STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. QUENTINE L. DAVIS
(SC 20157)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued November 16, 2018—officially released April 2, 2019
Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D‘Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.*
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Syllabus
Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crimes of criminal possession of a pistol and carrying a pistol without a permit, the defendant apрealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the handgun that had given rise to those charges. On the evening of the defendant‘s arrest, an anonymous tipster had called 911 to report that a group of men was gathered near a vehicle parked outside of his window and that “a young man” in that group was in possession of a handgun. The caller could not say exactly how many men there were because they were moving back and forth across the street. The caller further stated that, although he had seen the handgun, he could not identify the specific person who was carrying it because all of the men were wearing dark clothing. When police officers responded to that location, a group of approximately six men who were standing around the vehicle began to walk away. The police officers then ordered the men to stop in order to conduct a search pursuant to Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1), but the defendant continued to walk away. The officers repeated their order, after which they witnessed the defendant drop an object into a nearby garbage can. The police ultimately arrested the defendant, searched the garbage can, and discovered the handgun. On the basis of these facts, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the handgun, claiming, inter alia, that the Terry stop was unlawful and that the subsequent discovery of the handgun was tainted by the unlawful Terry stop. Specifically, the defendant claimed that the anonymous tip did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he had been engаged in criminal activity and that his detention therefore violated his right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant appealed. Held that the trial court improperly denied the defendant‘s motion to suppress, this court having concluded that the detention of the defendant violated the fourth amendment because the anonymous tip that the police received did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had been engaged in criminal activity: although the information conveyed in the anonymous tip may have supported a reasonable suspicion that a young man possessed a handgun in the location where the group of men were spotted under the standard set forth in Navarette v. California (572 U.S. 393), that information was not sufficiently detailed or specific to enable the police to know which of the approximately six individuals subject to the Terry stop possessed the handgun and, therefore, did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant himself was in possession of the handgun.
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with the crimes of criminal possession of a pistol, carrying a pistol without a permit, possession of less than one-half ounce of cannabis-type substance, breach of peace in the second degree and interfering with an officer, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three, where the court, B. Fischer, J., denied the defendant‘s motion to supрress certain evidence; thereafter, the defendant was presented to the court, Cradle, J., on a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charges of criminal possession of a pistol and carrying a pistol without a permit; judgment of guilty in accordance with the plea, from which the defendant appealed. Reversed; further proceedings.
Daniel M. Erwin, for the appellant (defendant).
Jennifer F. Miller, assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state‘s attorney, and Devant Joiner, assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
ROBINSON,
The dispatcher relayed the anonymous tip to police officers on the beat. Within minutes, three police cruisers containing at least five uniformed police officers arrived at the scene. At least one of the cruisers was sounding its siren. As the police officers exited the cruisers, a number of them unholstered their guns. The offiсers considered this location to be in a high crime area.
The officers observed approximately six men standing around a black Infiniti. As the police approached the men, they walked away. Officer Thomas Glynn ordered them to stop, and five of them did. Glynn and another officer, Matthew Collier, recognized two of the men from previous criminal interactions. The sixth individual, later identified as the defendant, continued to walk away from the police down Winthrop Avenue, despite additional orders to stop by Collier and Glynn. The defendant held his right hand at his waist in front of his body, extended his arm, and dropped an object into a garbage can. Shortly after dropping the object, the defendant turned toward Collier and Glynn and said something to the effect of “who, me?” At that point, the poliсe arrested the defendant. A subsequent search of the garbage can produced a 9 millimeter handgun.
The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a pistol in violation of
police recognized two of the individuals from prior criminal encounters. Accordingly, the trial court denied the defendant‘s motion to suppress.
Thereafter, the defendant filed a “motion to reconsider and/or articulate” in which he contended that the trial court‘s reliance on Navarette was misplaced because the state had not cited that case. The defendant further argued that, because Navarette was based on specific concerns arising in the context of anonymous tips about drunk driving, it should be limited to that context. The defendant also requested that the trial court clarify whether it had rejected his claim under the state constitution. The trial court summarily denied this motion.
Thereafter, the defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contenderе to the gun charges pursuant to
On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court improperly determined that the anonymous 911 call was sufficiently reliable under the
Assuming, without deciding, that Navarette is not limited to anonymous tips about drunk driving, we conclude that, although the anonymous tip in the present case was sufficiently reliable under the Navarette standard to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a young man in the vicinity of 472-476 Winthrop Avenue had a handgun, it was not sufficiently detailed to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was in possession of that
We begin our analysis with the standard of review. “Our standard of review of a triаl court‘s findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence
and pleadings in the whole record . . . . [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . . We undertake a more probing factual review when a constitutional question hangs in the balance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836, 843, 955 A.2d 43 (2008). Because the defendant in the present case does not challenge the trial court‘s factual findings but claims only that those findings do not support the conclusion that the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, our review is de novo. See, e.g., State v. Benton, 304 Conn. 838, 842-43, 43 A.3d 619 (2012). The state has the “burden of proving that the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory detention.” State v. Batts, 281 Conn. 682, 694, 916 A.2d 788, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1047, 128 S. Ct. 667, 169 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2007).
We next review the governing legal principles. “Under the
“Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person,
having the information available to and known by the police would have had that level of suspicion. . . . The police officer‘s decision . . . must be based on more than a hunch or speculation. . . . In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 617, 778 A.2d 108 (2001).
“An anonymous tip genеrally does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable suspicion . . . .” State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 326 n.21, 857 A.2d 329 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S. Ct. 1711, 161 L. Ed. 2d 527 (2005). This is because, “[u]nlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, [146-47, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612] (1972), an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant‘s basis of knowledge or veracity, Alabama v. White, [496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)]. As we have recognized, however, there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hammond, supra, 257 Conn. 617; see also Navarette v. California, supra, 572 U.S. 397 (“[O]rdinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations, and an anonymous tipster‘s veracity is by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable. . . . But under apprоpriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make [an] investigatory stop.” [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).
“Whether an anonymous tip suffices to give rise to reasonable suspicion depends on both the quantity of information it conveys as well as the quality, or degree of reliability, of that information, viewed under the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 850, 123 S. Ct. 194, 154 L. Ed. 2d 81 (2002). “[I]f a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.” Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. 330.
In Navarette v. California, supra, 572 U.S. 397, a majority of the United States Supreme Court found its decisions in Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. 325, and Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000), to be “useful guides” in determining whether an anonymous tip had sufficient indicia of reliability to give
State v. Hammond, supra, 257 Conn. 617-20 (United States Supreme Court‘s decisions in White and J. L. “dominate this analysis“). “In White, an anоnymous tipster told the police that a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light. The tipster further asserted that the woman would be transporting cocaine. . . . After confirming the innocent details, officers stopped the station wagon as it neared the motel and found cocaine in the vehicle. . . . [The United States Supreme Court] held that the officers’ corroboration of certain details made the anonymous tip sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. By accurately predicting future behavior, the tipster demonstrated a special familiarity with [the suspect‘s] affairs, which in turn implied that the tipster had access to reliable information abоut that individual‘s illegal activities. . . . [The court] also recognized that an informant who is proved to tell the truth about some things is more likely to tell the truth about other things, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity. . . .
“In J. L., by contrast, [the court] determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a barebones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun. . . . The tipster did not explain how he knew about the gun, nor did he suggest that he had any special familiarity with the young man‘s affairs. . . . As a result, police had no basis for believing that the tipster [had] knowledge of concealed criminal activity. . . . Furthermore, the tip included no predictions of future behavior that could be corroborated to assess the tipster‘s credibility. . . . [The court] accordingly concluded that the tip was insufficiently reliable to justify a stop and frisk.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Navarette v. California, supra, 572 U.S. 397-98.
On the basis of its decisions in Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. 325, and Florida v. J. L., supra, 529 U.S. 266, the majority in Navarette identified the following four factors to be considered in determining whether an anonymous tip has sufficient indicia of reliability: (1) whether the tipster had firsthand knowledge of the alleged criminal behavior; (2) whether the report was contemporaneous with the alleged criminal behavior; (3) whether the report was made “under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event“; and (4) whether the tipster used the 911 emergency system, which allows calls to be recorded, thereby providing “victims with an opportunity to identify the false tipster‘s voice and subject him to prosecution . . . .” Navarette v. California, supra, 572 U.S. 399-400. Once a court has determined that an anonymous tip is reliable on the basis of these factors, that court must thеn determine whether the tip “creates reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 401; see also id. (upon determining that anonymous 911 call was reliable, court was required to “determine whether the 911 caller‘s report of being run off the roadway created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk driving as opposed to an isolated episode of past recklessness“).
In Navarette, the anonymous 911 call was recorded as follows: “Showing southbound Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8-David 94925. Ran the reporting party off the roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 395. Applying the four reliability factors that it had identified,
Like the anonymous tipster in Navarette, the anonymous caller in the present case used the 911 system, and provided a contemporaneous, firsthand account of the alleged criminal conduct9 containing innocent details later corroborated by the рolice. Likewise, the caller reasonably might have been startled by seeing a handgun. We therefore assume for purposes of this opinion that, as far as it went, the police reasonably could have relied on the caller‘s statement.10 In other words, we assume that, under Navarette, the police reasonably could have believed the anonymous caller‘s statement that he saw a young man with a handgun in the vicinity of 472 to 476 Winthrop Avenue shortly before they arrived at the scene. We conclude for the following reasons, however, that, even if the tip was trustworthy, it did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was in possession of that gun.
Unlike the tipster in Navarette, who provided a detailed description of the specific vehicle that had run her off the road, thereby enabling the police to identify that
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that “the anonymous tipster must provide a sufficient quantity of information, such as the make and model of the vehicle, its license plate numbers, its location and bearing, and similar innocent details, so that the officer, and thе court, may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the same as the one identified by the caller.” In Wheat, the court further observed that, although Florida v. J. L., supra, 529 U.S. 266, “focused on deficiencies in the quality, rather than in the quantity, of the information contained in the tip at issue in that case . . . it [was] significant that that tip only spoke of a young black male wearing a plaid shirt, standing at a particular bus stop. See [Florida v. J. L., supra, 268]. That is a rather generic description [creating] the possibility for confusion of the suspect‘s identity . . . .” United States v. Wheat, supra, 731.
Similarly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has observed that, “[i]n order to pass muster under Terry and its progeny, the articulable suspicion must be particularized as to the individual stopped. . . . Accordingly, in the absence of other circumstances that provide sufficient particularity, a description applicable to large numbers of people will not suffice to justify the seizure of an individual.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re S.B., 44 A.3d 948, 954-55 (D.C. 2012). In that case, the court concluded that an anonymous tip that a black male who was wearing white pants and “messing around” with a girl in a particular playground had a gun was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion as to the defendant in that case because the police officers lacked “a rational basis for differentiating [the defendant] from [a different] individual in white clothing whom they had just searched (or any other juvenile in white pants who might come along) . . . .” Id., 956-57; see also Goodson v. Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 2000) (lookout broadcast for “tall, heavy-set, white man dressed as a cowboy” did not give police “reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk any tall, heavy-set, white man” because “[s]uch a description would simply be too vague, and fit too many people, to constitute particular, articulable facts on which to base reasonable suspicion“); United States v. Jones, 998 F.2d 883, 884-85 (10th Cir. 1993) (tip from identified callers regarding suspicious activity by two African-American men who left scene in black Mercedes was not sufficiently specific to give rise to reasonable suspicion to stop black Mercedes in which two African-American men were traveling); United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1980) (radio bulletin indicating that “the police were looking for a black male, [five] feet [six] inches to [five] feet [nine] inches tall and weighing between 150 and 180 pounds, with a medium afro hair style, who was wearing jeans and a long denim jacket” did not give rise to probable cause to arrest individual merely
because he matched that description); In re A.S., 614 A.2d 534, 539 (D.C. 1992) (lookout broadcast was not sufficient to еstablish reasonable suspicion when police officer‘s description “could have fit not merely the five individuals [in the specified location], but a potentially much greater number of youths in the area“); State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205, 222, 837 A.2d 359 (2003) (911 caller “must provide a sufficient quantity of information, such as an adequate description of the vehicle, its location and bearing, or similar innocent details, so that the officer, and the court, may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the same as the one identified by the caller” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also State v. Benton, supra, 304 Conn. 843 (police must have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity” [internal quotation marks omitted]).11 Indeed, we entirely agree with the District of Columbia Court of Apрeals that the “dragnet seizure of [multiple] youths who resembled a generalized description cannot be squared with the long-standing requirement for particularized, individualized suspicion.” In re A.S., supra, 540; see also id. (“[t]o allow the seizure of three people on the basis of a generalized description that would fit many people is directly contrary to the central teaching of the [Supreme] Court‘s [f]ourth [a]mendment jurisprudence demanding specificity” [internal quotation marks omitted]).
In the present case, the anonymous caller indicated only that the handgun was in possession of one of several young men wearing dark clothing in the vicinity of 472 to 476 Winthrop Avenue. It is clear, therefore, that the tip was not sufficiently detailed or specific to enable the police to know which of the six individuals subjected to the Terry stop had the handgun. Indeed, they had no way of knowing whether any of those individuals had that gun. The caller could not specify exactly how many individuals he had seen, and he indicated that some of the individuals were gathered around the Infiniti, while others were “crossing the street . . . back and forth.” Thus, for all the police knew, it was possible that the individual with the handgun was not part of the group gathered around
We therefore conclude that the anonymous 911 call in the present case did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that any of the individuals gathered in the vicinity of the black Infiniti, including the defendant, was in possession of a handgun, justifying an investigative Terry stop. We, therefore, further conclude that the
seizure of the defendant violated his fourth amendment rights. Accordingly, we also conclude that the trial court improperly denied the defendant‘s motion to suppress.
In reaching these conclusions, we are mindful of the gun violence that plagues our state and our nation and the importance of ensuring that the police have the tools that they need to combat this pestilence. We emphasize that the police have not only the right, but the duty to respond appropriately and effectively to gun complaints. For example, as the defendant conceded at oral argument before this court, the police in the present case could have responded to the anonymous 911 call by going to the scene and observing the men or approaching them to ask about the handgun without effecting a Terry stop. See United States v. Watson, 900 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2018) (when police receive anonymous tip about gun, they can respond “with a strong and visible police presence, one that involved talking with people on the scene when they arrived” or “make their own observations about the developing situation, which could transform an innocuous tip into reasonable suspicion” [internal quotation marks omitted]); United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 436 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[o]fficers proceeding on the basis of an anonymous tip that does not itself give rise to reasonable suspicion have many tools аt their disposal to gather additional evidence that could satisfy the requirements of Terry and therefore allow police to stop the individual . . . [including] investigation, surveillance, and even approaching the suspect without a show of authority to pose questions and to make observations about the suspect‘s conduct and demeanor” [citation omitted]); see also United States v. Harger, 313 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to grant the defendant‘s motion to suppress.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices Palmer, McDonald, D‘Auria, Mullins and Ecker. Although Chief Justice Robinson was not present when the case was argued before the court, he has read the briefs and appendices, аnd listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision.