Dеfendant’s first thirty-nine exceptions and assignments of error based thereon are addressed to the admission of evidence. Those which merit discussion will be considered in numerical order.
Defendant initially asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the witness Donald Brake to testify that when defendant, at the Hamburger Shop shortly after the fight, told him he had kicked Jimmie Collie so hard he had sprained his ankle, he “seemed to be joking about it.” Defendant claims the witness was thus permitted to state a conclusion which was irrelevant and highly prejudicial in that it indicated an attitude of unconcern on defendant’s part. No authority is cited and no reason stated in support of this assignment save the bare assertion that it was irrelevant and prejudicial. For that reason the assignment is deemed abandoned under Rule 28, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court,
Assignments of Error 2 through 8 relate to the introduction of photographs of the deceased to illustrate the testimony of various witnesses. Viewed in context and in the setting at the trial, it appears that in each instance the familiarity of the testifying witness with decеased was established, and the accuracy of the photograph as a true likeness of Jimmie Collie
*358
was shown. They were offered and admitted over defendant’s general objection. When a general objection is interposed and overruled, it will not be considered reversible error if the evidence is competent for any purpose. Rule 21, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court,
Defendant insists, however, that the Statе sought to use the photographs to establish the corpus delicti; that photographs may not be used for that purpose, and therefore the corpus delicti was never shown by competent evidence.
“The phrase
‘corpus delicti’
means literally the body of the transgression charged, the essence of the crime or offense committed. To establish the
corpus delicti
it is necessary to show the commission of a particular act and its commissiоn by unlawful means.” 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson Ed., 1957), § 66. Strong and cogent circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove the
corpus delicti
where no direct evidence is available. “The
corpus delicti,
in cases such as we are considering, is made up of two things: first, certain facts forming its basis, and, secondly, the existence of criminal agency as the cause of them.”
State v. Williams,
*359 Here, defendant argues that the State failed to show by competent evidence that the body upon which the autopsy was performed was the body of Jimmie Collie because the photograph exhibited to the doctor was not competent as substantive evidence and was thereforе inadmissible for the purpose of proving corpus delicti. This contention is not supported by the decided cases.
Photographs have been held properly admitted, with appropriate limiting instructions, to illustrate testimony establishing the
corpus delicti
in North Carolina and other jurisdictions.
State v. Gardner,
This is in accord with the general rule that “photographs are compеtent to be used by a witness to explain or to illustrate anything it is competent for him to describe in words.”
State v. Gardner, supra.
The photographs must, of course, be properly limited and authenticated, and must be relevant.
State v. Atkinson,
Applying these principles to the facts in this case, it appears that Dr. Haberyan, although not previously acquainted with Jimmie Collie, tеstified that the photograph exhibited to him was a fair and accurate representation of the body upon which he performed an autopsy, and expresed his expert opinion that a kick in the head inflicted by a leather shoe could have caused death. The witness Dennis Eason, who saw Jimmie Collie at the fight in Aycock Park, said he recognized the same photograph which had been shown to Dr. Haberyan as a fair likeness of Jimmie Collie on the night he was killed. The father of the deceased identified the same body as that of his son. Thus there was no failure to connect the subject of the autopsy to the deceased named in the bill of indictment. The assignments of error based on such contention are overruled.
Manifestly, there was plenary evidence in proof of the second element of the corpus delicti. Several witnesses testified *360 that Jimmie Collie was kicked in the head by defendant Dawson following which blood was seen running from the victim’s mouth, ears and nose. These witnesses observed that the victim had no pulse and was not breathing. Dr. Haberyan testified essentially that death was caused by a skull fracture behind the right ear and near the base of the brain, compressing vital centers controlling the heart and lungs, and that the fracture was caused by a blow inflicted by a blunt instrumentality such as a cement curbing or a leather shoe. There is no evidence in the recоrd that when Jimmie Collie fell from the hood of the car the back of his head struck the curb. To the contrary, the testimony shows that he fell from the hood of the car and landed face down. This points to the conclusion that the blow which caused death was inflicted by Edward Dawson’s shoe and greatly weakens the suggestion that Collie’s death was attributable to other causes. It was a question for the jury. Defendant’s motion for nonsuit was properly denied.
Defendant’s Exceptions and Assignments of Error Nos. 9 and 13 through 39 concern the admission of testimony involving a fracas at the gymnasium of Benvenue School on the night of November 7, 1969, at a party given by the coach for his football players. These assignments therefore will be grouped for discussion.
Defendant had testified that due to injuries received when he was thrown from a horse and when he was involved in an automobile accident on November 2, 1969, his physical condition was such that he was unable to kick Jimmie Collie as alleged by the State. On cross-examination the solicitor referred to defendant’s professed physical disability and asked: “Didn’t keep you from getting into a fight with the coach of the football team at Benvenue School, did it?” Defendant’s objection and motion to strike were overruled. Later, over the continued objections of defendant, the State was permitted to elicit rebuttal testimоny from Coach Hendricks and his wife to the effect that Edward Dawson was neither a student nor a football player at Benvenue School; that defendant came to the party uninvited and was requested to leave; that he left but returned in a half hour accompanied by fifteen other boys who marched into the gym and assaulted the coach; that defendant pressed the arm cast he was wearing against Coach Hendricks’ neck, struck the coach, was strong and active and had no apparent disability save *361 the cast on his arm. This evidence was offered and received for the sole purpose of showing the physical condition of the defendant at that time and to impeach defendant’s testimony that on the night of November 22 when Jimmie Collie was killed defendant was so disabled by injuries that he could not have struck or kicked anyone. The jury was specifically instructed to consider the evidence only for that purpose.
The evidence was competent for the limited purpose for which it was admitted. Under the North Carolina rule of wide-open cross-examination, so called because the scope of inquiry is not confined to matters brought out on direct examination, questions designed to impeach the witness, if relevant to the controversy, may cover a wide range and are permissible within the discretion of the court.
State v. Penley,
Nor was the testimony of Coach Hendricks and his wife, offered by way of rebuttal to impeach defendant’s testimony of his professed physical incapacity, rendered inadmissible by the general rule which prohibits the State from offering evidence of other offenses committed by the defendant on trial. Such evidence, when it “tends to prove any other relevant fact . . . will not be excluded merely because it also shows him to have been guilty of an independent crime.” Stansbury, N. C. Evidence (2d Ed., 1963), § 91;
State v. McClain,
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Hataway to testify in rebuttal that defendant stated during an in-custody interrogation that he kicked the deceased two or three times. The record reveals that upon timely objection a
voir dire
was conducted, at the conclusion of which the judge made findings of fact that before defendant made any statement to Officer Hataway he was fully advised of his constitutional rights and understood them. The judge concluded that any statement made by defendant to the officer was made knowingly, freely and voluntarily. Nevertheless, defendant now contends his incriminating statement was involuntary because his
*362
mother, who was present at the police station at the time of the interrogation, was not apprised of her son’s constitutional rights and was not allowed to be present at the interrogation. In support of this contention, defendant cites
Miranda v. Arizona,
We find nothing in
Miranda
or
Escobedo
which even remotely supports defendant’s position. A confession is not rendered involuntary merely because the person making it is a minor.
State v. Murry,
So it is with us. The correct tеst of the admissibility of a confession is whether the confession was, in fact, voluntary under all the circumstances of the case.
State v. Gray,
We are aware of the different procedure used in the federal courts', where an independent examination of the facts is made to determine voluntariness. In earlier federal cases it was held that reviewing federal courts were likewise bound by the facts as found by the trial judge.
See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana,
*364 Our proсedure upholding the findings if supported by competent evidence is grounded on the reliability of the trial judge who hears the testimony on voir dire, observes the demeanor of the witnesses, and sits in a more strategic position to judge credibility and determine the true facts with respect to volun-tariness. Here, the facts are only weakly disputed and the record strongly supports the findings. All assignments of error addressed to the admission of defendant’s statement are overruled.
It is worthy of note that under the law as recently declared by the United States Supreme Court defendant Dawson’s statement to the officers, even if obtained in violation of
Miranda,
would be competent on rebuttal (so used here) to impeach and attack the credibility of his trial testimony. In
Harris v. New York,
Finally, defendant assigns as error several portions of the charge. Since only one assignment is preserved and properly brought forward in defendant’s brief, all others are deemed abandoned under Rule 28, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, swpra.
After retiring to consider its verdict, the jury returned and requested the court to repeat its definitions of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The trial judge, “out of an abundance of precaution,” repeated his charge as to second degree murder and then detailed the circumstances which legally reduce that crime to manslaughter, voluntary or involuntary, as the jury might find from the evidence. Defendant assigns this as *365 error, contending that its effect was to cause the jury to reconsider second degree murder as a possible verdict and perhaps to find defendant guilty of voluntary rather than involuntary manslaughter. This contention has no merit.
It is true that a judge who is requested by the jury to reiterate his instructions on some particular point is not required to repeat his entire charge.
McGaha v. State,
Prejudicial error in the trial below has not been shown. The verdict and judgment must therefore be upheld.
No error.