642 A.2d 90 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1993
The defendant, Robert F. Culmo, Jr., who is charged with two counts of stalking in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §
For the following reasons, the court finds that §
The defendant was arrested in December, 1992, on a warrant alleging that he had committed two counts of stalking in the second degree in violation of §
On October 25, 1992, according to the complainant, she was shopping at another grocery store when she noticed the defendant following her in the aisles. She looked outside the store window and saw that the defendant's car was parked alongside her car.
The complainant stated that she feared that the defendant was going to do something to her. She stated also that the defendant drives or walks up and down her street, which is at the rear of his property. According to the affidavit, the complainant further stated that her husband had filed a complaint with the Connecticut state police alleging that the defendant had run him off the road. Based on these allegations, and others, issuance of an arrest warrant was authorized.
Following the granting of a portion of the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars dated January 29, 1993, seeking more information about the offenses alleged, the state, on February 19, 1993, filed a substitute information, the present charging document, accusing the defendant of two counts of stalking in the second degree. Count one charged that "at the Town or City of Clinton, in the vicinity of 215 East Main Street on or about the 23rd day of October, 1992, the said Robert Culmo, Jr., at around 8 p.m., with intent to cause reasonable fear for the physical safety of another person, namely Kathleen Banks, while said Culmo was in a motor vehicle and on foot, did willfully and repeatedly follow and lie in wait for Kathleen Banks, in a manner likely to cause another person, *50
namely Kathleen Banks, to reasonably fear for her physical safety, all in violation of Section
The second count charged that the state "further accuses Robert Culmo, Jr., of stalking and charges that at the Town of Clinton at 266 East Main St., on or about the 25th day of October, 1992, around 7:45 a.m., the said Robert Culmo, Jr., with intent to cause reasonable fear for the physical safety of another person, namely Kathleen Banks, while said Culmo was in a motor vehicle and on foot, did willfully and repeatedly follow and lie in wait for Kathleen Banks in a manner likely to cause another person, namely Kathleen Banks, to reasonably fear for her physical safety, all in violation of Section
The substitute information contained allegations in both counts that the stalking allegedly occurred while the defendant "was in a motor vehicle and on foot," allegations not made in the first information filed.
In both motions to dismiss dated February 4, 1993, and April 8, 1993, and the supporting memoranda, the defendant asserted that the stalking statute violated the due process guarantees of the United States and Connecticut constitutions. The state filed a responsive memorandum on April 23, 1993, to which the defendant replied with another submission dated April 30, 1993. Oral argument was held on May 4, 1993. Following argument, the court requested that the defendant file another memorandum outlining with specificity what
The defendant raises three closely related claims. The first is that §
Prior to discussing the defendant's claims, a brief discussion of the legislative background of the stalking statute would be helpful. DeFonce Construction Corp. v. State,
Spurred by problems that both celebrities and private citizens were having, California was the first state to pass a stalking law. In 1992, Connecticut's legislature followed suit, enacting General Statutes §§
Testifying in favor of the stalking statute, Representative Thomas Luby, a principal sponsor, asserted that the proposed legislation "fills a gap" existing between the harassment statutes; General Statutes §§
The first question to be answered is whether the defendant has standing to raise the claim that §
In determining whether the defendant has standing to attack §
When a defendant attacks a statute as being void due to vagueness, normally, a court limits its inquiry to the statute's impact as applied to the facts of the case before it. State v.Perruccio,
When a challenged statute, however, if vague, could intrude on "fundamental constitutional guarantees," particularly
Typically, facial vagueness challenges have been entertained by courts confronting claims that a statute explicitly or implicitly affects recognized
While the void for vagueness analysis is most commonly undertaken in the
The defendant claims that the statute implicates numerous basic constitutional liberties and
The court agrees that, on its face, §
By its title and its terms, the stalking statute implicates the right to move about freely in public. Webster's *56
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "stalk" as "to pursue quarry or prey stealthily." The statute prohibits repeated "following" and lying in wait with the requisite intent. The substitute information in the present case, in both counts, charges the defendant with repeatedly following the complainant while "in a motor vehicle" and "on foot." The affidavit in support of the arrest warrant makes it clear that the "following" alleged against the defendant all occurred in public places where the defendant would normally have a right to be: at a Stop Shop, in the Stop Shop parking lot, on the highway (first count); and at a Waldbaum's Foodmart (second count). Moreover, some of the conduct occurred in the context of the defendant's traveling to and from his own residence. The act of "following," in and of itself, can be quite neutral. One can follow someone coincidentally, or intentionally, but with benign intentions. In the present prosecution, where the defendant was traveling, why, and with what intention are all at issue. Whether the defendant had a lawful purpose to go where he did when he did is at the heart of the case. His right to move freely about the community on public streets, in public places and in the vicinity of his home is clearly implicated by §
The "right to travel" at issue in the present case is an outgrowth of earlier cases examining the right to travel abroad, and viewing the right as a "liberty" interest that is "basic in our scheme of values." Kent v. Dulles,
Approximately one year after King, in Nicholls v. Schaffer,
Then in 1984, in Bruno v. Civil Service Commission,
Perhaps the most detailed analysis of the right to intrastate travel, in the context of a criminal case, is contained in Lutzv. York, supra,
In light of Bruno, Lutz, and the other cases cited previously, the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the allegations as set out in the substitute information and affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, the court concludes that the defendant's right to intrastate travel is implicated in the present prosecution,5 that the right is fundamental, and that he, therefore, has standing to raise a claim that §
In analyzing the statute to determine if it is void for vagueness, the court is guided by the fundamental precept that it is unfair to subject someone to prosecution if the law defining the offense fails to give adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Connally v.General Construction Co.,
A vague law "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis," if it does not clearly indicate what conduct is criminal and what is not. Grayned v. Rockford, supra,
Notwithstanding these accepted principles, a heavy presumption of constitutionality attaches to a law enacted by the legislature. As the Supreme Court has stated: "The party attacking a validly enacted statute, however, bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality. . . . In choosing between two constructions *60
of a statute, one valid and one constitutionally precarious, we will search for an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably accords with the legislature's underlying intent."State v. Breton,
Because almost all language is inherently ambiguous to some degree,7 "mathematical certainty" can never be obtained in the drafting of a statute. Grayned v. Rockford, supra,
Analysis of the language of §
In undertaking analysis of these elements, the court is guided by General Statutes §
Section
The term "wilful" has a variety of shades of meaning depending on the context of its use, but it is not unduly vague as used in §
Section
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "repeatedly" as meaning "again and again." Acting "repeatedly" in the context of the statute means precisely what the commonly approved usage of the word suggests — acting on more than one occasion. An isolated act of "following" or "lying in wait" cannot constitute "stalking."
It is true that determining when a single course of continuous conduct has devolved into "repeated" conduct may not always be simple. For example, if an individual follows another person to the local drug store, waits outside while the person goes in, and then resumes following the person, has only one act of following occurred, or is the following "repeated"? The statute does not attempt to place boundaries of time, or space, around the proscribed repetitive conduct. In leaving these parameters undefined, however, §
A wilful and repeated "following" or "lying in wait" is required to constitute a violation of the statute. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "follow" to mean "to go, proceed, or come after" and "pursue in an effort to overtake." As used in §
Language has its limits. Such ambiguities as exist in the use of the word "follows" are not sufficient to render its meaning incomprehensible to a person of common intelligence.
The statute can also be violated by repeatedly "lying in wait." "Lying in wait" is an ancient phrase with a widely understood meaning in the context of various statutes defining first degree murder. Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) defines "lying in wait" to mean "[l]ying in ambush; lying hidden or concealed for the purpose of making a sudden and unexpected attack upon a person when he shall arrive at the scene." See also annot., 89 A.L.R. 2d 1142 (1963). "`Lying in wait' as a legal concept has physical and mental elements. *64 Those generally stated are the physical ones of waiting, watching, and secrecy or concealment, and the mental one of purpose or intent to inflict bodily injury or to kill another unawares." Id.
The phrase "lying in wait" is no stranger to Connecticut law. Prior to repeal, Connecticut's homicide statute, General Statutes §
The term has repeatedly been examined by courts throughout the country, particularly by courts construing California's homicide statute, which states that murder perpetrated by "lying in wait" is murder of the first degree. Cal. Penal Code §
It is noteworthy that Connecticut's criminal attempt statute, General Statutes §
The defendant argues that §
The legislature's decision to focus on the fear created in the victim is not unlike the approach adopted in the kidnapping in the first degree statute, General Statutes §
Nor is there anything unusual in the legislature's decision to require that the trier of fact evaluate whether a victim's fear for his or her physical safety is "reasonable." Connecticut's penal code contains numerous statutes that require analysis of whether an actor's beliefs are reasonable. See, e.g., General Statutes §
In the court's view, on consideration of the statute in its entirety, it cannot be said that a person of common understanding would fail to understand what conduct is prohibited. Section
The question arises as to what standard of review the court should apply in determining if the asserted state interest is weighty enough to justify the infringement on the right to move freely about, which §
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. Proto, supra,
The analytical framework spawned by the
In the court's view, whether the approach used in Lutz v.York, supra,
The right to move about freely, implicated by §
In summary, by providing for protection of the victim, maximizing the opportunity for prevention of more serious crime, and providing a tool for intervention by police authorities, §
The defendant also attacks §
Before addressing these concerns, the court must determine if the defendant has standing to raise the claim that the statute is overbroad on its face. The court concludes that he does not.
As the Supreme Court noted in State v. Proto, supra,
The normal rules of standing are relaxed in the
In State v. Proto, supra,
The task of demonstrating that a statute will significantly compromise recognized
In undertaking this threshold analysis, courts have relied heavily on the distinction between statutes that regulate conduct, and statutes that regulate expression.11 The Supreme Court has held that when a statute proscribes intentional conduct, not speech, the
In light of the clear teaching of the case law and the language of §
Section
It is of course predictable that in the course of prosecuting cases, the state will introduce evidence of words spoken, writings delivered, or gestures made to prove that a defendant acted with the requisite intent. This is likely to be particularly true in cases involving defendants who have had previous relationships with their victims, e.g., former spouses, former girlfriends, former boyfriends and the like.
Words can be used to prove an intention to violate virtually any penal statute, however, and their use as evidence of crime does not transform a statute criminalizing conduct into a statute implicating protected communication. As the supreme court of Oregon pointed out in the context of that state's "hate crimes" statute, there is a distinction between "making speech the crime itself, or an element of the crime, and using speech to prove the crime. . . ." State v. Plowman,
The defendant, therefore, lacks standing to pursue a facial challenge because §
The defendant argues that §
All criminal statutes require police authorities, and prosecutors, to exercise discretion in deciding when they should be applied, and when they should not. As noted, the statute is relatively narrow in scope and sufficiently explicit to provide guidance as to its proper use. Invoking §
The defendant has failed to bear his significant burden of demonstrating that §
For these reasons, and those previously stated, the defendant's motions to dismiss are denied.