*1 or class of workers which there were participating members directly in and inter- Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, STATE of ested in dispute question, the labor thus rendering appellants ineligible for un- Freddy COTTON, Allen employment 72-1366(hX2). benefits. I.C. § Defendant-Appellant. Because we affirm the Commission’sdeci- sion on the ground, above unnecessary it is No. 12692. appellants’ consider attack on the Com- Supreme Court Idaho. mission’s independent alternative and bases for denying unemployment benefits.3 Nov. 1979. phrase “grade clearly class” intended to include more the group than
employees directly or actually interested
participating dispute. in the labor To im-
pose such a interpretation restrictive
render 72-1366(hX2) I.C. § mere surplusage.
The record discloses that the Metal Trades represented
Council all employees the craft
and these employees voluntarily banded to-
gether and made bargain- their council agent.
ing justified Commissionwas
concluding that such an arrangement for
the purposes of this statute
the council be treated as single grade or
class. The council, members of the with the
exception of the carpenters, overwhelming-
ly voted to strike and subsequently partici-
pated in the strike which resulted in the
work stoppage. The Commission did not
err in concluding that all of the members of
the craft unions class, a single constituted
seeking by common bargaining improve
wage rates and other a way benefits such
to benefit the membership of each and all
of the included craft unions.
The decision of the Industrial Commission supported by the hereby record
affirmed. example, disposition company
3. For report view our of this had directed them to to work case, unnecessary it sign indicating they reported determine whether a list had appellants actually participated in returning the strike. to work before to their homes. The Similarly, appellants’ company reported we need disputed apparently not address Appellants con- this. they merely following tention that employer’s signed were up mornings their on the during Friday, May 6, Monday, May instructions Tuesday, the craft unions’ 9 and May they strike and the steelworkers’ strike which had before told unidenti- were previously 6,May Appel- they commenced on sign 1977. fied individual that need not return to representatives up any longer. lants maintained that *2 Jarman, Cotton, Pocatello, According J. the only Ronald for defend- defense ant-appellant. witness, the victim had made homosexual evening earlier in at a to him advances Gen.,
David H. Leroy, Atty. Lynn E. Thomas, Boise, bar, him the Gen., that the victim accosted Deputy Atty. plaintiff-respondent. he with a knife. Cotton claimed underpass *3 of- the The victim then disarmed victim. McFADDEN, Justice. money for fered Cotton various sexual acts. Freddy Cotton, Allen defendant-appellant dropped picked which Cotton He his wallet (hereafter Cotton) by was charged informa- victim were up for him. Cotton and the tion public offenses; of four namely, rob- bar when Cotton headed toward another bery (I.C. 18-6501), attempted § infamous was arrested. crime against (I.C. nature 18-306 and §§
6605), infamous crime against (I.C. nature assignment of The first 18-6605), § and degree second kidnapping have entered court namely, that the should (I.C. 4503). 18-4501 §§ and jury The ren- comple acquittal upon the judgment of dered a verdict guilty on all four counts case, tion the without merit. state’s judgment and of conviction was entered. Cotton, that such The contends appellant, Cotton was sentenced to an indeterminate judgment been entered should have sentence not years to exceed fifteen on the of the victim’s improbability the inherent robbery charge years and five on each of principle testimony. It is a well established the charges, other to run concurrently with the and credibility that the of witnesses robbery the sentence. testimony be is to weight to be to presents Cotton three issues in ap- this the by determined by jury the and peal: (1) that the trial court erred in not 748, 743, Lewis, court. State v. 96 Idaho dismissing the following presenta- case the v. 69 738, (1975); Gailey, 536 P.2d State tion the evidence; (2) state’s that 254, 146, 149, trial court erred its instructions on rea- doubt, sonable and in giving although his re- competent conflict Where there is quested definition of reason- verdict, this ing evidence sustain the doubt; able (3) and that the trial court dis reweigh court that cannot evidence abuséd its discretion in imposition of sen- Froelich, 96 Ida turb the v. verdict. State tence. judgment The of conviction and sen- Lewis, 685, (1975); v. ho State P.2d 658 tence are affirmed set reasons out be- at supra. jury was In the instant case the low. liberty to version of believe victim’s 2,1977, On the evening April according reject By con story or to it as unreliable. evidence, to the state’s Cotton accosted the charged, of the crimes victing appellant victim ain well-lit underpass in the city of accept chose to the victim’s version Cotton, Pocatello. knifepoint, forced the The victim appellant. versus that of the give victim to him his wallet. Cotton then evi competent and furnished sufficient forced the victim to remove his trousers and finding which was support dence to such a attempted anal intercourse on the victim. young testimony corroborated Cotton then forced the perform victim arresting officers. police woman upon fellatio him and then ordered the vic- At the record the close of the state’s case tim to accompany Cotton, intending to take to constitute contained sufficient evidence the victim to Cotton’s house where the vic- prima did not err the court facie case and perform tim towas anal intercourse upon refusing to dismiss case. Cotton. At point this young woman walked them without incident. Upon appellant claims that the court reaching a bar on the other side of the erroneously gave two instructions on underpass, she police by advised the phone what doubt, she concept observed and reasonable Cotton was erred arrested shortly thereafter. failing give requested his precisely language
which more
defined the term “rea-
identifies as
doubt.” This court
in State v.
troublesome,
sonable
particularly
are not at
“[y]ou
Holm,
904,907-8,
93 Idaho
288 liberty
jurors[,]
as
if
disbelieve
from
(1970), held
the instruction
as
men”,
you
evidence
believe
used
precisely
number 12 in this case fails to
Moon,
early
case
v.
State
the term “reasonable doubt” and
define
214-15, 117
P.
760-61
necessary.
such a
definition
court held
the instruction
should
say:
went on
Nolan,
31 Idaho
sustained.
such term
opinion
“It is our
that when
82-83,
(1917),
169 P.
297-98
the court
is used in an instruc-
doubt]
[reasonable
this instruction was sub
stated
while
tion,
jurors
required to
where the
are
ject it was not sufficient of
criticism
it,
meaning
apply
understand its
prejudicial and
itself to amount to
reversi
*4
so
precisely
term should be defined more
ble error. The court said it was inclined to
jurors’
question
there
no
is
part
view that this
of the instruction was
concept
with
respect
minds
of ‘rea-
conveyed no
useless because it
information
.
.
sonable doubt’.
. The California
intelligence
ordinary
didn’t
which men
jury
...
is
instruction1
clearer
already possess. The
in
v. Bas
court
State
and more concise than the instruction
246,
sett,
277, 287,
P.2d
251-52
Idaho
385
86
by
which was
the district court.
by the
(1963),
position taken
followed the
concept
Hereafter whenever the
of rea-
Nolan,
Moon,
supra,
supra,
court in
and
e.,
sonable
is at
in all
doubt
issue i.
crimi-
subject
was
language
stating
while the
cases,
nal
is entitled to
the defendant
require
criticism it
not
was
sufficient
added.)
such an
(Emphasis
instruction.”
where
reversal. A
cases
review Idaho
908,
98 Idaho
478 P.2d
288.
erroneous
reversal was
an
ordered due to
However, the
in
held that the
court Holm
indicates
instruction on reasonable doubt
defendant was entitled to a new trial on
contained a
generally
the instruction
grounds.
other
It therefore declined to ad-
Hix,
v.
58
(State
law
misstatement of the
dress Holm’s contention
the instruction
730,
(1938); State v.
78
1003
Idaho
P.2d
as given deprived him of
due
constitutional
(1939);
454
87 P.2d
Taylor, 59 Idaho
process, equal
laws,
protection
a fair
358, 283
Taylor,
State v.
76 Idaho
jury trial.
confusing
so
(1955))
was
or the instruction
appellant’s
The
requested jury instruction
jury
argumentative as to mislead the
2 is
jury
number
California
(State
Dickens,
191 P.2d
v.
68 Idaho
Holm,
approved
v.
this
in State
(1948)).
supra,
every
for use in
case.
criminal
Thus
it was error for the district court to decline
not
12 should
While instruction number
to give the requested instruction. The
given,
confusing,
is
have been
it
not so
question now before this
is
court whether
re-
misleading
require
erroneous as to
prejudicial
requiring
this is
reversal.
The
not
versal.
instruction does
contain
fact,
language
errors of law.
it
includes
instructions
the appel
of which
complains
approved
lant
have in
that this court has
was
parts
various
been
given in a
previous
number of
in
cases. The
contained in the instruction
State
(1979 Revision)
1. CALJIC 2.90
is
It is
“Reasonable doubt
defined as follows:
doubt;
possible
everything
not a mere
“PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE—REA-
affairs,
depending
relating
human
SONABLE DOUBT—BURDEN OF PROOF
evidence,
open
possible or
moral
is
to some
pre-
“A
in a
defendant
criminal action is
imaginary
is
of the case
doubt.
It
that state
contrary
sumed
be innocent until
which,
comparison
after
and consid-
the entire
proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt
evidence,
eration of all the
leaves the minds
guilt
satisfactorily shown,
his
whether
he is
they
jurors in
that condition that
cannot
guilty.
pre-
entitled to a verdict of not
conviction,
they
say
abiding
to a moral
sumption places upon
feel an
the State the burden of
certainty,
charge.”
proving
guilty beyond
of the truth of the
him
a reasonable doubt.
Holm,
was not such as would confuse
supra.2
though long
v.
Even
it can-
not be said
particu-
that it would confuse the jury
the facts of
jury
light
in
this
that they
perform
such
unable to
in-
conjunction
in
lar case and taken
with
duty. Therefore,
their
we hold that
which is the same
struction number 10
prejudicial.
error was not
California
instruc-
part
the first
question.5
tion in
Holm,
However as was
v.
stated
we
supra,
again
must
reiterate that
third issue is that
appellant’s
instruction as
Jury
stated in California
In-
unduly
harsh
imposed
the trial court
(see
struction 2.90
1)
preferred
n.
and is
established that
sentence.
It is well
one
that all
Idaho
courts in
should use
any particular
imposed
to be
a criminal case.3
sentence
matter
discretion of the trial
is within the
As to the
giving
instruction num
appeal
be disturbed on
court and will not
11,4
ber
which the appellant also claims was
A
appears.
discretion
unless an abuse of
instruction need
have been
prescribed
sentence that is within the limits
given if the California instruction discussed
will not be considered
ordinarily
statute
However,
above had been given.
this in
art, 100
an abuse
State v.
of discretion.
Seif
approved
Gilbert,
struction was
v.
in State
Idaho
Where
346, 351,
69 P.
63-64
It
limits, an
statutory
sentence is within
not disapproved
Dickens,
in State
showing
a clear
has the burden
supra,
173,181,
although
the court
*5
part
abuse
on the
of the court
in Dickens
of discretion
stressed that more concise lan
guage be
98
imposing
Chapa,
used. The court holds that
v.
this
the sentence. State
(1975).
courts,
phrase
including
2. The
967
the
Various other
contained
that,
courts,
“unless it is such
the same kind of
were
Idaho
an
and the federal
have held that
interposed
graver
doubt
life,
transactions of
a
v.
accused is entitled to
definition. Holland
prudent
it would cause a
S.,
Kane,
reasonable
man
693,
supra; People
U.
v.
27
166
Cal.2d
approved
pause"
to hesitate and
in State v.
(1946);
McHenry,
P.2d 285
State v.
88 Wash.2d
Taylor,
362,
358,
582,
76 Idaho
283 P.2d
585
211,
(1977). We favor
that it is within the court’s discretion to do
logical
leads the court to conclude
condition
so, the rule also states that when the trial
indi-
particular
case is one which
court does not require
presentence
inves
cates a
evaluation.
psychological
need for a
tigation
case,
in a felony
the court must
just
situation that existed
show affirmatively why it was not ordered.
French,
man
supra.
State v.
French was a
However,
case,
in this
himself
never
family.
with wife and
He had
indicated to
court that
there was no
com-
committed a crime before and was
presentence report.
need for a
pletely
unexplainable
his
astounded
own
Whitman,
96 Idaho
in the case
appellant,
behavior. The
(1975),
P.2d 579
this court. addressed this
hand,
above,
request
no
stated
made
very question and stated that when the
probation.
sodomy
fact
Only the
defendant does
request
withholding
unusual
the court
presented
crime was
suspension
the disposi-
of sentence and
support
request for
evaluation.8
of the
probation,
tion of
presentence investiga-
no
made;
tion need be
the court
only
must
provided
appellant has
affirmatively
report
why
state
no
was made
sentenc
transcript
court with
*6
when there is
application.
such an
such
No
ing
us it
hearing. From the
before
record
application was
Sentencing
made here.
in
On
is
the motion
denied.
why
unclear
was
place
this case did
until
not take
over a
appeal,
from a
presumed
will not be
error
week after the verdict was
which
rendered
error
silent
proving
record. The burden of
ample time
appellant
was
the
to have
for
Wolfe,
is
appellant.
on
State v.
the
request.
made such a
At the
the
time
382, 390,
returned,
appellant
was
request-
verdict
the
pro
Therefore,
the
any
of
without
record
psychiatric
ed a
but
not
examination
did
ceedings
that
than a brief
other
statement
request probation
of
suspension
or
sentence.
submitted,
pre
respondent
the
we cannot
appellant
the
The
that
trial court
asserts
denying
in
sume that the trial court erred
ordering
psychiatric
in
ex-
also erred
not
the motion.
no factors before this
amination. There are
had
additional
showing
by
court
in discretion
the
two
any
appellant
error
before the
request.7
bring evidence
refusing
opportunities
trial court in
the
following
rely
provide
the
filed
his intention
on defense
6. The statutes
sen-
notice of
Cook,
robbery,
(l.C. 18-6503);
years
§
tences:
to life
of
or defect.
mental illness
nature,
attempted
against
crime
at-
infamous
such notice
BAKES, Justice, concurring specially: pru- cause a reasonable and [which] I hesitate pause,” concur with the dent man to majority there was no trial court instructed this case. prejudicial error in this and the case *7 judgment question, should be I affirmed. jury would problematical It is whether a however, the approval Court’s carte blanche any by giving be more helped one than of the California jury number instruction other, may well words and it be that the 2.90 set out footnote at 74. ante themselves, doubt,” “reasonable have That instruction has its As problems. own meaning than out clearer the definition set example, the instruction states that in either instruction. This no doubt everything affairs, relating to human those accounts for cases cited in footnote depending evidence,” on open “moral is which majority opinion, ante possible some or I have imaginary doubt. judge it is state that either error for a trial doubt, always thought the word that the use of or attempt define reasonable part “moral” in that was of the instruction that it is not error to fail to define Court typographical Supreme Wyoming been blind- term. As the which had ly recently observed: perpetuated throughout I was years.
surprised phrase to find the “moral evi- ‘reasonable doubt’ need term “[T]he Dictionary dence” defined in Black’s Law be be and a trial court would defined (5th rea- ed.), p. on as: to avoid instructions well-advised Therefore, law, we could substantive it seems that
sonable doubt. an instruction to define purporting deeply reasonable doubt take time to into delve .more given. brought should not be into validity of the instruction now question. again giving “We reviewed the matter of Bentley a reasonable-doubt instruction in of the California Criticism State, Wyo., 206. In that P.2d little, however, is construc- unless it means phrase case we said the ‘reasonable doubt’ semantic up I offer Accordingly, tive. do not self-explanatory is and definitions instruc- following suggested dissection the clarify meaning its but rather tend to tion reasonable doubt: State, jury.” confuse the Cosco v. a criminal gives The law a defendant (Wyo.1974). which innocence presumption action a BISTLINE, Justice, specially concurring. the defendant with presumption remains we have the Court hold- On one hand places The law throughout the trial.
ing that it was error for the trial court to proving upon the State the burden refuse defendant’s instruction on reasonable burden is not the guilty. defendant doubt, having year the Court in the is more defendant proving stamp approv- that instruction the innocent, requires but likely guilty than al. On the other hand we have one member prove the presented the evidence casting of the Court doubt on that instruc- a reasonable guilt beyond defendant’s tion. There is much to what Justice Bakes usage common doubt. Doubt is a word of “Beyond may writes. doubt” reasonable A rea- definition. needs no further explana- well be sufficient without further which simply a doubt sonable doubt is attempts tion and at further refinements you it you would entertain may the definition cause confusion where however, If, you reasonable. perhaps existed. none will not reasonable, you then doubt is not it, However, entertain but cast it out. agree I with Justice McFadden in- give approved failure to of common equally a word Beyond struction the instruction was instructed usage. you simply Hence are confusing, which “is not so mis- con- must presented the evidence leading require as to a rever- erroneous a reasonable you beyond at least vince any language I not see contained sal.” do guilty. doubt that the defendant which, had that in the refused instruction mindful should reaching you a verdict given, produc- have been would is the doubt” “beyond a reasonable ed a result. different you which quality proof same a defendant you want were question having It does seem that charged Bakes, with a crime. been some further raised Justice have been in might discussion the Court Bakes, Frankly, I do
order. as with Justice
hot see much in the California instruc- Sitting
tion to commend it. as the new
member of a court which has allowed itself deeply making
to become involved
rules, some of which I fear transcend into