Thе indictment returned against defendant charged him with two prior offenses and the crime of Robbery First Degree by means of a Dangerous and Deadly Weapon. Sections 560.120 and 560.135, V.A.M.S. After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the court assessed a penalty of twelve years confinement. Section 556.280, V.A.M.S.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the indictment was presented without the grand jury hearing any legally competent evidence, (2) the trial cоurt erred in allowing in-court identification without having found “beyond a reasonable doubt” that such identification was not tainted by prior illegal procedures, (3) the trial court erred in permitting evidence of additional offenses not connected with the offense for which defendant was being tried, and (4) the trial court erred by exerting pressure on the jury by (a) inquiring as to the prospect of reaching a verdict, and (b) the giving of a “hammer” instructiоn.
Factually, it appears that certain employees of a large automobile plant in the City of St. Louis, during all times of interest here, had participated in or perhaps promoted a “floating” poker game. Such activities were scheduled at different locations on or near payday for those employees interested. On the night of January 11, 1968, and on at least one prior occasion, the game was scheduled at the residence of employee Sanders. Two *838 others, Belue and Buck, paid Sanders rent, furnished free beer and with some regularity “cut the pot.” Approximately twenty-five men were in attendanсe with games in progress in a bedroom and the kitchen. Near two a. m. on the 12th, Sanders answered a knock on the front door, recognized one of the two on the porch, and opened the door. After a mоment, two men entered with ski masks on their face. After announcing there was to be a holdup, one intruder, now identified as defendant Corlew, with the aid of a shotgun, had all present place their hands on their heads and stand in the kitchen. The other, identified as (Wayne) Twist, brandished a semi-automatic pistol. With obvious precision, each victim was taken, one at a time, from the kitchen; and after compliance with instructions to put all money, watches, rings and billfolds in a suitcase, each was ordered to the floor of a bedroom where Twist tied his hands and feet together. When there was no more rope, this was done with strips torn from •sheets and bedding. After the intruders left, Belue and Buck drove to a police station and reported the robbery and that defendant was one of the offenders. Belue directed the police to defendant’s home where they were met by Mrs. Corlew around four a. m. While the police were there, defendant called by phone and he was advised the police would wait. Defendant arrived about 6:40 a. m. on the 12th. Soon thereafter he was takеn to the police station where he was identified by Sanders, Belue, Buck and one Wilkerson as the offender. There was no lineup procedure. For simplification of the first point presented, it should be mentionеd at this time that all four had known defendant previously, but Sanders had not known his name. At the station, one of the others advised Sanders that defendant was named Eddie or “Bud” Corlew.
Sanders and one police officer ápрeared before the grand jury. The trial court sustained defendant’s motion to see a copy of their testimony and it is a part of the record. State ex rel. Clagett v. James, Mo.,
Upon motion of defendant, the triаl court held an extended and exhaustive pretrial hearing with all trial witnesses testifying as to whether or not the police station identification had tainted the identification testimony anticipated at trial. Based оn testimony which was identical to that given at trial, and a portion of which we of necessity must detail later, the court found “that any in-court identification would not be tainted by what happened at the police stаtion.” However, the order entered provided there would be no reference to such proceedings. In view of the fact the restrictive portion of the order was not violated, we need not discuss the propriety thereof. Nevertheless, since each witness knew defendant prior to the offense, his in-court identification had an independent basis and was admissible notwithstanding lack of counsel at the station. Statе v. Mentor, Mo.,
In point one defendant argues the indictment should have been quashed. This for the reason, Sanders, at the station, “learned from Mr. Buck and others that the defendant Eddie Corlew was to be identified as the robbеr,” and, “If the evidence was to be excluded from the petit jury it must also be excluded from the grand jury.” For several reasons, this contention is without merit. First, Sanders did not mention the police station events before the grand jury, but did, in rеference to defendant, say, “ * * * he played cards there the Thursday before and I let him in.” Second, since Sanders knew defendant from his appearance, his identification was of the individual person; and evеn though he might have learned defendant’s real name under circumstances we will assume were improper, such fact would be of no legal significance. Third, and of more importance, is the long estab
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lished principle that actions of a grand jury are not made void by some later exclusionary rule applied at trial to some portion of the evidence. As was said in State v. Randolph,
In his second point, defendant claims error because of the failure of the trial court in its order, finding in-court identification would not be tainted, to include the words “beyond a reasonable doubt.” No authority is cited which calls for the specific entry. However, the wording of the order made makes it abundantly clear the trial court so concluded. In any event, we are to аscertain from the record if the order can be sustained, State v. Williams, Mo.,
Next, argument is mаde that the trial court should not have allowed evidence of other offenses committed by defendant. Such offenses (not convictions) were those in which defendant had threatened and assaulted some of the witnesses prior to trial. Belue testified that about a week after the robbery, he saw Corlew at their usual bar and told him, “ * * * if he would give all our wallets and stuff back, that we would drop the charges * * *.” Defendant explained that he couldn’t get the watches and rings back because they were gone, but said, “I can get your stuff and Buck’s stuff back.” This counteroffer was denied, but later at the same bar Belue found a sack containing most of the wallets, personal papers, car keys and plant identification badges in a closet. Evidence was offered that some time later, defendant threatened and assaulted certain witnesses prior to the trial. Wilkerson testified that while with his wife, defendant slapped him and said “ * * * he was going to get everyone, and I should
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tell Buck and Belue too.” The witness also had told defendant, “What made it bad, a guy that is supposed to be a friend of mine hold a gun on me and take my money,” and defendant replied, “Suppose that guy didn’t know that you were going to be there.” It was shown defendant told witness Buck, “ * * * you are going to get yours too * * *,” after he had threatened Belue and broken his nose. While commenting on comparable evidence, this court recently said in State v. Mason, Mo.,
Lastly, defendant complains of the so-called “hammer” instruction given after the jury had been deliberating about two hours. It need not be repeated here as it is essentially identical to that set forth in full in State v. Jackson, Mo.,
Finding no error, the judment is affirmed.