delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant, West Dalton, was indicted and arraigned at the May term, 1902, of the circuit court of Wilson county, upon a charge of petit larceny, and, entering a plea of guilty, his punishment was fixed by the jury impanelled for that purpose at confinement and hard labor in the workhouse of the cuunty for eleven months, and a judgment to this effect, and of infamy, and for the costs was rendered against him, from which there was no proceeding in error.
At the succeeding September term of the court, a special judge presiding, an order, reciting that the prosecutor cоnsented thereto on account of sickness in the family of the defendant, was entered “remitting the remainder of the imprisonment during the good behavior of the defendant,” and releasing the costs, and the case is now befоre us upon a proceeding impeaching the validity of this action of the court.
This order remitting the unexpired portion of the imprisonment and releasing the costs adjudged against the defendant is absolutely null and void.
The judgmеnt entered against the defendant at the May term of the court was final, and nothing more remained to be donе. The court did not and could not reserve the right to set aside or alter it, and upon the adjournment of that term, sine die, the parties were
The action of the court in this case was, in substance, an attempt tо exercise the pardoning power, which, by the constitution (art. 3, sec. 6), is vested solely in the governor of the Stаte. The vestiture of the power to grant reprieves and pardons in the chief executive is exclusive оf all other departments of the State, and the legislature can not, directly or indirectly, take it from his control, and vest it in others, or authorize or require it to be exercised by any other officer or authority. It is a power and a duty intrusted to his judgment and discretion, which can not be interfered with, and of which he can not be relieved. The circuit judge’s action in remitting the imprisonment and releasing the costs adjudged against the defendant can not .be sustained under section 7226 of Shannon’s edition of the Code, or Act 1891, ch. 123, sec. 18 (Shannon’s Code, sec. 7423), authorizing the dischаrge of convicts confined in workhouses under certain circumstances. The authority given judges by the first statute is confined, upon a proper construction of this act, to the term of the court at which the judgment was renderеd, and the power to discharge inmates of the workhouse is confined by the latter statute to the workhouse сommissioners. If,
Nor can the action of the court be sustained upon any supposed control of the court over its records. So long as the court remains in session, the record is in the breast of the judge, and all judgments entered at that term may be vacated or modified upon any subsequent. day of the term, but upon final adjournment the pоwer of the court over the record is gone.
This is the rule governing final judgments of all courts of record, save сertain proceedings authorized by statute to correct errors resulting from clerical mistakes, which it is not сlaimed apply to this case. After the parties to the cause have been dismissed by final judgment and adjournmеnt of that term, the court has no more jurisdiction of them and of the case upon the merits than where no suit has been instituted
A judgment at a subsequent term, vacating one entеred at a former term of the court by consent of parties given in open court, is void. Anderson v. Thompson,
The order remitting the unexpired punishment of .the defendant and releasing him from costs adjudged against him is reversed, and the .case remanded, that the former judgment of the court may be executed.