The opinion was delivered by
Peter J. Davis appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm, holding that a motion to correct an illegal sentence does not provide a defendant a means for a collateral attack of a conviction arising after a district court ruled that the State, during trial, could orally amend the date of offense alleged in the complaint.
The amendment at issue was made at the close of the State’s evidence. Originally, Davis was charged with one count of first-degree murder which was alleged to have occurred on January 26, 2000. His case was joined with other codefendants who were charged not only with the crime of first-degree murder, alleged to have occurred on January 26, 2000, but also with crimes alleged to have occurred on January 24, 2000. The information was amended twice, and the third amended information, the last filed before trial, alleged that Davis, along with his codefendants, conspired to commit first-degree murder on January 24, 2000, and committed overt acts on both January 24, 2000, and January 26, 2000.
During the trial, after the State had rested its case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict. As to Count X, the count at issue
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on this appeal, defense counsel argued the State had not presented evidence to prove that
Davis
and the alleged coconspira tors agreed to commit murder on January 24, 2000. Defense counsel contended there was no testimony showing Davis was with the others on that particular date. The State then moved, over defense counsel’s objection, to amend the information to properly show January 26, 2000, as the only date on which Davis allegedly conspired to commit first-degree murder. The court granted the State’s oral motion. No written fourth amended information was ever filed, nor was the amendment memorialized in a journal entry. Davis was found guilty and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See
State v. Davis,
Subsequently, Davis filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing the district court lacked jurisdiction because the State had not memorialized the amendment, which Davis felt caused him prejudice. The district court held a hearing on the motion on June 22, 2005. After considering counsel’s arguments, the court found the defendant suffered no prejudice due to the State’s failure to file a fourth amended information and denied Davis’ motion to correct an illegal sentence. The district court subsequently ordered the State to file a journal entiy nunc pro tunc correctly stating the offense in the conspiracy count. The State complied.
Davis filed this appeal. His argument is based upon the requirement that the complaint or information shall be a plain and concise “written” statement of the essential facts constituting the charged crime. K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 22-3201(b). Thus, even though an oral amendment is permitted at trial, a writing is required. “The amendment to [a] complaint or information may be shown by interlineation on the complaint or information, by the filing of an amended complaint or information, or by a journal entry stating the amendment to the complaint or information.”
State v. Rasch,
Davis’ motion was filed pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3504. K.S.A. 22-3504 only applies if a sentence is illegal, and the question of
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whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review.
State v. Hoge,
We must examine whether Davis’ argument falls under any of these categories of an illegal sentence. In doing so, we note that the essence of Davis’ claim, as the district court correctly concluded, is whether Davis suffered prejudice. Contraiy to the defendant’s argument, no jurisdictional issue is raised. The State’s failure to file an amended complaint after making an oral motion to do so does not deprive a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant. See
State v. Switzer,
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Regardless of how Davis’ issue is framed, a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not the appropriate mechanism for the relief he seeks. This court has reiterated that K.S.A. 22-3504(1) has very limited applicability.
State v. Gayden,
“The defendant herein is seeking reversal of his conviction of aggravated robbery as opposed to correction of the sentence imposed on the conviction. In essence, the defendant is seeking to use the correction of an illegal sentence statute as tire vehicle for a collateral attack on a conviction. Such relief is not available under K.S.A. 22-3504.”281 Kan. at 602 .
See also
Hoge,
Similarly, we conclude that relief is not available to Davis under K.S.A. 22-3504 based upon a prosecutor’s failure to memorialize in writing an oral amendment to a complaint or information or based upon a claim that the oral amendment prejudiced the defendant. Davis is essentially seeking to use the correction of an illegal sentence statute as a vehicle for a collateral attack on his conviction.
The district court correctly denied relief, although for the wrong reason. As stated in
Nash:
“The district court should have denied relief on the basis that the only relief sought was not available under the statute. However, where the trial court reaches the right result, it will not be reversed even though its reasoning was not correct.
State v. Graham,
Affirmed.
