State v. CopelandState v. Copeland
Rendered on the 8th day of October, 2010.
KIRSTEN A. BRANDT, Atty. Reg. No. 0070162, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
RICHARD S. SKELTON, Atty. Reg. No. 0040694, 130 W. Second Street, Suite 1818, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
DONOVAN, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Jimmy L. Copeland appeals from his conviction and sentence for one count of possession of cocaine, in violation of
I
{¶ 2} On Thursday, September 4, 2008, Dayton Police Officers Creigee Coleman and Jason Barnes were patrolling the area in the 1600 block of West 3rd Street in Dayton, Ohio, in a marked police cruiser when they observed a white Ford Expedition with no front license plate and dark tinted windows. The Expedition was traveling eastbound on West Third Street at the time. Based on these observations, Officer Barnes turned on the overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop of the Expedition. The driver of the vehicle turned off of the street and pulled into the parking lot of the Check Exchange check cashing store located at 1616 West Third Street.
{¶ 3} The two occupants of the Expedition, the driver and the front-seat passenger, immediately exited the vehicle and began walking towards the check cashing store. Officer Barnes spoke with the driver of the vehicle, Lawrence Bradley, while Officer Coleman approached the passenger, later identified as Copeland, and ordered him to return to the vehicle. Copeland did not initially comply with Officer Coleman‘s order, but after some hesitation, Copeland returned to the vehicle. Officer Coleman then ordered Copeland to open the passenger door and get back in the vehicle. Officer Coleman testified that Copeland opened the passenger door but did not get in the vehicle. Instead, Copeland turned his back
{¶ 4} At this point, Officer Barnes came around to the passenger side of the vehicle to assist Officer Coleman. Officer Barnes placed Copeland in handcuffs, and Officer Coleman holstered his taser. After he had been handcuffed, Copeland told the officers, “I got this shit on me.” Officer Barnes performed a patdown of Copeland and discovered a plastic grocery bag in his right front pocket which contained a large amount of crack cocaine and a digital scale. Officer Barnes also found approximately $620.00 in cash in Copeland‘s left front pocket. A K-9 unit was called, and the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics on the money. Officer Barnes placed Copeland under arrest and transported him to the Montgomery County Jail.
{¶ 5} At the jail, Officer Barnes advised Copeland of his Miranda rights. Copeland waived his rights and agreed to speak with Officer Barnes. During the interview, Copeland stated that the drugs and scale were not his, and that he was merely holding the items for a customer from his barbershop. Copeland further stated that he was aware of the nature of the contraband when he initially agreed to take possession of them. Copeland stated that he did not sell drugs. Copeland claimed that the large amount of money found in his pocket was from his business as a barber. Copeland indicated that he was not willing to identify the person who gave him the drugs because he feared for his own safety.
{¶ 6} Copeland was indicted for possession of cocaine (more than 25 grams but less than 100 grams) and drug paraphernalia on September 11, 2008. At his arraignment on September 18, 2008, Copeland stood mute, and the trial court entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf. Copeland filed a motion to suppress on September 29, 2008. A hearing was held
{¶ 7} Copeland waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter was tried to the court on June 8, 2009. At trial, Copeland contradicted the earlier statements he made to Officer Barnes regarding the origin of the crack cocaine and digital scales that were found in his possession. Specifically, Copeland testified that the cocaine and scales belonged to his nephew, Lonzo Bennett, III. Copeland testified that Bennett accidentally dropped the contraband on the floor of his barbershop after getting a hair cut. Aware of what the bag contained, Copeland testified that he picked the drugs up and put them in his pocket. Copeland stated that he intended to speak with Bennett about the drugs after he had attended to another client at the barbershop, but Bennett left the shop before Copeland had an opportunity to speak with him.
{¶ 8} Copeland further testified that he went outside to look for Bennett, but he was gone. Copeland observed his friend, Lawrence Bradley, who pulled up to the shop in a car, a white Ford Expedition. Copeland testified that he asked Bradley if he would drive around the area in order to look for Bennett. Bradley agreed, and the two men began driving around the neighborhood, but they could not locate Bennett. Copeland testified that while they were driving around, Bradley informed Copeland that he had to stop and cash a check at the Check Exchange. Copeland testified that he had been in possession of the cocaine and scale for approximately thirty minutes when he was arrested.
{¶ 9} On August 29, 2009, the trial court filed a written decision finding Copeland guilty of both counts in the indictment. On September 29, 2009, the court sentenced him accordingly. It is from this judgment that Copeland now appeals.
{¶ 10} Copeland‘s first assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 11} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING MR. COPELAND FOR POSSESSION OF COCAINE WHEN IT HELD SECTION 2925.11(A) OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE AS BEING A STRICT LIABILITY OFFENSE.”
{¶ 12} In his first assignment, Copeland contends that the trial court mistakenly interpreted
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14} “(A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance.”
{¶ 15} For the trial court to have found Copeland guilty of possession of crack cocaine pursuant to
{¶ 16} Copeland also argues that the following statement made by the trial court at his sentencing hearing established that the court mistakenly thought that
{¶ 17} “The Court: All right. Mr. Copeland, it is unfortunate as to how the facts played out. The law gives us a strict – it‘s a strict liability, a strict requirement, if you had it, even if your intentions are good, you‘re still responsible.”
{¶ 18} The language cited by Copeland fails to establish that the court misunderstood or failed to consider the requisite mental state of “knowingly” required for a conviction pursuant to
{¶ 19} In its written decision finding Copeland guilty, the trial court specifically discussed and considered the mens rea element of possession in
{¶ 20} Copeland also argues that he did not “possess” the cocaine because he did not have “control” over the substance. Conversely, Copeland asserts that he had only temporary
{¶ 21} “‘Control,’ as used in statute making it unlawful for any person to possess or control any narcotic drug, is given its ordinary meaning, namely to exercise restraining or directing influence over.” Black‘s Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed., 1979. Copeland‘s argument that he did not have “control” of the cocaine which he knowingly possessed is without merit. When the police stopped and searched Copeland, they discovered the bag containing crack cocaine and digital scales in his pocket which he had knowingly possessed for some thirty minutes. Upon review, we find that the presence of the contraband in his pocket clearly established that he “exercise[d] restraining or directing influence” over the cocaine and scales. To find otherwise would be to set aside common sense as it relates to the plain meaning of the concepts of “possession” and “control.”
{¶ 22} Copeland‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶ 23} Copeland‘s second assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 24} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING MR. COPELAND OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE BECAUSE, EVEN ASSUMING HE HAD POSSESSION OF THE COCAINE, THIS POSSESSION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF A VOLUNTARY ACT UNDER REVISED CODE 2901.21(A) BECAUSE HE DID NOT POSSESS IT LONG ENOUGH TO HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO END
{¶ 25} In his second and final assignment, Copeland argues that pursuant to
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} Moreover, to apply the phrase “for a sufficient time to have ended possession” to the language before the comma in
{¶ 28} The evidence adduced at trial established that Copeland was aware of the illegal nature of the contraband when he initially picked the bag up off of the floor of his barbershop and put it in his pocket. The bag containing the cocaine and the scales remained
{¶ 29} Copeland‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
IV
{¶ 30} All of Copeland‘s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FAIN, J. and FROELICH, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Kirsten A. Brandt
Richard S. Skelton
Hon. Frances E. McGee