State v. DallmanState v. Dallman
On August 21, 1997, Mark Dallman pleaded guilty to one count of first degree child rape. After the court refused to impose a special sexual offender sentencing alternative, Dallman filed numerous procedural motions, including a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.1 On October 30, 2000, the trial court summarily reviewed and dismissed all of Dallman‘s actions. Dallman appeals. We hold that the trial court had the authority to review Dallman‘s challenges summarily, that his habeas corpus petition was not perfected,
FACTS
On March 20, 1997, the State charged Dallman with first degree child rape and first degree child molestation. By agreement, Dallman pleaded guilty on August 21, 1997, to an amended information charging only first degree child rape. After questioning the appellant, the court determined that Dallman‘s plea was “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.” Report of Proceedings (8/21/97) at 11. Dallman does not dispute the facts underlying the charge.
As part of the plea agreement, the prosecutor recommended a special sexual offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA). Following the sentencing hearing аt which Dallman‘s wife and therapists testified, the judge declined to follow the SSOSA recommendation, citing Dallman‘s long history of sexually abusing the victim and evidence that none of his current mental health providers were aware of what was happening. The trial court articulated three additional reasons for the decision: (1) he continued to live near children, (2) he had limited interpersonal contacts and resources, and (3) hе failed to accept responsibility for his actions. The court imposed a 90-month sentence.
At the sentencing hearing, Dallman acknowledged that he understood the time limits for collaterally attacking the judgment. The trial court advised: “Mr. Dallman, you understand that you have a year under the specified circumstances to challenge the sentence entered today. Be sure to read the advice of collatеral attack, a copy of which you have received.” Report of Proceedings (9/8/97) at 74. He answered affirmatively. Dallman did not appeal, but he filed a Personal Restraint Petition (PRP) with this court more than a yеar later, on October 26, 1998.
On March 11, 1999, this court dismissed Dallman‘s first PRP because evidence does not support Dallman‘s allegations.2
On August 12, 1999, the Washington Supreme Court issued a Ruling Denying Motion for Extension of Time to review the order dismissing his PRP. The commissioner‘s ruling reads, “[F]or both procedural and substantive reasons, the [Court of Appeals] Chief Judge did not err in dismissing Mr. Dallman‘s personal restraint petition.” Clerk‘s Papers at 161.
On September 17, 1999, while his second PRP was pending,3 Dallman filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in thе Pierce County Superior Court.
In his second PRP, Dallman claimed that his mental incompetency was “newly discovered” and therefore exempt from the one-year limitation for filing. But this court dismissed because Dallman raised that issue in his first petition.
From May 22 to October 30, 2000, Dallman filed several additional motions in the superior court, including a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The trial court denied all the motions without hearing or comment on October 30, 2000.
On December 7, 2000, Dallman appealed the dismissal order.4 On January 3, 2001, Dallman filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the trial court. The trial court issued an “Order Granting Defendant‘s Motion for Reconsideration and AMENDED Order Denying Post Plea and Sentencing Motions But Granting Finding of Indigenсy” on January 8, 2001. Clerk‘s Papers at 143-144. Then it appointed appellate counsel and notified the State, through the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney‘s office, of Dallman‘s claims. The State responded to his appeal.
ANALYSIS
POST CONVICTION MOTIONS
The trial court summarily dismissed Dallman‘s three post-conviction motiоns: (1) Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (October [sic] 1999);5 (2) Petition to Redress Grievance (May 2000); and (3) Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Indictment (June 2000). Dallman asserts that whenever a defendant files a post-conviction motion, the trial court must notify the State and hold a hearing on the merits. We disagree.
Post-conviction motions must be made within the time limits set forth in
Here, Dallman‘s post-trial motions were untimely, unperfected, and unsupported by sufficient affidavits. Summary dismissal was proper.
HABEAS CORPUS
The propriety of the writ of habeas corpus is a question of law that we review de novo. In re Personal Restraint of Becker, 96 Wash.App. 902, 905, 982 P.2d 639 (1999), aff‘d, 143 Wash.2d 491, 20 P.3d 409 (2001).
Superior courts and their judges shall have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus on petition by or on behalf of any person in actual custody in their respective counties.6
Dallman argues that because the habeas cоrpus statute, chapter
In this case, there is no proof that Dallman ever served the petition. There is no affidavit. Nor is there an indication of service in any form in this court‘s file. Dallmаn did not serve the Attorney General‘s Office nor any other representative of the State and his petition was not perfected for the trial court‘s review.
But the trial court did review the petition and properly treated it as a successive collateral attack barred under
We hold that at least two grounds support the trial court‘s summary dismissal of Dallman‘s habeas corpus petition. First, the petition was never perfected and second, it was an impermissible collateral attack barred by
We also do not hold that the State is required to submit a memorandum in response to the petition. First, we do not read
The trial court properly exercised its authority under
We concur: SEINFELD and HOUGHTON, JJ.