487 N.E.2d 911 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1984
The defendant, Robert T. Crider, appeals from a conviction of the crimes of rape, aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated burglary.
In the early morning hours of September 9, 1982, Crider broke into a home in Cuyahoga Falls. When the occupant appeared, Crider bound and blind-folded her. He then raped the victim. After raping her, Crider stated that in the future she would know him because he would call her "doll baby." After Crider left, the victim telephoned her neighbor who, in turn, called the police. The victim continued to cooperate with the police by making a statement and describing the rapist.
Several days after the incident, Crider returned. He grabbed the victim from behind and ran a knife across her arm. He then told her she had been a "bad girl" and he called her "doll baby." As the police investigation continued, the victim was shown an array of photographs. She pointed out Crider as the man who had raped her. Crider was subsequently indicted for rape, aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, Crider was found guilty as charged and sentenced.
One count of aggravated burglary was based upon the underlying felony of intimidation of a witness, namely, the victim. R.C.
R.C.
"No person, knowingly and by force or by unlawful threat of harm, shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder *269 a * * * witness in the discharge of his duty."
Crider refers to R.C.
In a 1961 bribery case, State v. Lieberman (1961),
The Lieberman definition was generally followed by this court in an intimidation case, State v. Hudson (June 30, 1982), Summit App. No. 10491, unreported. In Hudson a witness was defined as "a person with factual knowledge relevant to the issues involved in the proceedings." An examination of the intimidation statute does not offer an express definition of the word "witness." However, rules of statutory construction provide that a word is to be read in context and construed according to its common usage. R.C.
"* * * one that is cognizant of something by direct experience: one who beholds or otherwise has personal knowledge of something * * * see earwitness, eyewitness * * *."
The intimidation statute was designed to protect those people who saw, heard or otherwise knew, or were supposed to know, material facts about the criminal proceeding. Once a person becomes possessed of such material facts, he likewise becomes a "witness" within the meaning of R.C.
It would be ludicrous to hold that the victim, who was intimidated, is not a "witness" under R.C.
Crider further argues that the evidence is insufficient to identify him as the intimidator. However, the victim testified that she recognized the voice as being Crider's. Furthermore, he referred to the victim as "doll baby" as he promised he would do. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the court's denial of Crider's motion for acquittal.
During trial, the court was informed that a radio news report was given concerning Crider's trial. Defense counsel moved the court at that time to voir dire the jury to determine if any jurors had heard the news report. The court denied the motion.
The record reveals that the court admonished *270 the jury not to listen to news reports concerning the trial. There is no indication in the record that the jury failed to obey this instruction. Furthermore, aside from Crider's allegations in his brief, there is nothing in the record that reveals the contents of the news broadcast. Thus, the ruling of the court has not been shown to be prejudicial to Crider. This assignment of error is overruled.
Crider argues that the photographic identification by the victim should have been suppressed as being unduly suggestive. Crider does not argue that the photographs themselves were suggestive, or that they were displayed in an improper matter. Rather, his argument is based on the fact that after the victim pointed out Crider as her attacker she became very nervous and stated that she was fifty percent certain of the identification. Crider also objects to the fact that the identification occurred over three months after the crime.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, this identification procedure was not improper. Neil v. Biggers (1972),
Accordingly, the totality of the circumstances here do not indicate that the identification was unlawfully unreliable. Therefore, the assignment of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
QUILLIN, P.J., and BAIRD, J., concur.