536 N.E.2d 686 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1988
In 1986, the General Assembly amended R.C.
In State v. Kruse, case No. C-870097, the defendant pleaded guilty on December 11, 1986 to one count of aggravated trafficking in cocaine (a violation of R.C.
In State v. Cravens, case No. C-870095, after acceptance on January 6, 1987 of a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated trafficking in cocaine (in violation of R.C.
The statutory language to be interpreted is found in the following parts of R.C.
"(H) Notwithstanding the fines otherwise required to be imposed pursuant to section
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"(4) If the offense is aggravated trafficking and a violationof division (A)(1) of this section, or if the offense is trafficking in drugs and a violation of division (A)(3) of this section, the court shall impose a mandatory fine of two thousandfive hundred dollars and, if *71 the offender has previously been convicted of a felony drug abuse offense, the court shall impose a mandatory fine of five thousand dollars.
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"(6) If the offense is trafficking in marihuana and a violation of division (A)(7) of this section, if the offense is trafficking in drugs and a violation of division (A)(7) of this section, or if the offense is aggravated trafficking and aviolation of division (A)(2), (4), (5), or (6) of this section,the court shall impose a mandatory fine of five thousand dollars and, if the offender has previously been convicted of a felony drug abuse offense, the court shall impose a mandatory fine of ten thousand dollars.
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(I) When the mandatory fine imposed pursuant to division (H) of this section does not exceed the maximum fine that could be imposed pursuant to section
"(J) Any mandatory fine imposed pursuant to this section shallbe paid to the law enforcement agencies in this state that wereprimarily responsible for or involved in making the arrest of,and in prosecuting, the offender. The mandatory fines shall be used to subsidize each agency's law enforcement efforts that pertain to drug offenses. Any additional fine imposed pursuant todivision (I) of this section shall be disbursed as otherwiseprovided by law.
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"(L) No court shall impose a mandatory fine pursuant todivision (H) of this section upon an offender who alleges in anaffidavit filed with the court prior to sentencing that he isindigent and is unable to pay any mandatory fine imposed pursuantto that division, if the court determines that the offender is anindigent person and is unable to pay the fine." (Emphasis added.)
The statutory language used by the trial court to justify its suspension of a portion of the fines was originally enacted in 1974 (Am. Sub. H.B. No. 511 [134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1987]) and is now found in R.C.
"(F) At the time of sentencing and after sentencing, when a fine is imposed, the court may:
"(1) Suspend all or any portion of the fine, upon any conditions that the court imposes in the interests of justice and the correction and rehabilitation of the offender;
"(2) Permit payment of all or any portion of the fine in installments, or by any other method and in any time and on any terms that the court considers just, except that the maximum time permitted for payment shall not exceed two years."2 (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that in Ohio, trial judges do not have inherent power to suspend the execution of a sentence, the legislature may grant or withhold the power to suspend, and a suspension *72
not authorized by statute shall be set aside. State, ex rel.Gordon, v. Zangerle (1940),
The interpretation of a statute is the determination of what the statute means. The interpretation starts and ends with the words chosen by the legislature, but it is not limited to the words alone, because the whole context of the enactment must be considered.
The process of interpretation requires (1) a decision about the purpose to be attributed to the statute and (2) a decision about the meaning of the legislature's words that will carry out that purpose. The words have a double function: They serve as guides to discovery of the purpose, and they serve as limitations on the extent of the statute's applications. The words must be taken in their usual, normal or customary meaning.
We first note that in divisions (H) through (L) of R.C.
The purpose and intent of the 1986 amendment are further revealed by its design and structure. First, mandatory fines are separate from the fines that may be assessed generally for felony convictions. Division (H) begins with the phrase "[n]otwithstanding the fines otherwise required to be imposed" under R.C.
Finally, we believe it is abundantly clear that the provisions of R.C.
The defendants make two contentions in support of their position that R.C.
We conclude that the General Assembly intended to restrict the trial court's discretion about imposing fines in those cases involving drug convictions specifically enumerated in the nine parts of division (H) of R.C.
We find merit in the single assignment of error uniformly presented by the state in both these appeals, to the effect that the trial court erred in suspending a portion of the mandatory fines. We vacate that order in each case which first imposed the mandatory fine and then suspended a portion of it. We remand these cases with instructions to impose the mandatory fines without suspension of any portion.
Judgment accordingly.
KLUSMEIER, P.J., and UTZ, J., concur.
"(A) In determining whether to impose a fine for a felony and the amount and method of payment of a fine, the court shall consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the victim impact statement prepared pursuant to section
"(B) The court shall not impose a fine in addition to imprisonment for felony, unless a fine is specially adapted to deterrence of the offense or the correction of the offender, or the offense was committed with purpose to establish, maintain, or facilitate an activity of a criminal syndicate, as defined in section
"(C) The court shall not impose a fine or fines for felony that, in the aggregate and to the extent not suspended by the court, exceed the amount that the offender is or will be able to pay by the method and within the time allowed without undue hardship to himself or his dependents, or will prevent him from making restitution or reparation to the victim of his offense.
"(D) At the time of imposing sentence, or as soon as possible after imposing sentence, for a felony, the court shall notify the victim of the offense of his right to file an application for an award of reparations pursuant to sections
"If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail." (R.C.
"(A) If statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment prevails.
"(B) If amendments to the same statute are enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature, one amendment without reference to another, the amendments are to be harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be given to each. If the amendments are substantively irreconcilable, the latest in date of enactment prevails. The fact that a later amendment restates language deleted by an earlier amendment, or fails to include language inserted by an earlier amendment, does not of itself make the amendments irreconcilable. Amendments are irreconcilable only when changes made by each cannot reasonably be put into simultaneous operation." (R.C.