STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. 5399
SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII
DECEMBER 3, 1973
55 Haw. 138 | 516 P.2d 709
RICHARDSON, C.J., MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ.
On November 17, 1972, the defendant was arrested in Honolulu for operating his motorcycle without wearing a helmet, as required by
The thrust of the defendant‘s main argument is that
At the outset we note that the Federal Constitution does not require us to strike down
We accept now, as we did in State v. Lee, supra, the fundamental tenet that the relationship between the individual and the state leaves no room for regulations which have as their purpose and effect solely the protection of the individual from his own folly. But to say that a motorcycle helmet law has as its primary objective the protection of the wearer from head injuries is not to say that ipso facto it is unconstitutional. There may be significant secondary harms to society as a whole which it is the purpose of the statute to remedy and which, if realistic, bottom the statute in policies which are constitutionally acceptable.
A wide range of possible justifications for mandatory helmet laws have been articulated by courts and commentators. They include: (1) the “flying missile” theory, i.e., helmets shield cyclists from foreign objects which might cause loss of control and consequent accidents with others, see State v. Fetterly, 254 Or. 47, 49-50, 456 P.2d 996-97 (1969); (2) the “public ward” theory, i.e., helmet laws, by limiting the
Both theories maintain that though helmet laws are directed on a primary level toward protecting the individual from head injuries, on a secondary level they protect much broader social interests. Viewed without limit, of course, “seсondary harm” arguments could justify an impermissibly wide range of governmental interference with private liberties. See, e.g., State v. Lee, supra at 524, 527, 465 P.2d at 578, 579-80 (Abe, J., dissenting). We agree with Professor Kaplan, however, that
[m]erely because protecting the public from secondary harms could logically justify a vast range of governmental interferences with individual liberty, and merely because we could define secondary harms as including anything lessening the full development of an individual‘s perfection, this does not mean that such interference is always improper.
As in so many areas of the law, the problem of deciding when secondary harms are sufficiently great in magnitude to justify remedial legislation aimed at primary behavior is one of enlightened judicial line-drawing. We start the process in this case with the observation that statistical evidence at the legislature‘s command indicates that the rate of increase of highway accidents and fatalities, as compared with other kinds of accidents, is alarmingly high. See, e.g., Note, supra at 357. Moreover, there is evidence that the extent of motorcycle accidents, and particularly head injuries resulting therefrom, is at least as alarming as the general trend. See, e.g., Simon v. Sargent, supra at 279. Finally, the appropriateness of mandatory helmet laws as a remedy for this situation is likewise statistically demonstrable. See, e.g., State v. Lee, supra at 519-20, 465 P.2d at 576.
With the great danger of primary harm to helmetless cyclists as well as the rationality of helmet wearing as a safeguard thus statistically supported,2 the magnitude of secondary harms of the nature indicated above is sufficiently great to justify the law at issue in this case. In answer to the reductio ad absurdum argument of the dissent in this case with respect to the extent of governmental intrusions justifiable by secondary harm analysis, we refer to the statement in Lee that “this holding is limited to this case.” 51 Haw. at 521, 465 P.2d at 577. Particularly, we note that a tool which has aided us significantly in drawing the line between the police power and individual freedom in this case is the well-established dоctrine that in regulating the use of public highways, the state has always been afforded exceptionally
The foregoing analysis adequately answers the defendant‘s argument that
Finally, we see no merit in plaintiff‘s claim that the statute denies him the equal protection of the laws. It is not difficult to discern a rational basis for the legislature‘s distinction between motorcyclists and, for example, automobile drivers, whose vehicle affords them substantially more protection than does a motorcycle.
See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
We therefore decline to overrule State v. Lee, supra, and affirm the defendant‘s conviction.
James E. Cotton, defendant-appellant, pro se.
Stephen Y. Lau, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (Barry Chung, Prosecuting Attorney, City & County of Honolulu, of counsel) for plaintiff-appellee.
The majority of this court has upheld the constitutionality of the helmet requirement provision of
The defendant attacks the constitutionality of the portion of
The State, on the other hand, contends that the State has a vital interest in protecting “members of thе community from injuring themselves” and that the headgear requirement is a valid exercise of its police power. The State also urges this court to adopt the reasoning in Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Mass., 1972); aff d mem., 409 U.S. 1020 (1972), where contentions similar to plaintiff‘s were rejected:
For while we agree with plaintiff that the act‘s only realistic purpose is the prevention of head injuries incurred in motorcycle mishaps, we cannot agree that the consequences of such injuries are limited to the individual who sustains the injury. In view of the evidence warranting a finding that motorcyclists are especially prone to serious head injuries, see Statistical Division, National Safety Council, 1971 Motorcycle Facts, the public has an interest in minimizing the resources directly involved. [Fn. omitted.] From the moment of the
injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family‘s continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned.
It is generally recognized that a state has inhеrent authority under its police power to enact reasonable laws to protect and preserve public order, safety, health and morals. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Borden Co. v. McCrory, 169 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. La. 1959); Pacific Meat Co. v. Otagaki, 47 Haw. 652, 394 P.2d 618 (1964); State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698, 125 A.2d 477 (1956). However, it would be impossible for any court to provide a precise delineation of, or definition for, the scope of the police power.
On this difficult question the United States Supreme Court in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) said:
The term “policе power” connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. Except for the substitution of the familiar standard of “reasonableness,” this Court has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria. The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), is still valid today:
“To justify the State in... interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public...require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.”
In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), the U.S. Supreme Court said:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
I agree with the State‘s contention that the State has a substantial interest in highway safety and that it has the power to control and regulate the use of highways. However, it does not necessarily follow that under such power, the State may constitutionally mandate the wearing of headgear under threat of criminal punishment.
The general rule as stated by this court in Bishop v. Mahiko, 35 Haw. 608, 641 (1940), is that:
The burden of showing that an Act of the legislature is unconstitutional is on the party asserting it. Every enactment of the legislature carries a presumption of constitutional validity and should be upheld by the courts unless it has been shown to be, beyond all reasonable doubt, in violation of the Constitution. Moreover, the facts adduced to show unconstitutionality must be clear and convincing and must show beyond question that the legislature exceeded the limits marked by the Constitution. [Footnoted citations omitted.]
However, a presumption of constitutionality cannot serve as a rationale for complete judicial abdication of responsibility for determining whether legislation meets the test adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, and Shelton v. Tucker, supra. Thus, it is for this court to determine whether the object or purpose of the headgear requirement is to promote public safety and also whether it is unduly oppressive to individual freedom. See also, American Motorcycle Association v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 358, 158 N.W.2d 72, 76 (1968).
Comparing provisions (A) and (B) of
I agree, as this court said in State v. Lee, 51 Haw. 516, 519, 465 P.2d 573, 575-76 (1970), that the basic issue on the helmet question is
whether the legislature may constitutionally regulate the conduct of an individual so as to require him to protect himself from physical injury and or death; that is, whether physical harm to self is a proper subject of public interest and thus subject to the police power of the legislature.
Article I, Sec. 2 of our State Constitution3 guarantees the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this guarantee one has the constitutional right to be let alone. With this right to be let alone, one has the right to determine for himself what is for his “best interest,” even though some scholars contend that there is “...a general decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests best, and . . . an increased awareness of a great range of factors which diminish the significance to be attached to an apparently free choice or consent.”4
Are we to accept the State‘s contention (and the reasoning of Simon v. Sargent, supra) that injuries to a single individual are a concern, not for himself alone but for the public in general, because of the State‘s interest in keeping its citizens healthy and productive and in preventing expenditures of public funds to aid persons injured by falls from motorcycles? I believe that our acceptance of the State‘s argument would open the door to constitutional justification for unlimited paternalism on the part of the State. As a corollary, our
I recognize that that intent of the law is beneficent; howеver, that should not be the determinative factor as to its constitutionality. As stated by Justice Louis Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928):
The makers of our Constitution * * * sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man. * * *
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government‘s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
Therefore, I cannot agree that the protection of an individual from himself is within the legitimate exercise of the police power; otherwise, there would be no restriction or limitation to this power, and the State could regulate an individual‘s life, his way of living, and even his way of thinking. The statute is not concerned with the preservation of public safety, health, order, morals, or welfare; and though
The fact that the general public may consider it foolhardy to ride a motorcycle without a safety helmet is alone insufficient basis or justification for defining the non-use of a helmet a criminal offense. I believe that our State Constitution affords one the privilege of making a fool of himself if he so desires, so long as his action does not bring significant harm to the general public.
I would, therefore, hold that