State v. D.H.State v. D.H.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Dorrian, Brown, Tyack
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, D.H. (“appellant“), appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to 11 years of imprisonment pursuant to his guilty plea to a charge of rape. Because we conclude that the sentence imposed was not contrary to law and for other reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Appellant was charged with one count of rape, a first-degree felony violation of
{¶ 3} Appellant appeals from the trial court‘s judgment, assigning three errors for this court‘s review:
I. THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ADVISED OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL AND TO HAVE COUNSEL APPOINTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF FILING AN APPEAL
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM TIME OF INCARCERATION
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT RULING ON APPELLANTS’ [sic] MOTION FOR CREDIT FOR THE TIME SERVED ON HOME INCARCERATION
{¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to advise him of his right to appeal and to have counsel appointed for his appeal.
{¶ 5}
{¶ 6} Although it appears that the trial court failed to notify appellant of his appellate rights under
{¶ 7} Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error.
{¶ 8} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum prison sentence. Appellant concedes that the trial court referred to the purposes and principles of sentencing under
{¶ 9} We review a trial court‘s sentence to determine if it is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. State v. Frederick, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-630, 2014-Ohio-1960, ¶ 17; State v. Ibrahim, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-167, 2014-Ohio-666, ¶ 16. “Applying that standard, we look to the record to determine whether the sentencing court considered and properly applied the statutory guidelines and whether the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Reeves, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-856, 2015-Ohio-3251, ¶ 4.
{¶ 10} In this case, appellant pled guilty to the rape of his five-year-old daughter, a first-degree felony offense in violation of
{¶ 11} On appeal, although appellant appears to argue that imposition of the maximum sentence was too harsh, he does not claim that the sentence was outside the range provided by law, that the record fails to support the trial court‘s findings with respect to
{¶ 12} Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s second assignment of error.
{¶ 13} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by not ruling on his motion for jail-time credit for time spent on house arrest.
{¶ 14} A defendant is entitled by law to have the number of days that he was confined prior to conviction and sentencing credited against his sentence of incarceration.
{¶ 15} Generally, when a trial court fails to expressly rule on a motion, it is presumed the court denied the motion. See State ex rel. Forsyth v. Brigner, 86 Ohio St.3d 299, 300 (1999) (“[I]t is evident here that even assuming no express ruling on the
{¶ 16} This court has previously held that time served under electronically monitored house arrest as a condition of bail does not constitute confinement for purposes of the jail-time credit statute. State v. Blankenship, 192 Ohio App.3d 639, 2011-Ohio-1601, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). See also State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, ¶ 72 (“[P]retrial electronic home monitoring does not constitute detention for the purpose of prosecuting the crime of escape.“). Therefore, the trial court did not err by not granting appellant jail-time credit for his period of pre-conviction electronically monitored house arrest.
{¶ 17} Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s third assignment of error.
{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant‘s three assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
BROWN, P.J., and TYACK, J., concur.