State v. DaigleState v. Daigle
The defendant, Michael Daigle, appeals his conviction for resisting an officer in violation of
FACTS
On March 16, 1995, Deputy Roland Rivette of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff‘s Department entered a praline store loсated in Opelousas to serve a civil summons on Carol Bertrand. The store was owned by the defendant, Michael Daigle. On his initial visit to the store, Deputy Rivette did not identify himself as a police officer. He simply asked defendant if he had seеn Ms. Bertrand. He was informed Ms. Bertrand was not there, but would return later.
Later that day, Deputy Rivette visited the store again. He testified, as he approached the store, he saw Ms. Bertrand (through the store window) run into the back kitchen area. At this point, Deputy Rivette testified he attempted to enter the back kitchen area to serve Ms. Bertrand. According to Deputy Rivette, the defendant “came between me and the kitchen area and he wanted to know who I was.” After identifying himself and explaining he was there to serve papers on Ms. Bertrand, Deputy Rivette testified defendant became hostile and denied that Ms. Bertrand was on the premises. Defendant then indicated he “was going to call the police.” At this point, defendant exited the store and handed his neighbor a quarter to call the police.
Although Deputy Rivette was alone in the store, he did not attempt to serve Ms. Bertrand by entering the kitchen area. Instead, the Dеputy stated he was not sure “he had the right to go and confront this woman.” Eventually, Officer Bruce Alsandor, of the Opelousas Police Department, arrived on the scene. Defendant went outside and talked to Officer Alsandor. Deputy Rivette spoke with the officer when he entered the store and
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL EVENTS
Defendant wаs subsequently convicted and sentenced for resisting an officer in violation of
This court then ordered the case remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel on appeal. If he desired counsel, the district court was instructed to assess the indigency status of defendant and appoint counsel if appropriate. Two attorneys were appointed by the district court to represent defendant during this appeal process.
ERRORS ASSIGNED
In his original pro se appellate brief, defendant asserted the following single assignment of error: “The trial court erred in failing to recognize that a citizen can resist an unlawful arrest and search without being convicted of resisting an officer.” Following remand by the Supreme Court, defendant filed another pro se brief, received April 12, 1996, in which he assigned the following additiоnal errors: 1) the trial court erred by adding a felony charge during the bond hearing; 2) the trial court erred in failing to recognize that
ANALYSIS
Defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by the State to support his conviction for resisting an officer. When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any ratiоnal trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La. 1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La. 1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La. 1981). It is the role of the fact-finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witness, and therefore the apрellate court should not second-guess the credibility determination
Defendant was arrested for resisting an officer.
A. Resisting an officer is the intentional interference with, opposition or resistance to, or obstruction of an individual acting in his official capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest or seizure of property or to serve any lawful process or court order when the offender knows or hаs reason to know that the person arresting, seizing property, or serving process is acting in his official capacity.
B. (1) The phrase “obstruction of” as used herein shall, in addition to its common meaning, signification, and connotatiоn mean the following:
a) Flight by one sought to be arrested before the arresting officer can restrain him and after notice is given that he is under arrest.
b) Any violence toward or any resistance or opposition to the arresting officer after the arrested party is actually placed under arrest and before he is incarcerated in jail.
c) Refusal by the arrested party to give his name and make his identity known to the arresting officer.
d) Congregation with others on a public street and refusal to move on when ordered by the officer.
Conflicting testimony was presented regarding Ms. Bertrand‘s physical presence in the store when Deputy Rivette returned. Deputy Rivette testified he saw Ms. Bertrand run into the kitchen area as he approached the store. Both defendant and Ms. Bertrand denied she was present at the time Deputy Rivette entered the store. The trial court found defendant‘s and Ms. Bertrand‘s stories were fabricatеd and concluded Deputy Rivette‘s version of the incident was more credible. The trial court concluded defendant violated
Q: Okay, and at that time if you had a right to, you had an opportunity to go—
A:I could have gone in the back, but I wаsn‘t sure of my—whether I had the right to go and confront this woman. That‘s why I waited.
Deputy Rivette also testified he did not proceed to the back of the store because he thought he “would have probably had to fight with him, I guess.” However, defendant did not vocalizе any threats to the deputy. The most provocative statement the Deputy related defendant made to him was “he was going to call the police.”
Q: And at one point you said you figured that you would have to tussle with him to
get past him. He didn‘t tell you that or make any move—
A: The attitude he gave me, Randy, was if I went in the back of that counter, I‘d have had to fight him. That‘s the attitude I got. That‘s the feeling I got.
We cannot find defendant intentionally interfered with or obstructed the officer because of his “attitude” or Deputy Rivette‘s “feeling” that defendant would physically attempt to stop him from going into the back аrea of the store. Defendant did not take any actual steps in furtherance of obstructing or interfering with Deputy Rivette‘s attempt to serve Ms. Bertrand after he identified himself as a law enforcement officer. Proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant acted in such a manner is essential in this instance to convict him. Even when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot say the evidence in the record was sufficient to establish all the elements of the charged оffense.
Defendant also contends Deputy Rivette had no right to proceed into the back of his store. He correctly notes we have said a citizen has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. Melancon v. Trahan, 94-26 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94); 645 So.2d 722, writ denied, 95-87 (La.3/10/95); 650 So.2d 1183. A citizen‘s right of privacy is protected by
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, аnd particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conductеd in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
However,
Whether Deputy Rivette‘s entry into the kitchen area of defendant‘s store, without securing his consent, would have breached his protected expectational right of privacy рresents a more troublesome question which we need not address at this time. As discussed, we find the state did not present sufficient evidence to establish that defendant committed the charged offense.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant‘s conviction for resisting an officer in violation of
REVERSED.
WOODARD, J., concurs in the result.
AMY, J., dissents.