State v. . Crane

Feb 5, 1892

Versions:110 N.C. 530

15 S.E. 231

Clark, J.:

As tо the first exception, it is unnecessary to discuss whether the question was incompetent, for, if that be concеded, the error, if any, was cared by the explicit instruction to the jury at the time, and again in the charge, that the recital of facts in the question was not admitted as evidence, and was not to be considered as such by the jury. State v. Collins, 93 N. C., 564; Bridgers v. Dill, 97 N. C., 222; State v. Eller, 104 N. C., 853; Blake v. Broughton, 107 N. C., *535 220. In State v. Collins, supra, thе defendants were indicted for the larceny of some bams. The confessions of one of the defendants wаs erroneously received in evidence against the other. After one of defendants’ counsel had spoken, and when the ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍Solicitor was addressing the jury, the Judge withdrew from the jury the confessions, and it was held that this cured the errоr. The point is well considered by Ashe, J., who cites with approval the older cases, State v. May, 15 N. C., 328; State v. Davis, Id., 612; and McAllister v. McAllister, 34 N. C., 184 Indeed, our authorities аre uniform on this subject. If juries should be deemed incompetent to comprehend, or unable to obey, so plain a direction as that a paper read in their hearing is “ not to be considered as evidence, and that it had only been admitted to make the defendant’s reply to it (when read to him) intelligible” — if so low an estimate shоuld be placed upon jtirus, then the jury sj'stem is a failure, and should have no place in our jurisprudence. If unable to comprehend this, why so often contention whether instructions, frequently far more abstruse, should be given to the jury. But such a view is an unjust one; the jury is an essential part of the judicial system among every English-speaking people, and whilе not perfect, the experience of ages and the observation of the present are that it рerforms fairly well its part. Certainly no better substitute has ever been found. To underrate the intelligence of twelve honest impartial men who try the questions of fact submitted to them is a mistake. When aided by a just and intelligent Judge, their verdicts are generally correct. Jurors are not expected to possess legal training. Their province is not to p'ass on questions of law. But their grasp of the facts is usually just and accurate, and probably not a Court passes that upon the jury there are not men of equal mental capacity with the Judge who presides, or the counsel who addresses them. Jurors are not in their nonage, and it is not just to underrate their intelligence. *536 This Court lias heretofore said as much in State v. Jacobs, 106 N. C , 695.

The sеcond exception is without merit. The ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍jury were entitled to the benefit of the quasi admission, and the language of the witness was necessarily given as a part of the conversation.

.The third exception is equally without merit. The defеndant, who was a witness in his own behalf, denied, on his examination, that he had stated to one Rodgers that his wife had left him in February or March, 1890, because she said he wished to sleep with her daughters, and said his wife had never charged him with it, nor rеferred to it. He had also testified that he had never been charged by his wife, or by anyone else, with such offence till the witness Ezzell and one Rone charged him with it on the 29th of May, 1890, and that he had, therefore, been much surprised whеn it was made by them ; never having had so much as an intimation before that time that he was suspected of ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍being toо intimate with his step-daughters. It was, therefore, competent to prove by Rodgers that the defendant did make suсh statement to him in June or July, 1890, of what his wife had alleged when she left him in February, 1890. The Court instructed the jury that it was not substantive evidence, but was admitted only to contradict or impeach defendant’s testimony. That his wife had left him, and that defendаnt admitted she had given such conduct on his part as the reason for doing so, was competent in view of his denial of any intimation of such charge having been made, and somewhat corroborative of the evidencе of his two admissions of being guilty of the crime charged.

The prayer for instruction was properly refused. "When the Stаte relies upon a chain of circumstances, such that each circumstance is a necessary link in thе chain, it would then be proper to charge that “ a chain is no stronger than its weakest link,” but when various facts and circumstances are relied *537 on, as in this case, to- prove a fact, it would not be correct to charge, as asked, that “ it was incumbent upon the State to prove all the circumstances on which it relies beyond a reasonable doubt.” If, however, the prayer did not mean this, then upon ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍the only other construction whiсh can be placed on it, it was substantially given in the charge of the Court that, “ upon the whole evidence,” thе jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt, and if not they must acquit him.

As to the fifth and last exceptiоn, the Court found as a fact that “ the juror had not been influenced by the effort of the witness Watson.” The finding of such fact by the presiding Judge, who is far better acquainted with the surroundings than we can possibly be, is conclusive, and we cannоt look into the affidavits, whether one or more, to reverse such finding. We need not,'therefore, consider whеther the verdict of the jury oould'be impeached by one of its members. Certainly, it cannot be maintained that, as a matter of law, the verdict must be set aside because a juror is spoken to, when it is found as a fact that the verdict was not affected thereby. State v. Morris, 84 N. C., 756; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C., 481. Such a principle would place every verdict at sea whenever the losing party might be anticipatory and adroit enough to procure a witness of the winning side to address аn improper remark to one of the jurors. When ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍it appears ouly that there was opportunity whereby to-influence the jury, but not that'the jury was influenced, merely “opportunity and chance for it, a new trial is in the discretion of the presiding Judge.” State v. Brittain, supra; State v. Gould, 90 N. C., 658; State v. Miller, 18 N. C., 500, and especially State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C., 513, where this point is elaborately discussed by Peahson, J.

No error.