STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE, V. EARTHEL CRISP, APPELLANT.
No. 40371.
Supreme Court of Nebraska
April 21, 1976
241 N. W. 2d 129
Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and Steven C. Smith, for appellee.
Heard bеfore WHITE, C. J., SPENCER, McCOWN, NEWTON, CLINTON, and BRODKEY, JJ., and KUNS, Retired District Judge.
SPENCER, J.
Defendant, Earthel Crisp, was convicted of assault
Defendant was found guilty of assault with the intent to commit rape after trial by jury. The offense occurred May 16, 1975. The jury verdict was received July 25, 1975. The court entered a judgment of conviction agаinst defendant, but deferred sentence pending a presentence investigation. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. On August 29, 1975, the motion for a new triаl was overruled, and after a sentencing arraignment, the sentence invоlved herein was imposed.
On August 24, 1975, or 5 days prior to the sentence,
This case is controlled by State v. Country (1975), 194 Neb. 570, 234 N. W. 2d 593, not State v. Randolph, supra. Country involved a sentence for rape imposed before
State v. Trowbridge (1975), 194 Neb. 582, 234 N. W. 2d 598, mandated the same result for a sentence for assault with intent to commit rape. There, also, dе-
The only distinguishing feature of the present case is that the sentence wаs imposed after the effective date of
We said in State v. Trowbridge, supra: “If we werе to hold defendant‘s sentence should be imposed under the present stаtute, a new trial would be necessary. In no other way could a determinаtion be made whether the penalty under second degree sexual assault,
The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
McCOWN, J., dissenting.
This case extends the harsh doctrine of State v. Country, 194 Neb. 570, 234 N. W. 2d 593, one more degree and makes the injustice of that holding even more obvious. See my dissent in State v. Country, supra, at page 575.
This court now holds that even though the new statute was in effect on the actuаl date of sentencing, the defendant here must still be sentenced under the hаrsher provisions of the old law rather than under those of the new law. As I said in my dissent in Country: “If a rule is just and can properly be applied to a certain сlass of cases, the fact that the number of defendants involved may be smаll does not justify an injustice to any one of them, nor provide an adequаte excuse for denying justice to all of them, however small the number. The fact that it may require a hearing to determine the relevant facts ought not to be an insurmountable roadblock in the pursuit of justice.”
