103 Minn. 419 | Minn. | 1908
Lead Opinion
The trial court found that: The personal property of the defendant was valued at $10,400 by the assessor of the city of Minneapolis. Thereafter the city board of equalization increased that assessment $10,000. Thereafter the state board of equalization further increased the assessment by $6,630. The resulting tax of $810.90 was justly and properly levied. Judgment was accordingly entered for the tax, together with the penalty. This appeal was taken from the judgment. Defendant expressly admits: “In fact [it] had personal property consisting of cash, book accounts, and stock of all .kinds, including the soap in storage, of the cash value of $27,902.77.” The entire assessment was $27,030.
1. The defendant insists that the court will take judicial notice that property in this state is not assessed for its actual cash value; that the assessor assessed other personal property at fifty per cent., in pursuance of the instructions contained in the circular issued by the
2. Defendant also insists that the Minneapolis board of equalization had .no power to make an original assessment, as it undertook to do in this case. The increase was in pursuance of the following resolution of the city board: “On motion, * * * a raise of $10.,-000 was ordered assessed against the Cudahy Packing Company for goods in storage.” The board of equalization by the charter (1) is given power to revise, amend, and equalize, the assessment on the roll of the city assessor, and “(2) is vested with all the powers which are or may be vested in the county boards- of equalization under the general laws of the state so far as applicable, but shall not be restricted by any limitation as in respect to reducing the aggregate sum of real or personal property as returned by the city assessor.” County boards of equalization have not the power to make an original assessment. State v. Crookston Lumber Co., 85 Minn. 405, 89 N. W. 173. It is quite clear, however, that under the provision granting the power to revise, amend, and equalize the assessment the city board has power to amend by adding taxable property not included in the assessor’s list.
3. Defendant also argues that the action of the Minneapolis' board of equalization, and of the state board of equalization, also, in increasing the assessment, was invalid, because in both cases notice required by law to be given in such cases was not given. The argument is not tenable. The proceedings to collect taxes in this state are judicial. Official machinery is provided for the creation Of a just demand on the part of the state to be paid by certain individuals or out of certain property. Opportunity is given for an objecting property owner to appear in court and to interpose any objection he may have, including that of unfair or unequal valuation. With-respect to the collection of personal property taxes, one opportunity is certain
Under the judicial system, the equalization proceedings are designed merely to produce a just demand. Subsequent opportunity to defend against that demand on the ground of unfair or unequal valuation is allowed. Under the summary system, the means by which the taxpayer secures his day in court is often by appeal or resort to other remedy pending or following the action of the boards of equalization. In this state, accordingly, provisions relating to equalization are generally construed as directory, not mandatory. Failure to give notice, under the judicial system, becomes clearly material only when it is sought to bring the person or property into court. The mere failure of the assessor to notify the property owner and require him to list or return his taxable property (State v. Wm. Deering & Co., 56 Minn. 24, 57 N. W. 313), or the failure to give notice of hearing of boards of equalization (State v. Flynes, 82 Minn. 34, 84 N. W. 636), does not invalidate the assessment, in whole or in part. Indeed, the omission of equalization not resulting in unfair or unequal assessment is not a basis of objection in proceedings to collect. Scott Co. v. Hinds, 50 Minn. 204, 52 N. W. 523.
It was said in State v. District Court of Red Lake Co., 83 Minn. 169, 85 N. W. 1135: “It was immaterial that the various boards of review refused to reduce the amount of the assessment and that relators had no notice thereof. There was essentially only one question for the court to pass upon; and that was, what was the assessable
It follows that the failure of boards of equalization in this case to give notice is a mere irregularity, of which defendant cannot complain unless the tax sought to be collected was unfairly and unequally assessed. Section 919, R. L. 1905. This defendant has not shown. . Our attention has been called to Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 21, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 52 L. Ed. 15. In that case the corporation had paid the full amount of its taxes, based upon the same rate as that paid upon other property of the same class. A federal court of equity restrained the collection of the illegal excess resulting from the discrimination of a board of equalization, whose decisions were conclusive, except as proceedings for relief may be taken in courts. In the case at bar the action of the officials did not result in an illegal discrimination. This defendant is in no position to complain of the application of a tax rate universal throughout the state to his tangible property only at a valuation admittedly less than the law required. This, in another sense, is, for aught that appears in this record, a smaller tax than the defendant was legally subject to (State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 Minn. 13, 104 N. W. 567), and less than was imposed by law upon domestic corporations (section 838, R. L. 1905), because the tax on their shares of stock includes, in effect, the valuation of both tangible and intangible property as united in use.
Affirmed.
On April 10, 1908, the following opinion was filed:
Rehearing
On petition for rehearing, defendant urges that the decision previously rendered in this case violates article 4, § 2, of the constitu
. 1. It does not appear in this record that this defendant has been discriminated against. It is true that the state auditor directed an original assessment of fifty per cent, of the value of real and personal property, and that the city assessor testified that the assessment in Hennepin county was made on that basis as ordered. It might also be assumed, although it was not proved, that the assessors of 'other counties assessed in fact according to the same rule. The conclusion that in consequence there had been a "systematic, intentional, and illegal undervaluation of other property by the taxing officials” of the state does not at all follow. This order of the state auditor might appear to be in contradiction to the express statutory requirement that property should be assessed at its full value in money. As a matter of fact, on the contrary, however, it was designed and conduces to make possible literal obedience to the statute.
The result of the assessors’ labors is not the final listing or valuation of property, real or personal. It is merely a step to that result. After the assessor has made the survey, his list and valuation, the county auditor corrects the verified result of his labors, as by addition of omitted property (section 853, R. R. 1905), and various boards
It is urged that the court will take judicial notice of the fact that “it is the practice of assessing officials to (ultimately) return assessable property for taxation at one-half the cash value thereof.” Unfortunately courts must take judicial notice of the fact that the ultimate assessment of real and personal property is extremely uneven and erratic, and that no certain percentage of actual value is attained. Large amounts of property, aggregating enormous values, are as
It is elementary that, while a tax law must aim at equality, approximation to equality is all that can be had. Cooley, Taxn. (1st Ed.) 127; Davis v. City, 55 Iowa, 549, 8 N. W. 423. Absolute equality is not possible. “If equality were practicable,” said Chief Justice Gibson in Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258, 261, “in what branch of the government would power to enforce it reside? Not in the judiciary, unless it were competent to set aside a law free from collision with the constitution, because it seemed unjust. It could interpose only by overstepping the limits of its sphere, by arrogating to itself a power, beyond its province, by producing intestine discord, and by setting an example which-other organs of the government might not be slow to follow. It is its peculiar duty to keep the first lines of the constitution clear, and not to stretch its power in order to correct legislative or executive abuses. Every branch of the government, the judiciary included, does injustice for which there is no remedy, because everything human is imperfect. The sum of the matter is that the taxing power must be left to that part of the government which is to exercise it.” The courts will not substitute their judgment as to valuation for that of the board of equalization. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 23 L. Ed. 663. The local assessment cases recently decided by the supreme court of the.United States emphasize the extent to which the taxing power is legislative and executive in character, and how limited is the function of courts to interfere with its exercise, in a particular case. See, for example, French v. Barber
The certain purpose of the law of this state requiring a full valuation to produce equality is evident in the intention of the very instruction of the state auditor to which objection has been so strenuously urged here. The result of the operations of the official bodies here was a tax at a rate applying uniformly throughout the state on a valuation admittedly less than the taxable property defendant owned. It is entirely clear that in this case no attempt whatever was made to discriminate between different classes of property owners. The same rule applied indifferently to residents and nonresidents.
2. Defendant was not denied a hearing, within the meaning of the state and federal constitutions. It is the lawmaking power, and not the judiciary, which is to determine all questions of discretion or policy in ordering or imposing taxes, and which must make all necessary rules and ■ regulations and decide upon the agencies by means of which a tax shall be created and collected. Mr. Justice Shiras, in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 18 Sup. Ct. 340, 42 L. Ed. 740. It was not necessary that the board of equalization should have given notice of its increase. State Railroad Tax Cases, supra. It is unnecessary, however, to discuss the extent' to which such notice is necessary, because the property owner had the right to appear before the boards of equalization at definitely stated times, and was given certain opportunity to appear in court' and defend. Section 889, R. L. 1905. Indeed, it is natural to inquire, how did the defendant raise the objections now under consideration? The answer is clear: By embracing the opportunity afforded by statute to come into court and interpose the very defense which the demonstrated ingenuity of counsel has formulated. Moreover, the taxpayers’ remedy of paying under protest the tax claimed to be unjust or illegal, and of bringing an action for the recovery of the sum, is preserved by statute. Section 891. “What more [opportunity] ought to be given?” Mr. Justice Peckham, in Security Trust & Safety Vault Co. v. City of Lexington, 203 U. S. 323, at page 333, 27 Sup. Ct. 87, at page 90, 51 L. Ed. 204. Cf. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 28 Sup. Ct. 47, 52 L. Ed. 47.
Petition for reargument denied*