State v. DavisState v. Davis
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Ryan
The defendant was charged with six counts of murder in the first degree. He elected trial to a court of three judges as provided by
In his first assignment of error, the defendant claims that the grand jury selection process as conducted in New Haven County resulted in a “systematic and intentional exclusion of electors” from service on the grand jury which indicted him. On September 30,1966, the Superior Court ordered a grand jury of eighteen electors and two additional electors as alternates to be summoned to appear in New Haven on October 10, 1966. The grand jury was called to inquire into offenses alleged to have been committed by the defendant. Before the grand jury was called into the courtroom, counsel for the defendant
The defendant’s contention that there was a systematic and intentional exclusion of electors from service on the grand jury is based on the statement of the high sheriff of the county, who had not been called as a witness but who arose in court and voluntarily stated, that he chose for service on the grand jury only “high class people” who “understand what a grand jury is.” The defendant urges that this method constitutes an exclusion of electors from service on the grand jury which is proscribed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. See
Norris
v.
Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 591, 55
Were this not a capital case we should give this assignment of error no further consideration, since it was not properly raised. In fact, at no time was the claim made in the court below that there was a systematic and intentional exclusion of electors from service on the grand jury. In order that the defendant may be given every consideration, we have decided to consider this claim even though it was not properly raised.
State
v.
Reid,
146 Conn. 227, 230, 149 A.2d 698;
State
v.
Davies,
supra, 145;
State
v.
Walters,
145 Conn. 60, 64, 138 A.2d 786, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 46, 79 S. Ct. 70, 3 L. Ed. 2d 45. Upon properly raising an objection, the burden would be on the defendant to produce evidence sufficient to establish at least a prima facie case of the systematic exclusion of a class from the grand jury selection process.
Coleman
v.
Alabama,
389 U.S. 22, 23, 88 S. Ct. 2, 19 L. Ed. 2d 22;
Hernandez
v.
Texas,
347 U.S. 475, 480, 74 S. Ct. 667, 98 L. Ed. 866; see
Whitus
v.
Georgia,
385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S. Ct. 643, 17 L. Ed. 2d 599. The record is clear that the defendant produced no evidence which would tend to establish any such systematic exclusion, and the finding of subordinate facts is not attacked in this appeal. There was no actual tender of proof, nor is it claimed that the court refused to entertain such an offer. In the absence of such evidence, a presumption arises that the officer in charge of the selection of the grand jury performed his duty fairly and without discrimination against any class. See
Glasser
v.
United States,
315 U.S. 60, 87, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680; note, 1 A.L.R.2d 1291, 1296. No claim was made in the trial court, nor is it now
In passing upon the claim of the defendant that the court below was in error in concluding that the defendant was guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt, we determine whether upon all the evidence the court could reasonably have reached the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder. State v. Malm, 142 Conn. 113, 115, 111 A.2d 685; State v. Simborski, 120 Conn. 624, 626, 182 A. 221; State v. Dodez, 120 Conn. 216, 219, 179 A. 643.
For about four years prior to August 23, 1966, the defendant had lived in a common-law relationship with Gloria Baskerville, commonly known and hereinafter referred to as Fanny Baskerville. They had two children, and two other children of Miss Baskerville lived with them. On Tuesday, August 23, 1966, the defendant went to work on the midnight shift and returned home shortly after 8 o’clock Wednesday morning, August 24. His two children, the younger being a month old, were with his mother, the defendant’s common-law wife having left the home sometime early Wednesday morning. The defendant then went out to look for Fanny. He visited the house of her sister Leatrice McClure on two occasions that day. He asked Leatrice for the addresses and telephone numbers of her sister Katherine Anderson and her brother, John McClure, both of whom lived in Jersey City, New Jersey. He then decided to drive to New Jersey to find out if
The defendant returned to New Haven the same day, and at 10 p.m. he visited the home of Fanny’s sister-in-law, Gwendolyn McClure, still seeking Fanny. After that he drove around in his car and visited two taverns. At 3 a.m. Thursday, August 25, he went hack to the residence of Leatrice McClure, again inquiring about Fanny. Leatrice said to the defendant: “If someone aggravates you about my sister leaving you, you will hurt somebody, won’t you?” He said “Yes.” Although Leatrice knew where her sister was, she refused to tell the defendant because she was afraid he would injure her. On August 25, at about 9 p.m., the defendant came again to 16 Northeast Drive where Leatrice McClure resided with her mother, Mrs. Mary McClease, her grandmother, Mrs. Alice Pelham, her sisters, Charmaine McClease and Franeine McClease, a brother, Royal McClease, and her daughter, Leronda McClure. The defendant asked Leatrice if Fanny had called and inquired of her mother, Mary McClease, concerning Fanny. He said, “I’ll see you later,” and left the house.
The apartment located at 16 Northeast Drive consists of a living room and a kitchen with a utility closet on the first floor. The second floor contains four bedrooms and a bathroom. Shortly before midnight on Thursday, August 25, the defendant drove up in a Chrysler car and stopped. He got out of the car and walked into the courtyard toward 18 Northeast Drive, carrying a carbine held down by his right side. A shot was fired, and the defendant came out of the yard and said he had shot a dog. He then got back in his car and sat there for about a minute. After that he went to the trunk of the car, took out a brown sweater, got back in the car and sat there for about another minute. He then left the car with the brown sweater wrapped around the carbine and walked in the direction of 16 Northeast Drive, where the McCleases lived. The defendant entered the apartment shortly after midnight. When he entered, Leatrice McClure was standing
After the shootings the defendant changed his trousers and left the house, carrying the carbine straight up and down and swinging it as he walked. The brown sweater was in his hand around the carbine. The defendant was not running. He walked at the same pace at which he walked when he entered the house. He put the carbine in the trunk of the oar, sat in the car for almost a minute, and then drove off. He drove the car down Dixwell Avenue and Broadway and went through four or five red
The defendant claims that there was no evidence of premeditation to substantiate the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree. The basic claim of the defendant is that “this tragedy was, in fact, a sudden, impulsive occurrence.” The evidence indicates clearly that it was neither sudden nor impulsive. The trial court had in evidence before it the statements frequently made by the defendant to Fanny that if he had to shoot someone he was “going to take a whole lot” with him; his statements indicating a lack of regard for her family; his admission to Leatrice McClure at 3 a.m. on Thursday, August 25, that if someone aggravated him about Fanny’s leaving him he would hurt someone; and the statement made by the defendant between 8:30 and 9 p.m. on August 25 that he was “going to hurt someone tonight.” The defendant’s whole course of conduct indicated increasing anger, resentment and animosity towards the members of Fanny’s family because they refused to
While voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime, a killing by one who, at the time the act was committed, was in such an advanced stage of intoxication that he was incapable of conceiving and carrying into execution a deliberate plan to kill, or was mentally incapable of intent or premeditation, or
The defendant also claims that his mental condition at the time of the offenses was such that he was not capable of wilful, deliberate, premeditated murder. A psychologist, testifying as a defense witness, stated that he had interviewed the defendant and had administered four psychological tests to him. The test findings suggested that the defendant had a character disorder in which tendencies toward dependency, depression, jealousy, and suspiciousness and poor ability for affect control were prominent ; that the defendant is a person of average mental ability; that in situations where his feelings are not aroused he is quite capable of rational thinking and of logical procedure but that his ability to remain rational is subject to the “fluctuations which go with the ups and downs of his feelings”; that when he feels alone he becomes frantic and anxious, his resentments become strong, and he becomes unable to use his intelligence, judgment and rationality; that his jealousy, resentfulness and suspiciousness had a paranoid quality but that this trend was not so great that it would add up to a psychotic picture; that at the time of the offenses the defendant’s free will was affected by irrational jealousies and resentments which at other times he would be able to judge; and that the defendant’s act was a good example of “irresistible impulse.” A psychiatrist called by the defendant testified that the defendant acted in such a way as to indicate that his emotional
The legal standard of sanity or capacity to commit crime was reviewed and approved by this court in 1959. 1 “To be the subject of punishment, an individual must have mind and capacity, reason and understanding enough to enable him to judge of the nature, character and consequence of the act charged against him, that the act is wrong and criminal, and that the commission of it will justly and properly expose him to penalty.” State v. Davies, 146 Conn. 137, 144, 148 A.2d 251, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 921, 79 S. Ct. 1441, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1537. A defendant is within the law’s protection if his mind is so diseased or abnormal as to render him incapable of resisting an impulse to do an otherwise criminal act. State v. Pastet, 152 Conn. 81, 84, 203 A.2d 287; State v. Donahue, 141 Conn. 656, 664, 109 A.2d 364, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 926, 75 S. Ct. 775, 99 L. Ed. 1257; State v. Wade, 96 Conn. 238, 242, 113 A. 458.
While the state presented no medical experts, it offered evidence concerning the course of conduct and behavior of the defendant during the time he lived with Fanny, his common-law wife, a period of about four years. It also offered detailed evidence of his actions on August 24 and August 25 both before and immediately after the shootings. The defendant himself testified in considerable detail concerning his movements for a period of forty-eight
The state has a right, in the first instance, to rely on the presumption that the defendant was sane at the time of the offenses alleged in the indictment, and thereupon it becomes the privilege of the accused to offer such evidence as he desires upon the subject of his mental condition. As soon as substan
The defendant also contends that the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty upon him, pursuant to §§ 53-10 and 54-100 of the General Statutes, vio
The defendant, nevertheless, urges that through disuse capital punishment has become a sacrificial anachronism in the American legal system and that by virtue of the eighth amendment to the constitution of the United States the state no longer has the constitutional power to take the life of a convicted criminal. Although the penalty of death may now be inflicted less frequently, as of the end of 1967, thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia and the federal government continued to authorize by statute the infliction of the death penalty for the crime of murder. 3 In the same year, seventy-four persons were sentenced to death for the crime of murder. 4 Thus, the death penalty remains an accepted method of punishment, even though it is less frequently used.
To adopt the argument of the defendant would require this court to vitiate what is an inherently legislative determination that the death penalty is an appropriate mode of punishment for the crimes enumerated in
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
In 1967, the legislature enacted No. 336 of the 1967 Public Acts (
The eighth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666, 82 S. Ct 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758.
Pour other states authorize the death penalty for a murder committed under certain circumstances, and nine states have abolished capital punishment outright. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoners Statistics Bul. No. 42 (June, 1968), Tables 15 and 16, pp. 30-32.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoners Statistics Bui. No. 42 (June, 1968), p. 1.