29 Mo. 330 | Mo. | 1860
delivered tlie opinion of tbe court.
In the year 1855 the town of Bolivar, in Polk county, was incorporated among others, with the power to regulate its police. In pursuance to this authority the town prohibited, by an ordinance, furious riding through the streets, alleys, or around the public square, under a penalty of not less than two, nor more than five dollars, or imprisonment for not more than three days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The defendant Cowan violated this ordinance, and. was fined five dollars therefor, which he paid and was discharged. He was afterwards indicted by the grand jury of Polk county for the same act under the law of the state prohibiting the running of horses at great speed upon the public roads and highways. To this indictment he pleaded in abatement his former conviction under the ordinance above mentioned. To this plea there was a demurrer, and the demurrer being overruled, the State appealed.
We do not see how any question can arise in this case as to the jurisdiction of the corporate authorities over this offence, if it is competent to the legislature to create municipal corporations and to confer on them the power by ordinance to regulate their police. Surely the right to exercise such a power can not be seriously questioned. If this corporation thus established by law takes cognizance of an act made an offence by its ordinances, and punishes it, the person thus punished can not be subjected to punishment again for the same act or offence. The constitution forbids that a person shall be twice punished for the same offence. To hold that a party can be prosecuted for an act under the state laws after he has been punished for the same act by the municipal corporation within whose limits the act was done, would be to overthrow the power of the general assembly to create corporations to aid in the management of the affairs of the state. For a power in the state to'punish, after a punishment had been inflicted by the corporate authorities, could only find a support in the assumption that all the proceed
The exercise of concurrent legislative and judicial powers over the same subjects within the same limits may sometimes lead to conflicts and embarrassments; but there is more safety to the community in two conservators of the peace than in one. Besides, there are so many municipal corporations whose powers of government are so feebly executed that it would be unsafe to confide to them exclusive powers of making and executing laws within their limits on the subjects within their jurisdiction. This, however, is a matter within the control of the general assembly, and may be regulated according to the exigencies of the various municipalities in the state. (State v. Simonds, 3 Mo. 413; State v. Payne, 4 Mo. 376; Baldwin v. Greene, 10 Mo. 410; Harrison v. The State, 9 Mo. 526.) There is nothing in the case of the City of St. Louis v. Cafferatta, 24 Mo. 94, which conflicts with the views above expressed, but, on the contrary, the tone of the opinion there given is in strict harmony with them. Nor is there any intimation or expression in that opinion from which it may be inferred that a person, punished under an ordinance for an offence, may for the same offence be punished in the state courts. There was no such point made, nor did the facts warrant any expression of opinion in relation to it. That case merely'decided that a certain ordinance of the city was not repugnant to a general law of the state.
It may be argued that the ordinance in this case is repugnant to that provision in the bill of rights which declares that no person can, for an indictable offence, be proceeded against criminally by information, except in cases arising in
The meaning of the words “indictable offence” in the clause of the constitution above cited was a long time a subject of discussion in this state. But the case of the
Judgment affirmed;