103 Kan. 814 | Kan. | 1918
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The action was one by the state to recover money paid to the defendant for his services as secretary of the Panama-Pacific exposition commission. Judgment was rendered for the defendant on the pleadings and a stipulation regarding certain facts, and the plaintiff appeals.
The legislature of 1913 passed an act providing for the representation of the state of Kansas at the Panama-Pacific international expositions at San Francisco and San Diego, Cal. A commission was authorized to encourage and promote full and complete exhibits of the resources and interests of the state and its citizens at the expositions, and provide and maintain buildings for the state exhibits, for official headquarters of the state, and for the comfort and convenience of its citizens and exhibitors. The sum of $50,000 was appropriated to carry out the purposes of the act. The commission, of which the governor was ex officio chairman, consisted of five members appointed by the governor. The members of the commission were to receive no compensation for their services, but were entitled to actual and necessary expenses. The commission was authorized to appoint, with the approval of the governor,
It is quite clear that a very unfortunate but perfectly innocent mistake has been made. The commission could no more pay one of its own members compensation to do work in furtherance of the object of the creation of the commission than it could let to itself the contracts for the erection of the exposition buildings. It is much debated in the briefs whether or not the members of the commission held “office,” within the meaning of the statute prohibiting officers of various kinds from doing or having done for their own profit any work in and about their offices, or over which they have supervision, direction, or control. It is not necessary to decide the question. The members of the commission were charged with the execution of an important public trust, as agents, at least, of the state, and the same public policy which underlies the statute forbids an agent of a private individual, even, or any one acting in a fiduciary relation, to tempt his own loyalty by entering into any transaction which requires him to play a dual role. It makes no difference that the defendant did not participate in the forbidden acts, or that no fraud or wrong was intended, or resulted. The
No one would for a moment question the fidelity or integrity of the members of the commission, or of the other state functionaries through whose hands the defendant’s vouchers passed; but they could not, singly or all together, cure or waive the defect in the commission’s authority. The legislature alone can do this, and the defendant must be remitted to that body for relief.
Under the pleadings and the stipulation, the services rendered by the defendant as secretary of the commission were necessary to the proper carrying out of the provisions of the act creating the commission, and were of full and actual value equivalent to the amount allowed him by the commission as compensation. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with direction to adjudicate against the state the facts just recited, and render judgment in favor of the state according to the prayer of the petition.