State v. CoyleState v. Coyle
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
Glen H. Dewar, Atty. Reg. No. 0042077, Public Defender, 117 South Main Street, Suite 400, Dayton, OH 45422
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 14th day of May, 2010.
GRADY, J.:
{¶ 1} On November 19, 1998, Defendant, Mark E. Coyle, was convicted on his pleas of no contest of fifteen counts of rape of a child under thirteen years of age in violation of
{¶ 2} Defendant filed no direct appeal from his 1998 conviction and sentence. On March 16, 2009, Defendant filed a “Motion To Correct Jail Time Credit,” asking the trial court to find that he is entitled to “jail-time credit” against his sentence for 365 days he was incarcerated in the Montgomery County Jail following his arrest on the charges of which he was convicted and until he was later delivered into state custody. (Dkt. 49). Defendant supported his motion with copies of court and jail records.
{¶ 3} The court referred Defendant‘s motion to its Division of Court Services. On April 27, 2009, the court approved and filed a report prepared by that office finding that Defendant is entitled to 344 days of jail-time credit on his claim. (Dkt. 50). Defendant filed a written objection to that report on May 1, 2009, contending that he is instead entitled to 365 days of jail-time credit. (Dkt. 51). The court ordered a “non-oral hearing” on Defendant‘s objection set for June 19, 2009. (Dkt. 52). On May 28, 2009, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal “from the final judgment rendered in the above-captioned case by this Court.” (Dkt. 55).
{¶ 4} “THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CREDIT MR. COYLE WITH ALL DAYS SERVED IN JAIL DURING PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT.”
{¶ 5} “[W]here, for whatever reason, a defendant remains in jail prior to his trial, he must be given credit on the statutorily fixed sentence ultimately imposed for all periods of actual confinement.” White v. Gilligan (S.D. Ohio 1972), 351 F.Supp. 1012, 1014. The requirement enforces the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. Workman v. Cardwell (N.D. Ohio 1972), 31 Ohio Mis. 99, 338 F.Supp. 893.
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} “Although the [department of rehabilitation and correction] has a mandatory duty pursuant to
{¶ 8} The State argues that Defendant‘s 2009 claim asking the court to determine that he spent 365 days in confinement is barred by res judicata, because Defendant failed to take a direct appeal from the 1998 judgment of conviction and sentence which failed to find that Defendant had spent any number of days in confinement. The State relies on the holding of the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. Spillan, Franklin App. Nos. 06-AP-50, 51, 52, 750, 2006-Ohio-4788. We do not agree.
{¶ 9} “A valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based on any claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman Township (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, at syllabus. The bar applies to a point or a fact which was actually and directly in issue in a former action and was there passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Norwood v. McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio St. 299.
{¶ 10} The number of days Defendant had spent in confinement
{¶ 11} Defendant‘s particular contention on appeal is that he is entitled to more days of jail-time credit than the 344 days to which the court found he is entitled. We are unable to resolve that issue on the record before us.
{¶ 12} The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides that persons shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or
{¶ 13} By providing for a reduction of a prisoner‘s stated sentence,
{¶ 14} The trial court referred Defendant‘s motion and request to its Division of Court Services, which after examining the relevant records returned a report to the court indicating that Defendant is entitled to 344 days. Defendant was entitled to notice of that determination and an opportunity to be heard concerning it before its adoption by the court. Instead, the court “approved” and filed the report as an order of the court. The court erred in so doing.
{¶ 16} In the present case, the required notice and opportunity could have been provided through an order giving Defendant a stated period of time within which to show cause why the court should not adopt the report of its Division of Court Services as an order of the court. Defendant could then have filed the objections he subsequently filed, permitting a proper resolution of the issue by the court as well as a direct appeal of the court‘s determination by either party. Appellate review of the determination would then be possible in relation to the record on which the court relied. The present record does not permit that review.
{¶ 17} The first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 18} “THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PROVIDE A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE CORRECT NUMBER OF DAYS OF PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT.”
{¶ 19} The notice of appeal that Defendant filed on May 28, 2009, deprived the court of jurisdiction to proceed to the hearing on Defendant‘s objections which had been set for June 19, 2009. Therefore, we cannot find that the court erred by not holding the hearing. The issue is nevertheless rendered moot by our determination of the first assignment of error. Therefore, we decline to determine the error assigned.
Conclusion
{¶ 20} Having sustained Defendant‘s first assignment of error, we will reverse and vacate the trial court‘s order of April 27, 2009 finding that Defendant is entitled to 344 days of jail-time credit. The case will be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the motion Defendant filed on March 16, 2009, consistent with this opinion.
DONOVAN, P.J. And FAIN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
R. Lynn Nothstine, Esq.
Glen H. Dewar, Esq.
Hon. Timothy N. O‘Connell