State v. DardenState v. Darden
OPINION
{¶ 1} Jared Darden pled guilty in the Fairborn Municipal Court, Traffic Division, to driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 2} The offense report filed in the case reveals the following facts:
{¶ 3} At approximately 2:30 a.m. on June 22, 2005, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Williams witnessed Darden driving on Dayton-Yellow Springs Road. Darden was exceeding the speed limit and Williams observed him drive over the right line several times. After Darden entered a right turn lane but continued to drive straight with his right turn signal on, Williams activated his pursuit lights and stopped him. Williams could smell alcohol on Darden‘s breath and he appeared to be intoxicated. Darden admitted to having consumed alcohol at a bar and he indicated that his driver‘s license was under suspension. Williams asked him to perform a series of field sobriety tests. A license check revealed that Darden had a prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol on May 22, 2003. Darden was arrested for driving under the influence and was taken to the Fairborn police department. There, Darden refused to submit to a BAC Datamaster breathalyzer test.
{¶ 4} Darden was charged with driving under the influence, marked lanes violations, and driving under suspension. On June 30, 2005, he entered a plea of not guilty. At the pre-trial conference on July 25, 2005, Darden apparently agreed to plead guilty to driving under the influence and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining two charges with costs to Darden. At a disposition and sentencing hearing on September 15, 2005, Darden pled guilty to driving under the influence. The court dismissed the driving under suspension charge and the marked lanes violation with costs to Darden. Darden was sentenced to 180 days in jail of which 150 were suspended.
{¶ 5} Darden raises two assignments of error on appeal.
{¶ 6} I. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING APPELLANT‘S GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH OHIO TRAFFIC R.10(D).”
{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Darden claims that the trial court was not permitted to accept his guilty plea because it failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Traffic R.10.
{¶ 8} The Ohio Traffic Rules, promulgated pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} “In misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses, except those processed in a traffic violations bureau, the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and shall not accept such pleas without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty.”
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} “With reference to the offense or offenses to which the plea is entered:
{¶ 13} “(1) The plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant‘s guilt.
{¶ 14} “(2) The plea of no contest is not an admission of the defendant‘s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint and such plea or admission shall not be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.
{¶ 15} “(3) When a plea of guilty or no contest is accepted pursuant to this rule, the court shall proceed with sentencing under Criminal Rule 32.”
{¶ 16} In Watkins, supra, the supreme court made clear that in order to meet
{¶ 17} As recognized by the parties, the supreme court recently addressed the effect of the trial court‘s failure to advise a criminal defendant that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt, pursuant to
{¶ 18} “The right to be informed that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt is nonconstitutional and therefore is subject to review under a standard of substantial compliance. Though failure to adequately inform a defendant of his constitutional rights would invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that it was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, failure to comply with nonconstitutional rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby suffered prejudice. The test for prejudice is `whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’ Under the substantial-compliance standard, we review the totality of circumstances surrounding [the defendant‘s] plea and determine whether he subjectively understood that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt. * * *
{¶ 19} “[W]e hold that a defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt. In such circumstances, a court‘s failure to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as required by
{¶ 20} Darden asserts that Griggs should not apply to his circumstances. He claims that the trial court made no effort to comply substantially with
{¶ 21} We find Darden‘s arguments to be unpersuasive. As stated above, the supreme court explained in Watkins that compliance with
{¶ 22} Although we agree that the better course is for the trial court to convey all of the information contained in
{¶ 23} The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 24} II. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION OF THE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE.”
{¶ 25} In his second assignment of error, Darden asserts that the trial court incorrectly determined that the mandatory minimum sentence was twenty days when, in fact, it was ten days. Darden indicates that he was charged with and pled guilty to a violation of R.C.
{¶ 26} In response, the state acknowledges that the trial court “may have incorrectly determined that the minimum mandatory jail time was twenty days.” However, it asserts that the trial court‘s effective sentence of thirty days in jail was appropriate based on the factors presented. See R.C.
{¶ 27} As an initial matter, we note that the trial court apparently treated Darden‘s refusal to take a chemical test as a sentencing enhancement, making the driving under the influence charge a “high-end” offense. This approach is incorrect. R.C.
{¶ 28} As separate offenses, violations of R.C.
{¶ 29} In the present case, Darden had a prior driving under the influence conviction within the past six years and, on the instant charge for driving under the influence, he had refused to take the chemical test upon his arrest. It appears undisputed that Darden could have been charged with a violation of R.C.
{¶ 30} As stated, supra, the state asserts that Darden‘s sentence does not rise to the level of plain error, despite the trial court‘s apparent misstatement of the mandatory minimum sentence. We disagree that Darden was required to establish plain error. Darden, by counsel, argued unsuccessfully before entering his plea that the test refusal should not be used as a sentence enhancer. A further objection to the sentence was not necessary to preserve the error.
{¶ 31} In sentencing Darden to thirty days in jail, the court indicated that it was taking into consideration that Darden did not have a valid driver‘s license and that he drove home from a club. The court also stated that it was intentionally giving Darden more than the mandatory minimum sentence. Although the court‘s sentence was clearly permissible, it is unclear whether the trial court intended to give thirty days in jail or ten days beyond the minimum sentence, which it believed to be twenty days. Because the trial court‘s misunderstanding of the relevant mandatory minimum sentence could have resulted in a longer sentence than the trial court wished to impose, we conclude that this matter should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
{¶ 32} The second assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 33} The judgment of conviction will be affirmed, and the matter will be remanded for resentencing.
Grady, P.J. and Walters, J., concur.
(Hon. Sumner E. Walters retired from the Third District Court of Appeals sitting by assignment of the Chief J