State v. Crutcher

of the search for the issuance community.” probable cause reputable member “a warrant. showing of particularized Perhaps a more sup- law-abiding nature of

plying the information will suffice.... CONCLUSION Seizure, LaFave, 2 Wayne R. Search in this ease that the affidavit We conclude added) ed.1996) (first 3.4(a) (3d emphasis for the issu- information contained sufficient (footnotes omitted); Cauley, 863 S.W.2d for the to find ing magistrate cf. (non-accusatory Although information that did at 417 of a search warrant. issuance activity was not that the erroneously not describe criminal determined courts lower tip). par-A applied nature of a criminal informant’s “citizen source” and informant was a showing explanation standard, was ab- ticularized our review indicates the Melson case, facts there are no other two-prong sent in this test satisfied the that the affidavit gleaned from or circumstances that informants as set governing confidential Therefore, corrobo- the affidavit that would bolster or the Court of forth in Jacumin. “citi- conclusory descriptions of the rate the on Appeals’ judgment is affirmed Criminal not es- Accordingly, zen.” the affidavit does costs of separate grounds stated. The provided that the information defendants-appel- tablish to the this cause are taxed informant, a citizen nor does it warrant lants. reliability courts

presumption of as the lower DROWOTA, BIRCH, HOLDER, and concluded.. BARKER, JJ., concur. Having concluded that the Melson apply to we turn standard does not question of the affidavit is

nonetheless sufficient because it satisfies two-prongs re of Jacumin test. With

gard knowledge, to the informant’s basis of sufficiently

the affidavit established that the informant the cook had witnessed firsthand ing process equipment and the to manu used Tennessee, Appellant, STATE methamphetamine facture premises. (“ See, Moon, e.g., at 339 ‘basis of CRUTCHER, knowledge’ prong Bobby Appellee. supported in this case seeing ‘marijuana being the informant used Tennessee, Supreme Court distributed’ at the defendant’s resi and/or at Nashville. dence”). regard reliability With informant, the affidavit states April “citizen” was “believed to be credible and Although [reliable.” this assertion alone is veracity-

insufficient to establish informant, Valentine, see State v. (Tenn.1995), the statements indicat positive performed that a field test was product”

on the “finished in the informant’s possession sufficiently the reli demonstrated Ballard,

ability of the information. See (informant’s description of S.W.2d at 562-63 unique the victim’s de jewelry that matched

scription magistrate to conclude sufficient for reliable); see also the information was 3.3(f). Thus,

LaFave, we conclude supra, § prongs both that the affidavit satisfied finding supported test and Jacumin Attorney Walkup, General and

John Knox Moore, Gener- E. Solicitor Reporter, Michael al, Yacuzzo, Attorney Karen M. Assistant General, Appellant. for House, Ruth, Jr., Tennes- Bryce C. White see, Appellee. for

OPINION

BARKER, J. of Tennes- appeal

This is an the State judgment of the intermediate see from the affirming suppression appellate court trial below.1 The sole evidence in the court the warrantless issue appellee’s violated search of Amend- rights guaranteed the Fourth his of the United States Constitution ment I, 7 of the Tennessee Consti- Article section tution. suppression that the

The State contends improper because evidence arrest. For question was incident to lawful follow, we conclude the reasons (Supreme Court Ad- S.C.A.L.E.S. argument this case on Octo- this Court’s 1. Oral was heard Students) Tennessee, project. Clarksville, part vancing Legal Education ber as 1998 in Crutcher, Bobby appellee, safety. was not under ar- still for appellee questioned his Officer going rest at the time of the search. Ac- Rich Evans about what was happen to cordingly, appel- him. Officer Evans we affirm both the trial court and told the lee that he nearby would be taken to a Appeal’s the Court of Criminal determination hospital for medical treatment. The that the search was not incident to lawful did not discuss charges criminal or arrest arrest. The evidence obtained from the proceedings they with did properly suppressed. search was give warning him a Miranda scene. BACKGROUND Officer Moniz testified that an ambulance On October Officer Frank Moniz arrived minutes after he radioed for Department of the Gallatin Police observed medical assistance. As the was be- motorcyclists away three drive from a traffic ing ambulance, friend, loaded into the his light speed. at an excessive rate of The Crook, Jeff asked if he could take control of emergency flashing officer activated his motorcycle. wrecked appellee The equipment pulled speed- and over two of agreed requested and that Mr. Crook also However, motorcyclists. ing the third mo- possession take gold of the chains that the torcycle, appellee, driven accelerated appellee had around his neck. even more in an attempt to flee from the Officer Evans testified that he and the pursuing gave officer. Officer Moniz chase other agreed officers let to Mr. Crook re- appellee and the two vehicles reached motorcycle move the from the scene. How- (100) speeds per of one hundred miles hour. ever, bike, releasing before Officer Evans The officer radioed for assistance even- inventoried backpack the contents of a tually upon entering slowed his vehicle down jacket that were located on it.3 The officer a residential area. found a handgun loaded .38 caliber located As Officer Moniz a hill in patrol crested his backpack inside the pill and found a bottle car, appellee up he observed the drive an upper pocket jacket.4 inside the left of the embankment and wreck into a storm drain. An examination pill of the bottle revealed appellee approximately The had been thrown several small packets powder, of a white twenty away motorcycle feet from his and which positive later tested cocaine. crawling was out of the roadside brush when appellant directly The taken was to Sum- up the officer apprehend drove him. Offi- Regional ner Medical Center from the scene upon reaching cer Moniz testified that spent accident. He several hours appellee, placed he one arm ap- behind the receiving x-rays there medical and treat- pellee’s back and intended to arrest him for during ment. The record reflects that endangerment evading reckless arrest.2 time, Officer Evans obtained an arrest war- However, appellee complained when the rant appellee upon for the based the evidence injuries, handcuffing Officer Moniz ceased possession. cocaine and firearm The him and an called for ambulance. appellee was released from the medical cen- Officer Moniz testified that he no made ter evening that same and was taken to the appellee additional effort to arrest the at the Drug County. Task Force Center in Sumner waiting accident scene. for the While ambu- The transpired record is silent as to what at lance, Officer Moniz and other However, the Drug Task Force Center. stayed appellee lay with the and made him evidence following day, shows that on the inventory was releasing personal There some evidence that Officer Moniz an search before planned charge appellee also with D.U.I. property motorcycle parties. to third was Apparently hospital, appellee while at the approximately twenty feet from the roadside to a submitted blood-alcohol test. The results when the search was conducted. The record is showed that his level blood/alcohol was less than appellee unclear whether the was still at the percent. 0.10 at time. scene 3. Officer Evans testified that he searched the police impounded appellee’s 4.The Gallatin mo- upon policy contents of based finding torcycle upon the cocaine substance. Department Police required the Gallatin appellee transported back to suppress. Sumner the motion to In State v. Regional Medical Center after hospital Odom, (Tenn.1996), offi- cials appellee notified had Court clarified the standard to be used broken neck. appellate reviewing courts when those find ings: appellee stayed Regional Sumner approximately Medical Center for days. four witnesses, Questions credibility The record refiécts that Officer Moniz ob- evidence, weight and value of the tained an arrest warrant for the on resolution of conflicts in the evidence are October based charges judge matters entrusted to the trial as the evading endangerment. arrest and reckless party prevailing trier of fact. The in the Officer Moniz testified that strongest legit- trial court is entitled to arrested after his release from the medical imate of the evidence view adduced at the center, (1) charged and was possession with: suppression hearing, including all reason- substance, aof controlled to wit: cocaine legitimate able and inferences that (2) grams, sell; over 0.5 pos- with intent to long drawn from that evidence. So as the handgun session of a during the commission greater weight of the supports evidence (3) felony; of a endangerment; reckless findings, the trial findings court’s those (4) evading arrest. words, upheld. shall be In other a trial The appellee filed a suppress motion to findings court’s of fact in a suppression cocaine substance and the handgun on the hearing upheld will be unless the evidence ground they that were through obtained an preponderates otherwise. improper search and seizure. Following an evidentiary hearing, the granted trial court application Id. at 23. The of the law to the the motion to suppress finding that court, however, facts found the trial is a search probable was without cause and did question of law which this Court reviews de not fall exception within an to the warrant Yeargan, novo. State v. 958 S.W.2d requirement. The trial court determined (Tenn.1997); Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. We that grounds there were no inventory for an apply these standards to address the issue in search since a party, Crook, third Jeff Contrary position this case. taken available to remove the motorcycle from the dissent, we consider the issue of whether addition, scene. the court found that the an arrest was made for Fourth Amendment search was not incident to a lawful arrest purposes primarily to be one fact. of See because the was not under arrest State, Childs 584 S.W.2d 786-87 when the search was conducted. (Tenn.1979) (reviewing an whether accused interlocutory On appeal, the intermediate purposes giving was in appellate court affirmed suppression or- warnings primarily question Miranda as a der. The State of appeals Tennessee to this fact). Court contending that the search proper as incident to a lawful arrest. The State DISCUSSION concedes police officers were not principle fundamental inventory entitled to conduct an search. See jurisprudence search and seizure is that the Drinkard v. 584 S.W.2d (Tenn.1979). police may they not conduct a search unless therefore, inquiry, Our first show cause and obtain a war was under arrest when rant from a magistrate.5 officers conducted neutral Under both the search. constitutions, the federal and state “a war

STANDARD OF REVIEW presumed rantless search or seizure is unrea sonable, This case involves a review of the and evidence discovered as a result trial court’s findings subject of fact and in grant suppression, law thereof is to unless the right 5. The applicable to be free from unreasonable tion. The Fourth Amendment is to provided through searches and seizures is in the Fourth the states the Fourteenth Amendment. Ohio, 643, 655, Mapp Amendment to the United States Constitution 81 S.Ct. 367 U.S. I, (1961). and Article section 7 of the Tennessee Constitu 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (Tenn. Hawkins, 969 S.W.2d or sei- State v. demonstrates that There are three tiers Crim.App.1997). one of the pursuant zure was conducted involving “seizures” action law enforcement narrowly exceptions to the warrant defined person under the Fourth Amendment. Bridges, requirement.” State v. 963 S.W.2d range (Tenn.1997). include a wide of inva These situations actions, “stop ranging from the sive exception require to the warrant One suspicion, to the frisk” under reasonable contemporaneous police ment is a cause, “custodial arrest” based on Chimel v. follows a lawful arrest. Califor following a to incarceration of an offender nia, 752, 762-63, 395 U.S. 89 S.Ct. custodial arrest. (1969); State v. Wat 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (Tenn.1992). kins, 827 S.W.2d justify Not seizures all lawful police officers make a lawful custodial When instance, po a degree of search. For same arrest, they permitted, are as incident suspicion no reasonable lice officer who has to search the arrested and may activity place taken that criminal has Chimel, immediately surrounding area. casual, investigatory stop; but a still make at 2040. The rationale U.S. at authority under law enforcement the officer’s searches is the need to disarm for those to informal is limited such circumstances (cid:127) safely take him into arrestee order questioning persons involved. Florida custody, preserve evidence and the need to Bostick, trial. States v. Rob for later use at United State v. But inson, ler, (Tenn.Crim.App. L.Ed.2d 427 1990). hand, Where, the officer on the other reasonable, suspicion that articulable has an In cases where the arrestee is in, preparing engaged person has vehicle, occupant of a behavior, in, the level of engage criminal searches, contemporaneous to the conduct authority is permissible law enforcement arrest, passenger compartments inside person frisk of stop raised to the Belton, the vehicle. York v. 453 U.S. New Ohio, Terry v. 392 of principles under the 2862, 454, 457, 101 2860, 768 S.Ct. 69 L.Ed.2d (1968). 1868, 1, 889 20 L.Ed.2d U.S. 88 S.Ct. (1981). Belton, has Following this Court cases, of pat-down search a limited In such joined jurisdictions6 upholding in several pas search of person a limited validity of those searches even where the in which the vehicle senger compartment of in the back seat of a arrestee neutralized upon a permissible riding are person was search is conducted. police car when the justified pro to action is showing that such Watkins, 827 at 295-96. 27, Id., at 392 U.S. tect officer. appellee contends that the State 776, 1883; Simpson, 968 S.W.2d v. at State at the accident scene and that under arrest (Tenn.1998). 780 under Belton and proper the search was need not address whether Watkins. We the next level By comparison, scope of Belton and search fell within the ar authority, the custodial enforcement law we affirm the trial court’s Watkins because rest, showing probable upon a justified was not under conclusion that has been com a crime cause to believe that arrest when the search was conducted. investiga mitted, suspect of and that the discussed As committed that crime. reviewing police con tion “The standards for it above, carries with arrest a lawful custodial stringent degree as the duct become more to “incident perform a search power to privacy the citizen’s increases.” invasion of Haught, 122 276, (1996); Sholola, v. 803, 282-83 6. See States v. 124 817 N.W.2d United F.3d Franco, 946, v. (7th 1997); 104, United States v. 981 F.2d 948 Cir. Idaho 831 P.2d White, 470, (10th Cir.1992); Garcia, 137, United States v. (Tex.App.1990). 472 141-42 801 S.W.2d Cir.1989), (6th 871 F.2d Vasey, F.2d United States v. affirmed after But see Cir.1989); (6th United Greenwald, remand 892 F.2d 1987); (9th State 109 Nev. Cir. Karlin, (7th States v. Cir. 852 F.2d 971-72 36, 37 (1993). 858 P.2d Pittman, 1988); Neb.App. arrest,” cause to believe that evidence of contemporaneous which is a search arrested, person of both the found, the area question crime in will be might into which the immediate, arrestee reach for a necessity for an warrantless evidence, weapon destroy or including the prevent search to the destruction or loss of passenger any area of vehicle in which the case, however, evidence.9 In this Chimel, riding. arrestee was 395 U.S. at appellee’s wholly unre- 2040; Belton, S.Ct. 453 U.S. at lated to the crime for proba- had 101 S.Ct. at 2862. justify ble cause to arrest. In order to full Chimel search incident arrest, to the critical The most invasive law enforcement was, question remains whether seizure is incarceration. Law enforcement fact, arrested at the scene. authority in such perform cases extends to “inventory a detailed per search” of all Tennessee, an arrest is more sonal effects the arrestee’s possession, and specifically taking, seizing, defined as “the or possibly of the vehicle in which riding he was another, detaining person either at the time of if that vehicle is also him, touching putting by any or hands on Lafayette, Illinois seized. act which indicates an to take intention him 2605, 2611, subjects into arrested Opperman, South Dakota v. the actual control and will of the 364, 372, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 making State, v.West the arrest.” 221 Tenn. (1976).7 (1968) (citations 425 S.W.2d State, omitted); Robertson bottom line is this: 184 Tenn. when the (1947) (citations Chimel, conduct a full search 198 S.W.2d under Williams, omitted); the seizure of suspect must rise to the 914 S.W.2d level of a custodial only possi arrest.8 The 947 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995).10 An arrest exception ble might this rule be a limited be affected without formal words or a station search in cases where there is 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest booking. house (1995). committed, believe that a However, crime has been there must be actual re- inventory 1995)(warrantless 7. An upheld, aof vehicle will be suspect’s Cir. seizure of DUI however, only when there contemporaneous is no reasonable alter- blood reasonable even without accuracy native to seizure of the because the of blood-alcohol evi vehicle. Drinkard v. time); quickly dence diminishes over United (6th Berry, States v. 866 F.2d Cir. 1989)(same factual scenario and rationale as in 8. The dissent seems to infer that because Officer Chapel). For an excellent discussion nar Moniz had appellee cause to arrest the LaFave, Cupp exception Wayne row see 3 R. evading for driving, ap- arrest and reckless 5.4(b) (1996 Search and at 155-163 Seizure "arrestable;” pellee necessarily was and there- ed.). fore, actually whether or not an arrest had been effectuated, justi- a search incident to arrest was opines 10.The dissent that the definition of "ar- fied. We may decline to hold that a search adopted rest” in Robertson and reaffirmed in upheld merely as a search incident to arrest longer Westis no accurate. Cited are a series of because a lawful custodial arrest “could have” Supreme United States Court cases and Tennes- Moore, been made. State v. see cases that the dissent claims establish a new (Tenn.Crim.App.1997), app. filed, ap- no arrest, if, definition of to wit: "an arrest occurs pears contrary, hereby to hold to the over- surrounding' in view of all the circumstances Accord, Layland ruled. v. 535 P.2d 1043 incident, a reasonable would have under- (Alaska 1975), grounds; overruled on other stood that he or she was not free to leave.” This Greenwald, v. 109 Nev. 858 P.2d 36 definition, however, recognize fails to the distinc- Evans, People v. 43 N.Y.2d 371 N.E.2d "arrest," tion between "seizure” and discussed (N.Y.1977). 400 N.Y.S.2d 810 person may being above. A be seized without placed under custodial arrest. None of the cases e.g., Cupp Murphy, 9. See 412 U.S. precise cited the dissent deal with this issue. (1973)(warrantless 36 L.Ed.2d 900 search agree person” While we that the "reasonable suspect’s fingernails of evidence beneath reason determining standard is a factor in whether an strangulation occurred, able in murder case even in the just any arrest has as it would be for arrest, contemporaneous seizure, absence of a because of required we believe more is to establish evidence); purposes "evanescent nature” of such United for a custodial arrest of a search inci- (9th Chapel, States 55 F.3d dent to an arrest. required, not see 5 of arrest are straint on the arrestee’s freedom of move- formal words (1995), or authority arresting § 2 some words legal ment under Am.Jur.2d Arrest it be used that make clear officer. Id. actions should is under the the arrestee that he or she definition, Relying on that we ac authority arresting legal control and knowledge that the facts in this case are officer, In this and not free to leave. appellee close under as whether the was accomplished this actions that would have arrest at the accident scene. The trial court included, to, accompany- limited but were not apprehended found that Moniz Officer hospital until the appellee appellee place him under and intended to served, warrant could be obtained arrest following arrest the wreck. The officer testi that he should consider telling appellee fied, however, arrest that he did not custody pending actual service of himself in injuries. appellee appellee’s Al due warrant, any other words or the arrest though Officer Moniz had cause to conveyed the same actions that would have scene, he nor make an arrest at the neither message. charges or Officer Evans discussed criminal procedures appellee. arrest with CONCLUSION appellee questioned the officers and was told axiomatic that a warrantless It only nearby that he would be taken to a may precede not an arrest and police search hospital treatment. The officers for medical justification. Smith part serve as of its appellee did not take the into until Ohio, several hours later when he was first re (1990) curiam); (per Sibron 108 L.Ed.2d leased from the medical center. York, v. New Giving to the trial find- deference court’s (1968). Moreover, we fact, ings agree trial court’s we with the to hold that prepared are not appellee ultimate conclusion that the was merely because conduct a warrantless time of the search. The under arrest the sus they probable cause have appellee kept was evidence reflects that the Having pect. determined at the scene for a few minutes accident time at the not under arrest waiting arrival of an ambulance. while search, the search was not we conclude more, showing there is no Without a lawful arrest.12 incident to any being detained Court of Criminal judgment of the treatment. reason other than medical taxed to the with costs Appeals is affirmed officers intend to If law enforcement of Tennessee. to an it is justify a search as incident action incumbent them to take some BIRCH, J., ANDERSON, C.J., concur. that would indicate to a reasonable DROWOTA, HOLDER, JJ., dissent. Although that he under arrest.11 or she is (1980), may argue that a search originally justify L.Ed.2d 633 the search 11. The State tried to an invento- it occurs before upheld of ry and its contents as where the under Chimel apparent It was after it became Rawlings search. to broaden We do not read the arrest. princi- argument the would under that this fail scope to lawful arrests. of searches incident the 653-54, ples S.W.2d at of Drinkard v. suspect im- police the Rawlings, arrested In the (because by appellee's friend Jeff of the offer to, after, contemporaneous the mediately and motorcycle) the of the that Crook to take control up- Supreme Court person. The his justify this search as "incident State tried to upon based incident to arrest held the search as did not that Officer Moniz arrest.” It is clear 448 U.S. at in that case. the circumstances appellee. he had arrested the believe case, police appellee’s the at 2564. In 100 S.Ct. appellee until several did not take exception 12. The- "search incident to arrest” search, appellee was the the when hours after protect need to from Chimel is based the medical center. More- from the first released preserve at the police and to evidence over, ap- until arrest was not made the formal Su- time of arrest. The dissent relies days exceed- proximately later. The search four Rawlings v. Ken- preme later Court's decision scope of Chimel. ed the and rationale tucky, III, Justice, DROWOTA, 752, 762-63, F. 23 L.Ed.2d FRANK Watkins, dissenting. 827 S.W.2d (Tenn.1992). When officers make majority’s respectfully dissent from the I occupant the of an automo- lawful arrest of view, my appel- case. In decision in this bile, a search of the arrested and at the time his motor- lee had been arrested passenger compartment of vehicle is therefore, searched; the search cycle was constitutionally permissible. New York v. as incident to a lawful arrest. was valid Belton, U.S. however, assuming, appellee Even Watkins, L.Ed.2d technically at the time had not been arrested at 295-96. Officers conduct the S.W.2d occurred, the search and arrest passenger compartment search of the substantially contemporaneous; were there- though automobile even arrested fore, constitutionally as the search was valid placed has been in the back of a seat Accordingly, incident to a lawful arrest. I car. Id. judgments would reverse lower In this the trial court and Court of suppression courts which ordered of the evi- Appeals appellee, Criminal that found during the remand dence seized search and Crutcher, Bobby lawfully had not been ar- pro- this cause to the trial court for further search, prior rested and as a result the ceedings. constitutionally lower courts held the search invalid as incident to a lawful arrest. In I. courts, affirming the decisions of the lower majority SEARCH INCIDENT characterizes the lower courts’ TO ARREST pri- conclusion that no lawful arrest occurred The Fourth Amendment to the United finding or to the search as a and provides States Constitution that factual right “[t]he states that the evidence in the record does of the people persons, to be secure in their preponderate not against finding. houses, effects, papers, against unrea7 seizures, sonable searches and shall not be majority While the states the correct stan- Similarly violated....” Article Section 7 appellate respect dard of review with to fac- guarantees Tennessee Constitution Odom, findings, tual State v. people “that shall be secure in then- (Tenn.1996), the lower court’s conclu- houses, persons, papers possessions lawfully sion that the had not been from unreasonable searches sei- arrested at the time of the search is not a “[Ajrticle I, zures. ...” section 7 is identical fact, law, finding of it is a conclusion purpose intent and with the Fourth derived from an application of the law to the Amendment.” Downey, 945 S.W.2d undisputed facts in this case. This Court (Tenn.1997). Therefore, both the bound conclusions of law of the federal protect state constitutions lower courts and reviews such conclusions de against unreasonable “searches” and “sei- Yeargan, novo. State v. majority zures.” recognizes, (Tenn.1997). As decision Reviewing legal de novo the under both the federal and state constitu- courts, conclusions of the lower it is clear tions, a pre- warrantless search or seizure is that the trial court and the Court of Criminal constitutionally sumed unreasonable unless Appeals in finding erred the search in this the State demonstrates that the search or constitutionally case invalid. pursuant seizure was conducted to one of the concluding had not narrowly exceptions defined to the warrant arrested, lawfully been

requirement. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d lower courts cite of this Court from decisions (Tenn.1998). 776, 780 proposition 1968 and 1947 for the that an seizing, The State contends that the in in taking, Tennessee is “the or another, detaining by case was in accordance with of of the person conducted one of either him, narrowly touching by any those exceptions putting defined to the or hands on or requirement warrant search incident to a act indicates an intention to take him which —a California, custody subjects person lawful v. 395 U.S. into and the arrested arrest. Chimel 304 5.1(a) (1996); Anderson, § person actual control and will of the the zure cf. State, making (Tenn.1996) (test the arrest.” v. 221 Tenn. West 937 S.W.2d 855 to de 178, 184, (1968); 425 S.W.2d 605 Robert person custody termine is in and 277, 284, son v. 184 Tenn. 198 S.W.2d warnings prior entitled to Miranda1 to inter (1947). undisputed facts rogation person is “whether a reasonable this record demonstrate that Officer Moniz suspect’s position the would consider himself apprehended crawling Crutcher as he was deprived or of herself freedom of movement brush, the from roadside seized Crutcher’s degree to a associated a formal ar with arm, began handcuffing process. the rest.”). objective It is an test which does not certainly These are acts which an “indicate depend upon subjective the intention the of custody. intention to take” the into subjective perception officer nor the addition, In lying Crutcher was on the road suspect. subjective intent of the officer subjected side and to the actual control and is relevant to the assessment to the will of Officer Moniz at the scene of the extent intent that the officer’s has been con view, therefore, my accident. apply even Chesternut, veyed person confronted. by employed majority, the definition the 7; 486 at n. 108 S.Ct. at 1980 n. U.S. 575 lawfully the had been arrested at 6, 100 Mendenhall, n. 446 U.S. at 554 S.Ct. at the scene of the prior accident to the search. Stewart, J.); (plurality opinion 1877 n. 6 of 3 However, applied by the definition of arrest LaFave, Wayne R. Search and Seizure

the and the lower long courts is no 5.1(a) (1996); Stansbury § v. see also Cali er applicable the standard. 318, 323-25, fornia, 511 114 S.Ct. U.S. law, applicable Under current an arrest 1529-30, (1994), citing L.Ed.2d 293 Ber 128 if, occurs in view of all of the circumstances 420, 440, McCarty, U.S. 104 kemer v. 468 incident, surrounding per the a reasonable 3138, 3150, (1984); S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d 317 son would have understood that he or she (uncommunicat- Anderson, at 854 937 S.W.2d was not free to leave. v. Hodari California person suspect ed is a is irrelevant belief D., 627-28, 499 U.S. 111 S.Ct. determination). to Fifth Amendment (1991); Michigan 113 L.Ed.2d 690 Chesternut, 567, 573, 486 U.S. 108 S.Ct. considered to deter- Factors courts have Delga 100 L.Ed.2d 565 INS v. mine whether an arrest has occurred include do, 210, 215, 104 1758, 1762, 466 U.S. S.Ct. 80 time, following: place purpose of Royer, L.Ed.2d 247 Florida v. encounter; officer; the words used 491, 502, 1319, 1326-27, U.S. general de- officer’s tone voice (1983) (plurality opinion); L.Ed.2d 229 Unit meanor; the officer’s statements to others Mendenhall, ed States v. encounter; present during who were 64 L.Ed.2d 497 officers; threatening presence of several Stewart, J.); (1980)(plurality opinion of officer; display weapon by of a an and the Moore, (Tenn.1989); S.W.2d physical touching citizen. (Tenn. Bragan, Mendenhall, at 446 U.S. at Darnell, Crim.App.1995); State v. Pancoast, 1877; People v. 659 P.2d 1348 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995); S.W.2d LaFave, (Colo.1982); Greene, Wayne R. Search (Tenn.Crim.App. 5.1(a) 1995); LaFave, (1996).2 Wayne R. Search Sei- Seizure Arizona, ent; any 1. Miranda v. form S.Ct. limitation on movement or other imposed suspect during of restraint interrogation; any the offi- interactions between Anderson, (factors Compare 937 S.W.2d at 855 suspect, including spoken cer and the the words relevant to determination of whether a reason- suspect’s suspect, the officer to and the able custody would consider himself or herself in responses; the extent to verbal nonverbal purposes for Fifth Amendment include suspect with the officer’s is confronted interrogation; the time and location of the guilt guilt; suspicions and the or evidence of questioning; duration and character of the suspect aware that extent to which the is made demeanor; general tone of officer's voice and answering ques- from he or she is free to refrain suspect’s transportation place method of will.) tions or to end the interview pres- questioning; the number of (1) did a sei- questions must be answered: majority opinion goes great into detail occur, i.e., distinguish between various Fourth in view of all person to zure of the incident, re- person seizures of the and surrounding Amendment the circumstances the person” stan- apply to the “reasonable person fuses have understood would a reasonable (2) the recognize leave; it “fails to dis- dard because and that he or she was not free to ‘seizure’ and ‘arrest.’” I tinction between so, upon probable if was the seizure based by majority distinction drawn the is feel the case, majority recognizes cause. In this the appeal. this immaterial in the context of to that “Officer Moniz had scope permissible of search and the While Therefore, make an arrest at the scene.” vary, the term used to describe a seizure only opinion relates difference depending upon quantum of individual- question first a seizure occurred. —whether seizure, supporting the suspicion ized by majority are The distinctions drawn vary. does not For ex- definition of seizure question. to that irrelevant reasonable, only ample, an officer has a if principle ap- correct is When the law suspicion that a has en- articulable plied the circumstances of it is to this crime, in, engage in a gaged or is about to lawfully clear that had been but person, the officer seize arrested at the time the search of his motor- seizure, scope and the duration cycle giving occurred. The incident rise to investigatory stop to an and search is limited appeal occurred when Officer Moniz ob- Ohio, Terry frisk. motorcyclists away pull served three from a Though light high traffic at a rate speed. When constitutionally scope permissible lights, Officer Moniz and activated his siren search is limited because the seizure is based motorcyclists pulled two of over. reasonable, only upon suspicion, articulable Crutcher, however, fled from Officer Moniz the test to determine whether the has speeds per in excess of one hundred miles been seized is the same—in view of all the through just a hour residential area outside incident, surrounding circumstances city County. of Gallatin in Sumner person have would a reasonable understood Crutcher crashed his and was that he or she was not free to leave. The apprehended Officer Moniz as he was determining a standard seizure crawling out of the roadside brush. This was regardless remains the has occurred same — stop ordinarily not a routine traffic “arrest,” it upon of whether is an based does not result in an arrest. Officer Moniz “investigatory stop,” cause or an offenses, witnessed Crutcher commit criminal suspicion. based reasonable articulable endangerment evading reckless and arrest.3 suspicion It is the individualized which varies already ground when Crutcher scope delineates the of the search and Moniz arrived Officer at the accident scene. the term used to describe the seizure. A directly proceeded Officer Moniz to Crutch- support lawful sufficient er, arm, Crutcher’s it into exception seized and moved incident to arrest warrant simply position to handcuff Crutcher. Officer requirement, is Fourth Amendment upon probable Moniz released Crutcher’s arm and did not “seizure” which based Therefore, com- determining whether a handcuff him because Crutcher cause. occurred, pain injuries.4 he plained Though lawful warrantless arrest has two did Yet, repeated majority’s 3. The references issuance turned out he had a broken neck.” because puzzling. conduct, warrant are and service of an arrest It professional of the officer's beyond dispute occurred, that the officer in this case had finds that no arrest concludes the en grounds to make a sufficient warrantless arrest. infirm, suing constitutionally sup search is witnessed the defendant commit- Officer Moniz during presses the evidence found the search. 40-7-103(a)(1) ting Tenn.Code Ann. crimes. majority’s recognize holding fails to (1997 Repl.). exclusionary purpose of the rule is to deter offi wrongdoing, law enforcement see State v. cial judge trial in this case found that 4. The Huddleston, (Tenn. 1996), very professionally. They "police officers acted completely highly punish appropriate not to jerk probably life saved this Defendant's professional conduct. him, arresting ground as it him off the 306 reasons, disagree I with Crutcher, For all these Officer Moniz re

not handcuff that Crutcher majority would conclude beside Crutcher mained with him and was at the time his had been arrested arrived on the Officer Rich Evans when any person reasonable searched because was stayed Crutcher scene. Both officers with understood would have position in Crutcher’s hospital taken to the ambu until he was light of the not free to leave that he was to re They repeatedly told Crutcher lance. case, being the I am of That circumstances.7 Crutcher, Fortunately for main still. search of opinion that the warrantless quickly.5 Though neither ambulance arrived motorcycle was valid as a search Crutcher’s arrest, informed Crutcher that he was under arrest. to the lawful warrantless incident precedent a condition formal words are not Chester of a lawful arrest.6 existence II. nut, 574, at 1980. 486 at U.S.

Moreover, not invari “an arrested is KENTUCKY RAWLINGS V. confined; if ably police taken to a station or However, assuming that Crutcher even station, police that an arrestee is taken to at the time this search had not been arrested no than a continuation of the is more occurred, opinion that the war- I am of v. Illinois inherent in the arrest status.” constitutionally valid un- search was rantless 2605, 645, 640, Lafayette, Rawlings Kentucky, v. reasoning of der the (1983). 2609, Finally, 65 77 L.Ed.2d 65 that testimony Moniz and Evans of Officers In that United 633 L.Ed.2d Crutcher was not arrested at the scene held that a search Supreme Court States determination. if the officer has accident does not control the formal arrest precede a art, a court legal “Arrest” a term of to arrest at time is not of the search were apply the to the facts to determine and the fruits must law Watkins, ar- probable cause to necessary support whether an arrest has occurred. State, 214 314, v. rest.8 See Warden Tenn. 827 at 296. S.W.2d applied over principle been in an appel- 8.This has majority that the 5. The relies the fact majority jurisdictions before only whelming both kept a few lee at the accident scene for was . Supreme Court ren support that no United States minutes as for its conclusion and after the State, occurred, Seay stating, Rawlings. reflects See v. evidence "[t]he dered its decision 81, kept (Ala.Crim.App.1994); the accident scene State v. that the 651 So.2d 83 789, (1998); waiting Earl, 489, for a few minutes while 792 Ark. 970 333 more, 274, 1306, Valenzuela, is of an Without there arrival ambulance. Ariz. 589 P.2d 121 State v. being 645, showing Simon, (1979); detained no by People 45 Cal.2d 290 v. 1307 any Sutherland, police 531, (1955); other than medical reason People v. 683 P.2d 533 imply 1984); Trine, 1192, (Colo. treatment.” These statements v. 236 State P.2d 1196 injured suspects in need of detain 1098, (1996); officers should 216, v. 1110 Hill 673 A.2d Conn. highway medical attention on the side 975, (D.C.1993); U.S., Collier v. 978 627 A.2d house arrest until all the formalities a station 217, 724, State, Ga.App. 338 S.E.2d 725 177 certainly policy a completed. That is are 552, Delmondo, (1985); Haw. 512 v. 54 encourage explic- either which this Court should Crabb, (1973); 551, 107 n. 2 State v. P.2d 554 itly implicitly. or 1203, (1984); 298, People 1209 v. 688 P.2d Idaho 211, 132, Kolichman, Ill.App.3d 161 Ill.Dec. 218 Though majority repeats well-settled 6. State, 569, (1991); Santana v. 574 578 N.E.2d required proposition are not that formal words (Ind.App.1997); State v. 1360 679 N.E.2d apply majority an fails to to effect (Iowa 1994); Peterson, Com 25 515 N.W.2d decision, it rule in this case. Given the Brillante, 503 399 Mass. v. monwealth police to arrest either an will be difficult for (1987); Commonwealth 462 n. 5 N.E.2d because it intoxicated or unconscious Mantinez, 92 Mass.App.Ct. 692 N.E.2d 44 person, words either difficult to inform such State, (1998); A.2d Md. 537 Lee v. 311 actions, being arrested. he or she is Brooks, A.2d 1266 634 247 (Me. 1993); Arterberry, People 431 Mich. Indeed,, appropriate hardly an “reasonable” is Varnado, (1988); State v. 429 N.W.2d descriptive who believes term for a defendant 1998); (Minn. State v. Bau N.W.2d of an accident scene that he free leave the man, (Minn.App.1998); El N.W.2d from fled which results because the defendant 1990); (Miss. So.2d through lis v. highway travels on a Meadors, P.2d Mont. one hun- speeds area at in excess residential Brooks, 337 N.C. per dred miles hour. (1964)(search 320, 788, suppression the lower courts ordered 379 791 which S.W.2d of the evidence and remand this cause precedes upheld arrest will be if the two regarded proceedings. trial court for further part as of one and the same transaction). Hold- I ám authorized to state that Justice there question Dissenting Opinion. is no er in this concurs probable Officer Moniz had

Crutcher at the HOLDER, J., scene of the accident for concur. endangerment evading reckless arrest. Moreover, none of the items discovered dur- motorcycle the search of Crutcher’s were

necessary or relevant to establish

cause to arrest for those two offenses. therefore,

Clearly, officers had cause to arrest Crutcher at the scene of the Moreover, accident. the record establishes Tennessee, Appellee, STATE of that Crutcher was released that same eve- ning hospital from the custody Drug Task Force and remained in HARRIS, Appellant. Teresa Deion Smith day until the next when he was hospital.9 returned to the Tennessee, Supreme Court of rule, at Jackson. Though bright-line there is no I would conclude that the search and arrest in 12, April 1999. part this case were of one and the same delay transaction because the between the solely by

two was caused the defendant’s need for medical Accordingly, treatment. assuming

even Crutcher was not arrested at scene, concludes, as the I would hold the search valid as incident to a lawful

arrest under the reasoning Rawlings.10

CONCLUSION I opinion Because am of the that the war- rantless search of the defendant’s was valid aas search incident ato lawful respectfully majori- I dissent from the

ty decision. I would reverse the decisions of 579, (1994); 437, 148; (1991); Twohig, S.E.2d 587 State v. 238 164 Wis.2d 475 N.W.2d 154 92, 344, (1991); Bowden, (6th Neb. 469 N.W.2d 354 New United States v. 121 F.3d Cir. 710 DeGrenier, 547, 1997); Miller, (4th

Hampshire v. 128 N.H. 517 A.2d United States v. 925 F.2d 695 814, (1986); Pena, 760, Cir.1991). 816 State v. 108 N.M. 538, (N.M. 1989); Jones, 779 P.2d 544 State v. 206, App.3d evening 112 Ohio 678 N.E.2d 291 9. The record reflects that on the (1996); Elk, x-rays State v. 249 Or. 439 P.2d 1011 accident Crutcher’s were misread. The (1968); Green, Or.App. day, hospi- State v. and the 67 676 P.2d error was discovered the next (1984); Trenge, 940 Commonwealth v. 305 tal called and asked that Crutcher be (1982); Pa.Super. hospital 8 for treatment of a frac- 451 A.2d 710 n. returned to Moultrie, State v. 316 S.E.2d vertebrae. S.C. 37 tured (1994); Nguyen, State v. 563 N.W.2d 125 n. (S.D.1997); disagree majority’s with the decision to Williams v. I Moore, (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Spurgeon, overrule (Utah App.1995); (Tenn.Crim.App.1997), P.2d monwealth, a decision in which the Parker v. Com appellate upheld un S.E.2d court a search Va. intermediate McKenna, Wash.App. present similar to those in this der circumstances Swanson, 958 P.2d case.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Crutcher

Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date Published: Apr 12, 1999

Citation: 989 S.W.2d 295

Court Abbreviation: Tenn.