27 Del. 469 | New York Court of General Session of the Peace | 1913
charging the jury:
This statute was designed to protect the owners of motor vehicles in the possession and operation of their cars, and indirectly to protect the public from the consequences of the improper use of motor vehicles. According to this statute the offense consists of the taking or operating of the motor vehicle of another without the consent of the owner. In cases where this charge is made, the important point in controversy is very apt to be the' matter of consent.' The scope of this statute is not restricted to the taking and operation of a motor vehicle by one who has no relation whatever to the owner, but extends to and includes one who may have a general relation or a special relation to the owner, such as servant or bailee, for it is intended by the statute to prevent a servant or a bailee improperly taking and operating a motor vehicle quite as well as it is intended to protect the owner and the public from the taking of the same by a stranger. In other words, a chauffeur employed to operate a machine, or a garage manager or a garage employee engaged to care for or repair a machine, who exceeds the contract of his employment by taking and operating his employer’s machine without his employer’s consent, is just as amenable to the provisions and punishments of this law as one, who without any relation to the owner, takes and operates a machine without the owner’s consent.
In the case under consideration the first question is not simply whether Hickman was the servant or chauffeur of the owner, for the determination of that question alone would not determine the issue of his guilt or innocence under this statute, but whether as the servant or chauffeur of the owner or in any other capacity, he took and operated the machine without the owner’s
With respect to Hickman, therefore, the question for your determination is whether he took and operated the machine without the owner’s consent.
Verdict, not guilty.