State v. CrumpState v. Crump
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
REBEKAH S. NEUHERZ, Atty. Reg. No. 0072093, 150 N. Limestone Street, Suite 218, Springfield, Ohio 45501
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 14th day of August, 2009.
DONOVAN, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Steven L. Crump appeals his conviction and sentence for one count of falsification, in violation of
{¶ 2} On December 3, 2007, Crump was charged by complaint with one count of
{¶ 3} Following a jury trial on April 10, 2008, Crump was acquitted of personating an officer, but he was found guilty of falsification. On July 1, 2008, Crump was sentenced to 180 days imprisonment which was suspended. Crump also received two years of community control and was ordered to pay court costs. Crump filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on July 24, 2008.
I
{¶ 4} On November 20, 2007, Dayton Police Officer Stephen Clark was dispatched to a bus stop at the corner of Forest Ridge and Acclivis Lane in Dayton, Ohio, to investigate a report of a white van driving recklessly near a bus stop where preschool age children were waiting to be transported to school. The dispatch which Officer Clark received indicated that he would be meeting another police officer, Officer Steven Crump, who had witnessed the reckless driving while he was dropping off his own 5 year old child at the bus stop.
{¶ 5} When Officer Clark arrived at the scene, he spoke with Crump who described the incident. While responding to the complaint, Officer Clark indicated that Crump told him that he was planning on buying an assault rifle. Officer Clark testified that Crump asked him about any laws in Dayton regarding the purchase of assault rifles. Because he thought Crump‘s questions were “odd,” Officer Clark asked him where he worked, and Crump stated that he was a deputy with the Clark County Sheriff‘s Department.
{¶ 6} After he answered some of Crump‘s questions regarding the legality of
{¶ 7} After a jury trial, Crump was convicted of falsification and found not guilty of personating an officer. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. It is from this judgment that Crump now appeals.
II
{¶ 8} Crump‘s first assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 9} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED THE DEFENDANT‘S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL.”
{¶ 10} In his first assignment, Crump contends that the trial court erred when it overruled his Crim. R. 29 motion for acquittal made at the close of the State‘s case because the evidence presented by the State was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction for falsification.
{¶ 12} Crump was convicted of falsification in violation of
{¶ 13} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
{¶ 14} Crump also asserts that the evidence submitted by the State was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that his statement mislead Officer Clark in the performance of his official duties. Initially, we note that Crump indicated to the police dispatcher that he was a police officer when he called to report a white van driving recklessly near the bus stop. During the trial, the audio tape recording was played in which Crump called in to report the incident and also informed the dispatcher that he was a police officer:
{¶ 15} “Operator: May I help you?
{¶ 16} “Crump: Good morning. How are you?
{¶ 17} “Operator: I‘m fine, sir. How can I help you?
{¶ 18} “Crump: Yes, ma‘am. We had an accident1 at a bus stop this morning with uh a vehicle that was sitting at a bus stop (inaudible) all the kids parents.
{¶ 19} “Operator: (Inaudible).
{¶ 20} “Crump: The vehicle and a bus pulled up, it was a preschooler‘s bus, and it was a preschooler standing walking towards the corner to get on the bus with the mom and
{¶ 21} “Operator: Okay.
{¶ 22} “Crump: And this car literally took off, squealed the tires all the way down the road and took off flying out the neighborhood.
{¶ 23} “Operator: Um okay. Did you get a license plate number of that car?
{¶ 24} “Crump: No, I know who it was.
{¶ 25} “Operator: Okay, you do?
{¶ 26} “Crump: Yeah I‘m also a police officer.
{¶ 27} “Operator: Okay.
{¶ 28} “Crump: And my little five year-old, a bunch of five year-olds standing there, six year-old and kids all the way down the main drag standing at bus stops with him riding like this and the bus driver even asked said that was the most inappropriate thing -
{¶ 29} “***
{¶ 30} “Crump: - Because she felt that it was very unsafe and I told her I would call. So I would uh do my little if the officer comes out or calls that might of (inaudible).”
{¶ 31} Officer Clark, who was clearly acting in his official capacity when he was dispatched to investigate Crump‘s claim, was, therefore, led to believe that he would be dealing with another police officer when he arrived at the scene. Once Officer Clark was at the scene, Crump advised him that he was in fact a deputy with Clark County Sheriff‘s Office. Crump then questioned Officer Clark regarding the legality of ownership of assault rifles. Without delving into a hypothetical discussion of Crump‘s motives for telling Officer Clark that he was an acting police officer, we can only assume that his intent was to
{¶ 32} Thus, a review of the record convinces us that the State‘s evidence, taken in its entirety, was sufficient to sustain Crump‘s conviction for falsification. In light of our holding in this regard, the trial court did not err when it overruled Crump‘s Crim. R. 29(A) motion for acquittal made at the close of the State‘s case as the evidence presented was sufficient to support his conviction.
{¶ 33} Crump‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶ 34} Crump‘s second and final assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 35} “THE JURY‘S VERDICT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE OVERTURNED.”
{¶ 36} In his final assignment, Crump argues that his conviction for falsification was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 37} “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence differs from a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101, 112, 2005-Ohio-6046. “In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
{¶ 38} The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are matters for the trier of facts to resolve. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231. “Because the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, the cautious exercise of the discretionary power of a court of appeals to find that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires that substantial deference be extended to the factfinder‘s determinations of credibility. The decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.” State v. Lawson (Aug. 22, 1997), Montgomery App. No. 16288.
{¶ 39} This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of facts on the issue of witness credibility unless it is patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way in arriving at its verdict. State v. Bradley (Oct. 24, 1997), Champaign App. No. 97-CA-03.
{¶ 40} Crump‘s conviction is also not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 41} Crump‘s final assignment of error is overruled.
IV
{¶ 42} All of Crump‘s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BROGAN, J. and GRADY, J., concur.
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Rebekah S. Neuherz
Hon. Bill C. Littlejohn