48 N.C. App. 99 | N.C. Ct. App. | 1980
Our disposition of defendant’s ninth and tenth assignments of error makes it unnecessary for us to discuss his remaining arguments on appeal. We conclude that the prosecutor imper-missibly harassed a key defense witness on a collateral matter such as to destroy the witness’s credibility on the critical issues involved in the case with neither a concrete showing nor an inference raised by the circumstances that he was acting in good faith. In refusing to restrain the prosecutor’s conduct or at least to require that the prosecutor demonstrate legitimate grounds for his harassment, the trial judge committed prejudicial error which deprived the defendant of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. For this reason the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Q. Have you on any occasion or occasions shoplifted?
Mr. Robinson: Objection.
A. No, I was not.
Q. Do you know what I am talking about?
A. I assume by shoplifting you mean stealing.
Q. Do you often —
Mr. Robinson: Objection to the question.
Court: Overruled.
Q. Have you at any time or times picked up things from Mann’s Drug Store without paying for them?
Mr. Robinson: Objection.
Court: Overruled.
A. They have been charged, no, I never picked up anything without paying for them.
Q. I will ask if you carried them home, left the store without paying for them?
Mr. Robinson: Objection.
Court: Overruled.
A. They had been charged to the account.
*105 Q. Without saying anything to anybody about it?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. And that if some of the articles were not returned?
A. I have never stolen anything in my life.
Q. No further questions.
Court: Members of the jury, you may not consider the implication of the question.
We recognize that, for purposes of impeachment, a witness may be cross-examined by the asking of “disparaging questions concerning collateral matters relating to his criminal and degrading conduct.” State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 675, 185 S.E. 2d 174, 181 (1971). Cf. State v. Purcell, 296 N.C. 728, 252 S.E. 2d 772 (1979) (clarifying the rule that the questions must concern particular acts of misconduct.) However, such cross-examination is limited by the requirement that the questions be asked in good faith. See, e.g., State v. Purcell, supra; State v. Spaulding, 288 N.C. 397, 219 S.E. 2d 178 (1975) (stating the rule), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 3210, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1210 (1976); State v. Lowery, 286 N.C. 698, 213 S.E. 2d 255 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902, 96 S. Ct. 3203, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1206 (1976); State v. Ross, 275 N.C. 550, 169 S.E. 2d 875 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050, 90 S. Ct. 1387, 25 L. Ed. 2d 665 (1970). This means simply that the questions must be grounded in fact. The prosecutor may not “inject into the trial of a cause to the prejudice of the accused by argument or by insinuating questions supposed facts of which there is no evidence.” State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 524, 82 S.E. 2d 762, 767 (1954). Nor may he “needlessly badger or humiliate” the witness by asking insulting or impertinent questions which he knows will not elicit competent or relevant evidence. State v. Daye, 281 N.C. 592, 596, 189 S.E. 2d 481, 483 (1972).
Nowhere in the record before us does any basis for this attack on this witness appear. If it appears at all that the
Moreover, under the circumstances present in this case, we think it plain that the judge’s admonition to the jury to disregard the “implication of the question” came far too late and was too ambiguous to erase the error. At that point, Mrs. Dawson had been asked at least six questions regarding her “shoplifting” activities. Had the instruction been given after only one such question, we doubtless would have found it adequate to cure the impropriety. However, coming as late as it did, after the prosecutor had indicated he was finished with the witness, and being phrased in the singular as it was, the admonition in our opinion was wholly ineffectual.
In holding as we do in this case, we emphasize the fact
The defendant is entitled to a new trial, and it is so ordered.
New trial.