State v. DaophinState v. Daophin
We review Daophin v. State, 511 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), to answer a certified question of great public importance.1 We have jurisdiction.
Respondent Daophin was convicted of trafficking in cocaine by delivery in excess of 400 grams contrary to
(b) Any person who knowingly sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, 28 grams or more of cocaine as described in s. 893.03(2)(a)4. or of any mixture containing cocaine is guilty of a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in cocaine.” If the quantity involved:
1. Is 28 grams or more, but less than 200 grams, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 3 calendar years and to pay a fine of $50,000.
2. Is 200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 5 calendar years and to pay a fine of $100,000. 3. Is 400 grams or more, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 calendar years and to pay a fine of $250,000.
Under the statute, the offense may be proven under five alternatives: (1) knowingly selling; (2) knowingly manufacturing; (3) knowingly delivering; (4) knowingly bringing into the state; or (5) knowingly being in possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine. The schedule of lesser included offenses, page 274, Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal), recognized that instructions on lesser included (category one) offenses would be given as follows: (1)
The question for us is whether the jury instructions are in error in not listing simple possession as a necessarily lesser included offense of the trafficking by delivery. Alternatively stated, may an accused be guilty of delivery without actually or constructively possessing the contraband? Through the law of principals, it is quite possible for an accused to aid, abet, counsel, hire, or otherwise procure the delivery of contraband without having actual or constructive possession of the contraband.
Respondent also argues that even if she were not entitled to an instruction on possession as a necessarily included lesser offense (category one), she was entitled to an instruction on possession as a permissive lesser included offense (category two). We disagree. In order to be entitled to instructions on category two offenses, both the accusatory pleadings and the evidence must support the commission of the permissive lesser included offense. In the Matter of the Use By the Trial Courts of the Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases and the Standard Jury Instruction in Misdemeanor Cases, 431 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1981); Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1968). Here, the state chose to limit its charge to trafficking. There is no accusatory charge of possession.
We disapprove and quash the decision below and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. To the extent they conflict with the decision here, we disapprove
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., dissent.
Notes
MUST A JURY BE INSTRUCTED ON SIMPLE POSSESSION OF COCAINE PURSUANT TO SECTION 893.13(1)(e), FLORIDA STATUTES, WHERE THE INFORMATION CHARGES TRAFFICKING BY DELIVERY [AND ONLY BY DELIVERY] IN AN AMOUNT GREATER THAN 400 GRAMS PURSUANT TO SECTION 893.135(1)(b)(3), FLORIDA STATUTES?