutes] Sec. 17-244. certain convicted persons to be examined, report and recommendation, (a) Except as provided in section 17-255 any court prior to sentencing a person convicted of an offense for which the penalty may be imprisonment in the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers, or of a sex offense involving (1) physical force or violence, (2) disparity of age between an adult and a minor or (3) a sexual
“(b) The request for such examination may be made by the state’s attorney or assistant state’s attorney who prosecuted the defendant for an offense specified in this section, or by the defendant or his attorney in his behalf. If the court orders such examination, a copy of the examination order shall be served upon the defendant to be examined.
“(c) Upon completion of the physical and psychiatric examination of the defendant, but not later than sixty days after admission to the diagnostic unit, a written report of the results thereof shall be filed in triplicate with the clerk of the court before which he was convicted, and such clerk shall cause copies to be delivered to the state’s attorney and to counsel for the defendant.
“(d) Such report shall include the following: (1) A description of the nature of the examination; (2) a diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant; (S) an opinion as to whether the diagnosis and prognosis demonstrate clearly that the defendant is actually dangerous to himself or others and requires custody, care and treatment at the institute; and (4) a recommendation as to whether the defendant should be sentenced in accordance with the conviction, sentenced in accordance with the conviction and confined
“[General Statutes] Sec. 17-245. disposition of defendant after report, (a) If the report recommends that the defendant be sentenced in accordance with the conviction, placed on probation by the court or placed on probation by the court with the requirement, as a condition of such probation, that he receive outpatient psychiatric treatment, the defendant shall be returned directly to the court for disposition. If the report recommends sentencing in accordance with the conviction and confinement in the institute for custody, care and treatment, then during the period between the submission of the report and the disposition of the defendant by the court such defendant shall remain at the institute and may receive such custody, care and treatment as is consistent with his medical needs.
“(b) If the report recommends confinement at the institute for custody, care and treatment, the court shall set the matter for a hearing not later than fifteen days after receipt of the report. Any evidence, including the report ordered by the court, regarding the defendant’s mental condition may be introduced at the hearing by either party. Any staff member of the diagnostic unit who participated in the examination of the defendant and who signed the report may testify as to the contents of the report. The defendant may waive the court hearing.
“(c) If at such hearing the court finds the defendant is not in need of custody, care and treatment at the institute, it shall sentence him in accordance with the conviction or place him on probation. If the court finds that such person is in need of outpatient psychiatric treatment, it may place him on probation on condition that he receive such treatment. If the court finds such person to be mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others and to require custody, care and treatment at the institute, it shall sentence him in accordance with the conviction and order confinement in the institute for custody, care and treatment provided no court may order such confinement if the report does not recommend confinement at the institute. The defendant shall not be subject to custody, care and treatment under this part beyond the maximum period specified in the sentence.”