35 Tex. 17 | Tex. | 1872
This is an appeal taken by the State to 'the judgment of the District Court of Houston county, quashing an indictment in which the appellee is charged ¡as the county attorney with receiving a bribe. The indictment charges that E. Currie, on the thirtieth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy, was acting as county attorney for the county of Houston, in the State of Texas, duly ■elected and qualified as said county attorney. On the 'trial the appellee excepted to the sufficiency of the "indictment, and filed the following special exceptions, .to-wit:
1. Because the said bill of indictment nowhere charges this defendant to have held and been in the exercise of the duties of any legislative, executive, or judicial office, under the State of Texas.
2. Because it does not appear from said bill of indictment that the office of county attorney was a legislative, executive, or judicial office.
3. Because the said bill of indictment nowhere charges .any offense against the general laws of this State.
4. Because said indictment is too vague and uncertain to hold this defendant to plead.
5. Because of other errors and defects apparent on the face of the said bill of indictment.
Upon some one or all of these exceptions the indictment was quashed. The crime for which the appellee is indicted, as well as the punishment affixed by law, are ■defined in Article 1870, Paschal’s Digest. Article 1871 enumerates who are executive, legislative and judicial officers ; county attorneys are not named in Article 1871, but district attorneys are. The act to which these articles belong was passed on the twenty-eighth of Au
Taking the law, then, as we find it, we are led to the conclusion that the averment in the indictment, that the appellee was duly elected and qualified as a county attorney, is a sufficient averment that he was a judicial officer. It is also our opinion that the indictment in this case sufficiently charges an offense against the penal laws of this State. The judgment of the district court is accordingly reversed, and the cause remanded, to be proceeded with in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.