No. 89412. | Ohio Ct. App. | Mar 6, 2008
{¶ 2} Sometime around the end of August or early September of 2006, the sheriff's department received anonymous telephone tips that appellant was residing *4 at an address on Front Street in Berea. The Berea address was located within 1000 feet of a school and, as such, was not a legally permissible address for appellant. In response to these tips, Detective Orlando of the sheriff's department spoke to appellant on September 6, 2006 when appellant came in to make his 90-day address verification. Curtis told Orlando that the Front Street address belonged to his girlfriend, Patricia Brown. He said his girlfriend was disabled and that he stayed at her place occasionally to help her out, but that he lived on Francis Avenue. Orlando then contacted Ms. Brown by telephone. As a result of that conversation, Orlando asked verification deputies to go out to Francis Avenue to verify appellant's address.
{¶ 3} On September 7, 2006, two detectives went to the Francis Avenue address to verify Curtis' residency. Detectives found no one at home at the upstairs apartment. A man answered at the downstairs apartment, but told the detectives he did not want to give information concerning appellant's residency. The detectives attempted to speak with other neighbors, but were unable to find anyone to speak to at that time. No other attempt was made to contact appellant's landlord or neighbors or to verify whether appellant resided at the Francis Avenue apartment.
{¶ 4} On September 12, 2006, Curtis returned to the sheriff's department and submitted a change of address form showing his new address as 2966 East 65th Street. *5
{¶ 5} At trial, the state presented testimony from the sheriff's detectives and from Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown testified that she and appellant had a romantic relationship beginning in April of 2005. She stated that he moved in with her in August of 2005 and continued to live with her until September of 2006. She stated that he moved boxes of his clothes into her home, ate his meals there, and slept there each night. She said he worked nearby in Berea and gave her money to help her pay the rent.
{¶ 6} The state presented 25 voice messages left by appellant on Ms. Brown's home phone after she told him to leave. In one, appellant stated he had left some clothes and clippers at her house. In another, he asked if she could have someone bring his belongings to 2966 East 65th Street.
{¶ 7} In his defense, appellant presented testimony from Sandy Drain, the owner of the property at 5912 Francis Avenue. Ms. Drain lived in the upstairs apartment and testified that she met Curtis through her niece, who was a good friend of his. According to Ms. Drain, Curtis moved into a vacant bedroom in the upstairs apartment in February 2006. She stated that he moved his clothing and possessions into the room and began receiving mail at that address. She also testified that he paid her for room and board and that he ate his meals and slept there until September 2006 when he moved out to be closer to his new job. She said he did occasionally stay with his girlfriend in Berea and that she knew he *6 worked in Berea. She also stated that she generally did not see him coming and going because she usually went to bed by 8:00 P.M.
{¶ 10} To determine whether a verdict or judgment of conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins,
{¶ 11} Appellant was convicted of three counts of failure to verify a current residence in violation of R.C.
{¶ 12} R.C.
{¶ 13} "If an offender * * * is required to register pursuant to section
{¶ 14} R.C.
{¶ 15} "An offender * * * who is required to register a residence address * * * shall periodically verify the offender's * * * current residence address * * * in accordance with this section. The frequency of verification shall be determined in accordance with division (B) of this section, and the manner of verification shall be determined in accordance with division (C) of this section."
{¶ 16} Pursuant to divisions (B) and (C), appellant was required to verify his current residence address every ninety days "by personally appearing before the sheriff or a designee of the sheriff, no earlier than ten days before the date on which the verification is required pursuant to division (B) of this section and no later than *9 the date so required for verification, and completing and signing a copy of the verification form prescribed by the bureau of criminal identification and investigation."
{¶ 17} The trial court found appellant guilty of failing to provide notice of a change in residence address in February, June and September 2006. In announcing its verdict, the trial court stated that it reviewed the Ohio Jury Instructions and found the definition of residence address to be, "where the defendant resides or is temporarily domiciled." According to the testimony of the two primary witnesses, appellant ate his meals, slept, and received mail at both his Francis Avenue address and at Ms. Brown's residence in Berea. Prior to finding appellant guilty on all counts, the court found there was no dispute that appellant kept some of his things at the two different addresses. However, by finding appellant guilty, the trial court concluded that appellant actually resided at the Berea address during the time period from February through September 2006 and failed to notify the sheriff of the change in his address.
{¶ 18} In a recent decision out of the Third District, the appellate court found the registration requirements of R.C.
{¶ 19} In finding that appellant was living in Berea and failed to verify that address as his current address as required by R.C.
{¶ 20} This is not one of those exceptional cases in which the evidence weighs heavily against conviction. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
*11Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
*1SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR.