28 Del. 518 | New York Court of General Session of the Peace | 1914
Upon being sworn, Ripley testified, in substance, that he had certain stocks and bonds in a vault of the Exchange Trust Company in Boston; that while in poor health and in a dazed condition he executed a power of attorney before a notary in Philadelphia, authorizing the accused to go to Boston and procure the stocks and bonds in question from the Trust Company, with the understanding that he would still have control of the same.
Ripley further testified that the accused had previously impressed upon his mind that he had been guilty of some misdemeanor; that the police officers were after him; that some one was after his property; that these things induced him to execute the power of attorney; that the accused went to Boston and in a couple of days thereafter returned to Philadelphia, bringing the said stocks and bonds with her, and showed them to him in his room;- that he was not sure that she had all of them, but he saw some of the envelopes containing some of them with his handwriting upon the same; that the prisoner refused to give them to
The prisoner denied that she had embezzled any of the property in question, but testified that she was engaged to marry Ripley; that she had been acquainted with him for eleven years, and had lived with him at different places for several years; that she had attended him and cared for him during his illness; that he had given her five thousand five hundred dollars worth of stocks and bonds in payment for personal services and to reimburse her for having used her name in a fraudulent transaction in which he was concerned; that she had performed valuable services in his behalf in shielding him from prosecution; and that none of the stocks and bonds had been converted by her, but were in the hands of her lawyer in Washington, where they had remained during her incarceration.
The questions of law presented appear in the charge to the jury.
Pennewill, C. J., charging the jury:
Gentlemen of the jury:—The prisoner is charged in this case with the embezzlement of certain property of Edward I. Ripley consisting of bonds and shares of stock.
There is a statute of this state—Rev. Code of 1893, p. 942— which provides:
“That every cashier, servant, agent, or clerk to any person, or to any body corporate, or being employed for the purpose, or in the capacity of a cashier, servant, agent, or clerk, by any person or body corporate, who shall embezzle, fraudulently abstract, or misapply any money, goods, bill, note, bond, check, evidence of debt, or other valuable security, or effects, which,*521 or any part whereof, shall be delivered to, or received, or taken into possession by him, or to which he has access for, or in the name, or on account of his master, or employer,” shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
The court are asked in behalf of the defendant to instruct you to return a verdict of not guilty, because, there having been a demand by Ripley for the securities in Philadelphia before they came to Wilmington and refusal to deliver, there could be no further conversion or embezzlement of the same in this county.
We do not say that when a conversion is once distinctly proved the crime is complete, and that there cannot be another conversion at another time and place that will constitute embezzlement. We express no opinion on that question.
If the jury believe that Ripley was willing, and by his subsequent conduct consented, to the retention of the securities by the prisoner after his demand and refusal in Philadelphia, then we saji- that there might be a conversion in this county.
You must be satisfied that the prisoner at the time of the alleged embezzlement in this county was the agent of Ripley, or acting in that capacity. You must also be satisfied from the evidence that the prisoner converted in this county the property
Counsel for the prisoner insist that there has been no conversion of the securities by the prisoner in this state.
We instruct you that it must be shown that the securities or a part of them have been converted in this county as charged in the indictment before the prisoner can be found guilty.
If you believe the owner was willing not only that the prisoner should go to the Trust Company in Boston and get the securities and bring them to him, but also keep them in her possession after bringing them here, and that she did nothing more than that, she would not be guilty of embezzlement because there was no conversion.
And so we say that, if you believe from the testimony in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner obtained possession of the securities lawfully and afterwards converted the same or any of them in this county as charged in the indictment, your verdict should be guilty.
But if you do not so believe, or if you believe that she obtained possession of them unlawfully, no matter whether she converted them or not, your verdict should be not guilty.
And again, if you believe Ripley had given the securities to the prisoner by a certain paper writing which is in evidence, and further believe that he had at the time sufficient mind to know what he was doing, your verdict should be not guilty, for in that case the securities belonged to the prisoner and she had a right to retain possession of them and convert them as she pleased.
So, gentlemen, perhaps the most important question for you to determine is whether or not Ripley had sufficient mind to know what he was doing when he executed the power of attorney and also the paper writing purporting to give the securities to the prisoner.
Verdict, not guilty.