{¶ 2} On February 11, 2004, two Sandusky County sheriff's detectives observed appellant, Wayne A. Davis, driving eastbound on West State Street in Fremont. The detectives recognized appellant and believed that his driver's license was suspended. The officers turned and followed appellant while confirming the status of his operator's license. Eventually, the detectives intercepted appellant at a gas station and charged him with a violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} Appellant pled not guilty and the matter proceeded to a trial by jury. At trial, both detectives testifiеd to observing appellant driving a vehicle. One of the officers produced a videotape taken from a gas station surveillance camera, showing appellant exiting the driver's side of his vehicle.
{¶ 4} The officer testified that a records check of the car appellant was driving showed it properly licensed and registered in Georgia to Taiji Knight, who had bеen a passenger in the vehicle when detectives stopped appellant. Over objection, the state introduced an Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles "packet" under sеal and signed by the bureau's registrar. The computer printout contained therein showed that appellant's temporary permit had been suspended for non-compliance with the Financial Responsibility Act for 90 days on September 29, 2000. Also in the packet was a copy of a "notice of suspension" sent to appellant, advising him of his 90-day suspension, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 5} With the introduction of this evidence, the state rested. When the defense rested without presenting witnesses, the matter was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict of guilty as charged. The court entеred judgment on the verdict and sentenced appellant. From this judgment of conviction, appellant now brings this appeal. Appellant sets forth the following three assignments of error:
{¶ 6} "First Assignment of Error
{¶ 7} "There was insufficient evidence to convict the appellant of driving under a Financial Responsibility Act suspension in violation of R.C.
{¶ 8} "Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 9} "The trial court failed to instruct the jury on an essential elеment of the offense charged.
{¶ 10} "Third Assignment of Error
{¶ 11} "The trial court erroneously and prejudicially admitted State's Exhibit `A' into evidence without a proper foundation."
{¶ 13} Properly signed and sealed BMV records are both domestic public documents under seal, pursuant to Evid. R. 902(1), and certified copies of public records, pursuant to Evid. R. 902(4). As such, the documents are self-authenticating and, "* * * no testimonial foundation is necessary * * *." State v. Morehart (Oct. 31, 1997), 6th Dist. App. No. WD-97-047. See, also, State v. Harper (Dec. 21, 2000), 10th Dist. App. No. 00AP-23. Cf. State v. Hirsch (1998),
{¶ 14} Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is not well-takеn.
{¶ 16} On appeal, a verdict may be overturned if there is insufficient evidence for its support. A reviewing court must determine whether there was presented at trial sufficient evidence to support all of the elements of the offense. State v. Thompkins (1997),
{¶ 17} Appellant was charged with, and convicted of, a violation of R.C.
{¶ 18} "(A) No person, whose driver's * * * or temporary instruction permit * * * has been suspended or canceled pursuant to [R.C. Chapter
{¶ 19} R.C.
{¶ 20} Appellant argues that, because the version of R.C.
{¶ 21} In both Roberts and Gasser, drivers whose licenses were suspended on points violations completed the statutory six-mоnth suspension, but failed to obtain reinstatement. Both were convicted of driving under suspension. On appeal, it was held that the convictions were improper because the defendаnts' license suspensions had expired by operation of law. Roberts at 96; Gasser at 117.
{¶ 22} The opposite result was obtained, however, in State v.Honeyman (Oct. 22, 1991), 2nd Dist. No. 90-CA-24, a case, like this one, involving an FRA suspension. The Honeyman court distinguished Roberts andGasser by pointing out that in the pre-S.B. 123 version of R.C.
{¶ 23} Appellant argues that the definition of the period of suspension found in post S.B. 123-R.C.
{¶ 24} We need not reach the question of whether the legislature intended to change an FRA suspension from an indefinite to a definite suspension. The fallacy in appellant's argument is that the version of R.C.
{¶ 25} There was evidence which, if believed, showed that appellant was driving during a period in which he had failed to satisfy all of the statutory requirements for reinstatement of his license from an indefinite FRA suspension. Thus, there was proof by which a reasonable trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the offense charged proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 26} Since we have concluded that the state did not need to prove that the vehicle appellant was driving was without proof of financial resрonsibility, it follows that the trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on this element. Consequently, appellant's second assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 27} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Fremont Municipal Court is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal for which sum judgment is rendered against appellant on behalf of Sandusky County and for which execution is awarded. See App. R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App. R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist. Loc. App. R. 4, amended 1/1/98.
Singer, P.J., Skow, J., Parish, J., Concur.