STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DANIEL KENNETH MEYER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. DA 15-0764.
SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA
May 30, 2017
Rehearing Denied July 11, 2017.
2017 MT 124 | 387 Mont. 422 | 396 P.3d 1265
Submitted on Briefs May 3, 2017.
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Alexander H. Pyle, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena.
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Madison L. Mattioli, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, Kenneth R. Park, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell.
CHIEF
¶1 Daniel Kenneth Meyer appeals from the District Court‘s order filed October 27, 2015, affirming Meyer‘s conviction of Aggravated DUI in the Justice Court of Flathead County. We affirm the District Court‘s order.
¶2 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court properly affirmed Meyer‘s Justice Court DUI conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 In January 2015 the State charged Meyer with several offenses, including Aggravated Driving Under the Influence as provided in
¶4 The day prior to the commencement of trial in Justice Court, Meyer filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of any
¶5 The Justice Court determined that conviction of a prior DUI is an element of the charge of Aggravated DUI; that the State had the burden to prove the prior offense at trial; and that the State could meet its burden by introducing a copy of Meyer‘s driving record. The Justice Court admitted Meyer‘s certified driving record into evidence. It contained two entries (for years 2001 and 2005) that indicated that Meyers had prior convictions for “driving under the influence of alcohol.” No other material details of the prior convictions are contained in the driving record.
¶6 The Justice Court instructed the jury on the statutory elements of the offense of Aggravated DUI, including the requirement that the defendant “has one prior conviction or pending charge for a violation of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Operating a Vehicle with an Alcohol Concentration in Excess of .08 within 10 years of the commission of the present offense.” The Justice Court jury convicted Meyer of Aggravated DUI.
¶7 Meyer appealed the conviction to the District Court in Flathead County, which conducted an appellate review based upon the Justice Court record. The District Court considered Meyer‘s contention that evidence of his prior DUI offenses was not an element of the crime of Aggravated DUI, but was relevant only as a “penalty provision” so did not need to be proven at trial. Meyer also argued that evidence of his prior convictions was prejudicial under
¶8 The District Court agreed with the Justice Court that evidence of Meyer‘s prior DUI convictions proved an element of the charged crime of Aggravated DUI that must be determined by the jury. The District Court concluded that a charge of Aggravated DUI under
¶9 The District Court affirmed Meyer‘s conviction of Aggravated DUI and Meyer appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 This Court reviews cases that originate in justice court and are appealed to district court as if the appeal were originally filed in this Court, undertaking an independent examination of the record. State v. Kebble, 2015 MT 195, ¶ 14, 380 Mont. 69, 353 P.3d 1175. The Flathead County Justice Court is a court of record, and the appeal to the District Court was an appeal on the record, with the District Court functioning as an intermediate appellate court.
¶11 On appeal from the district court‘s review of the justice court decision, this Court examines the record independently to determine whether the justice court‘s findings of fact meet the clearly erroneous standard, whether its discretionary rulings
¶12 This Court reviews a district court‘s decisions on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the district court acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, resulting in a substantial injustice. State v. Jenkins, 2011 MT 287, ¶ 4, 362 Mont. 481, 265 P.3d 643. This Court reviews a district court‘s decision on issues of law to determine whether the decision was correct. State v. Frickey, 2006 MT 122, ¶ 9, 332 Mont. 255, 136 P.3d 558.
DISCUSSION
¶13 Issue: Whether the District Court properly affirmed Meyer‘s Justice Court DUI conviction.
¶14 The determination of whether a jury must find a fact beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case turns upon whether the fact is an element of the offense. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013). A fundamental principle of the criminal justice system is that the State bears the burden to prove each element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Daniels, 2011 MT 278, ¶ 33, 362 Mont. 426, 265 P.3d 623. Identifying the elements of an offense turns upon whether the Legislature intended to create a separate offense, or to authorize the court to increase punishment after conviction. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 233-35, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1225-26 (1998).
¶15 The reviewing court will first consider the plain language of the statute to determine legislative intent. Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson, 2000 MT 287, ¶ 46, 302 Mont. 209, 14 P.3d 487.
(1) A person commits the offense of aggravated driving under the influence if the person is in violation of
61-8-401 ,61-8-405 or61-8-411 and:(a) the person‘s alcohol concentration, as shown by analysis of the person‘s blood or breath is 0.16 or more;
(b) the person is under the order of a court or the department to equip any motor vehicle the person operates with an approved ignition interlock device;
(c) the person‘s driver‘s license or privilege to drive is suspended, canceled, or revoked as a result of a prior violation of
61-8-401 ,61-8-406 or61-8-411 ;(d) the person refuses to provide a breath or blood sample as required in
61-8-402 and the person‘s driver‘s license or privilege to drive was suspended, canceled, or revoked under61-8-492 within 10 years of the commission of the present offense, or(e) the person has one prior conviction or pending charge for the violation of
45-5-106 ,45-5-205 ,61-8-401 ,61-8-496 ,61-8-411 or this section within 10 years of the commission of the present offense or has two or more prior convictions or pending charges or any combination thereof, for violations of45-5-106 ,45-5-205 ,61-8-401 ,61-8-496 , or61-8-411 .
Subsequent subsections of the statute provide separate punishments for first, second and subsequent convictions for Aggravated DUI.
¶16 It is clear from the plain language of subsection (1) of
¶17 It is also plain from the language of the statute that the Legislature listed the elements of the offense of Aggravated DUI separate and apart from the penalty provisions.
¶18 The existence of a prior conviction is often a factor that allows the judge to impose increased punishment after conviction. The existence of the prior conviction may be determined by the judge at sentencing and does not need to be found as a fact by the jury. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63;
¶19 Meyer agrees that the aggravation elements in
¶20 Meyer‘s reliance upon prior decisions of this Court is likewise misplaced. In Weldele the defendant was charged with the offense of DUI. He attacked the validity of one or more of his prior DUI convictions that the State intended to use to enhance the punishment for his DUI to a felony. This Court held that under Apprendi the State did not have to prove the prior DUI convictions to the jury because they applied at sentencing. Weldele, ¶ 40. The other cases that Meyer relies upon in this context, State v. Covington, 2012 MT 31, 364 Mont. 118, 272 P.3d 43, and State v. Vaughn, 2007 MT 164, 338 Mont. 97, 164 P.3d 873, both involved issues of sentence enhancement based upon prior felony convictions and are therefore not analogous to the present case.
¶21 The state of Arizona has an aggravated DUI statute very similar to the Montana statute under consideration in the present case. In State v. Root, 985 P.2d 494 (Az. 1999), the Arizona Court considered an appeal of an aggravated DUI conviction. The defendant argued that determination of the aggravation factor should be bifurcated from the issue of the present DUI, so that the jury would never hear about his driving record. The Arizona Court held that the aggravation factor was an element of the crime that must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the State was required to prove the factor to show the nature of the prior offense. Root, ¶ 12. The aggravation factors in the Arizona statute were elements of the crime of aggravated DUI, were not “a mere sentencing consideration,” and the determination could not be delegated to the judge in a case tried to a jury. Root, ¶¶ 12-13. Those same considerations apply in the present case.
¶22 Meyer argues that it was impermissibly prejudicial to his interests to allow the jury to know that he was twice convicted of DUI. He argues that the prior DUIs were erroneously admitted (based on
¶24 The evidence of prior DUIs was not erroneously admitted. Proof of the prior DUI was required as an element of the offense of aggravated DUI. Indeed, the evidence contributed to the conviction because it established a statutory element required for a conviction. Undoubtedly the admission of the evidence was prejudicial. However, the use of the prior DUIs was not impermissibly prejudicial. The State established this necessary element of the offense through a copy of Meyer‘s driving record which indicated only that he had a prior conviction and the date. There were no other details of the prior offenses and admitting evidence of a statutory element of the charged offense was not trial error.
¶25 Admissible probative evidence in a criminal prosecution will “frequently and inevitably be prejudicial” to the defendant, because the purpose of the proceeding is to secure a conviction and to impose a sanction. State v. Swenson, 2008 MT 308, ¶ 25, 346 Mont. 34, 194 P.3d 625 (concerning evidence of prior bad acts by the defendant). While evidence of Meyer‘s prior convictions may have made him uncomfortable, that is the nature of a criminal prosecution. A defendant does not have the right to have the prosecution “sanitized to the point that important and probative evidence must be excluded.” State v. Cox, 266 Mont. 110, 122, 879 P.2d 662, 669 (1994); State v. Langford, 267 Mont. 95, 105, 882 P.2d 490, 496 (1994). There was no unlawful prejudice in this case.
CONCLUSION
¶26 The decision of the District Court affirming Meyer‘s conviction for Aggravated DUI is affirmed.
JUSTICES WHEAT, BAKER, SHEA and RICE concur.