912 S.W.2d 756 | Tenn. Crim. App. | 1995
OPINION
The sole issue presented by this interlocutory appeal is the admissibility of a statement given by the appellee, William L. Cooper, also known as Billy Cooper.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. This Court concludes that the criminal investigator was not required to give Cooper the Miranda warnings before commencing the interview because he was not “in custody.” Thus, the trial court should not have suppressed the statement.
The Department of Human Services advised the office of the District Attorney General for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District that T.H.,
On December 21, 1992, Wilson went to Cooper’s home to talle to him. Cooper was not at home. Wilson left his business card with a note asking Cooper to call him. That evening, Cooper’s mother called Wilson and made an appointment for Cooper to go to the District Attorney General’s office the following morning. Cooper appeared for the interview on the morning of December 22nd. Before the interview commenced, Wilson told Cooper:
We’re making you aware of a referral that was turned in to the Department of Human Services from a child by the name of [T.H.] regarding what we described as digital penetration and she’s been to the doctor, Dr. Rogers here in Jackson, and we have evidence that in fact this child was touched. Now as I told you briefly when you first came in, that you are not under arrest and you’re going to tell me whatever you want to tell me and no matter what you tell me, you’re going to be able to leave, but there is a good possibility that with the evidence we have, this very well may be presented to the Grand Jury for a criminal indictment. If you choose to talk to us about it, then I think it might be wise for us to look at some type of counseling, some type of treatment if you want to call it treatment, for you regarding children of this age. So if you want to, just go ahead and tell me what took place two or three months ago and then again this is a twelve year old child trying to remember when this took place, we’re not going to lock you in to two or three months....
The interview that followed lasted twelve minutes. Cooper answered the questions Wilson asked. He admitted that part of the allegations made by the victim were true, but he denied doing other acts that the victim had related to a medical doctor. Cooper attempted to cast his admissions in a light most favorable to him. When the interview was completed, Cooper left the office.
The Henderson County Grand Jury returned a two count indictment against Cooper on February 1, 1993. The first count alleges that he digitally penetrated the victim. The second count of the indictment alleges that he engaged in sexual contact with the victim. The record does not indicate if Cooper was arrested prior to the return of an indictment or pursuant to a capias following the return of the indictment.
Defense counsel moved to suppress the statement Cooper gave Wilson on December 22, 1992. The motion alleges that when Wilson told Cooper that there was enough evidence to seek the return of an indictment from the grand jury, this “in the opinion of this writer shifted the process from an investigatory to accusatory.” The motion also alleges that when Wilson advised Cooper that a doctor who examined the victim verified someone had touched the victim, this “amounted to illegal inducement and again shifts the type of questioning from an investigatory to accusatory,” and Wilson should have advised Cooper of the Miranda warnings.
Before the assistant district attorney general could present all of his proof, the trial court advised him that the court was going to suppress the statement. The following colloquy occurred during the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress:
Q. Mr. Wilson, bringing your attention to December the 22nd, 1992, did you have the occasion to interview or take a statement from Mr. William L. Cooper?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. During this time, was Mr. Cooper incarcerated or under arrest?
A. He was not. I asked him by telephone to come to the office. I went by the house on an occasion and left a business card asking him to call.
Q. So he came voluntarily?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now where was the meeting to take place?
A. In the District Attorney’s office there at 225 Martin Luther King Drive, the state office buflding.
THE COURT: General Thompson, where the investigator for the District Attorney requests somebody to see them, is that voluntary?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
*759 THE COURT: All right, go ahead.
Q. After you interviewed him and took a statement from him, was he placed under arrest at that time?
A No, sir.
Q. What was he told at the end of the conversation?
A During the conversation, that the case could very well be presented to a later grand jury, which in fact it was.
THE COURT: Did you give him his Miranda rights?
THE WITNESS: No, sir.
Q. Did you ever discuss that—
THE COURT: General, I’m going to suppress it. He says that he didn’t give him his Miranda rights and told him it could very well go to the grand jury. I think he violated his rights.
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor, if I could just make a record.
The assistant district attorney general completed his direct examination of the witness, and defense counsel cross-examined the witness.
The trial court did not make a finding of facts at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing. Since only Wilson testified, and the evidence is not in dispute, this Court will address the merits of the issue presented in the application for interlocutory appeal.
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that the statement of an accused, “whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation,” cannot be introduced into evidence unless the state demonstrates that “procedural safeguards” were used to protect the accused’s privilege against self-incrimination.
The United States Supreme Court limited its holding in Miranda to “custodial interrogations.”
In Oregon v. Mathiason,
In the present case, ... there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a 1/2 hour interview respondent did in fact leave the police station without hinderance. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody “or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a “coercive environment.” Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to whieh it is limited.
The officer’s false statement about having discovered Mathiason’s fingerprints at the scene was found by the Supreme Court of Oregon to be another circumstance contributing to the coercive environment which makes the Miranda rationale applicable. Whatever relevance this fact may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule.13
In California v. Beheler,
The court below believed incorrectly that Mathiason could be distinguished from the present ease because Mathiason was not questioned by police until some 25 days after the burglary. In the present case, Beheler was interviewed shortly after the crime was committed, had been drinking earlier in the day, and was emotionally distraught. In addition, the court observed that the police had a great deal more information about Beheler before their interview than did the police in Mat-hiason, and that Mathiason was a parolee who knew that “it was incumbent upon him to cooperate with police.” Finally, the court noted that our decision in Mathiason did not preclude a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances” in determining whether a suspect is “in custody.”
Although the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is “in custody” for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest. In the present ease, the “totality of circumstances” on which the court focused primarily were that the interview took place in a station house, and that Beheler was a suspect because he had spoken to police earlier. But we have explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not required “simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” That the police knew more about Beheler before his interview than they did about Mathiason before his is irrelevant, especially because it was Beheler himself who had initiated the earlier communication with police. Moreover, the length of time that elapsed between the commission of the crime and the police interview has no relevance to the inquiry.15
In Minnesota v. Murphy,
The appellate courts of this state have followed Beheler and Mathiason.
This Court is bound by the trial court’s determination that the Defendant was not in custody at the time of questioning unless it “clearly appear[s] that there ha[s] been an abuse of discretion and a violation of the rights of the accused.” Childs v. State, 584 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Tenn.1979); State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631, 639 (Tenn.Crim.App.1990); State v. Nakdimen, 735 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tenn.Crim.App.1987). There is a “hairline of distinction” between the investigatory and the accusatory or custodial stage. Childs v. State, 584 S.W.2d at 788; State v. Morris, 234 [224] Tenn. 437, 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970). Whether one is in custody turns not on whether the interrogation occurred in a “coercive environment” but on whether the accused was “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). Under California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 1126, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983), the ultimate inquiry to determine whether a person is “in custody” for purposes of receiving Miranda protection is “simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Under the principles of Mathiason and Beheler and the totality of circumstances test of State v. Morris, 456 S.W.2d at 842, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the Defendant’s statement... .20
In State v. Brown,
[Tjhere was no violation of Miranda with regard to the defendant’s initial statement at the hospital.
The proof shows that when Officer Wood first questioned the defendant and his wife, he knew that hospital personnel suspected child abuse, and he knew that the victim was considered brain-dead as a result. Although the circumstances pointed to the Browns as the perpetrators of the abuse, Officer Wood testified that Mack Brown was not in custody at the time of the interview, and that there was not a sufficient basis upon which to detain or arrest him until he admitted hitting the child....
‡ ¡i: ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡
In view of the trial judge’s earlier finding that the defendant was not actually “in custody” until 4:00 p.m., after the statement at the hospital was given, we conclude that the court’s ruling on the admissibility of that statement was erroneous. .. .22
In State v. Timothy Blackburn,
In the case at bar, Cooper argued in the trial court and argues in this Court that Miranda warnings are required “when the process shifts from the investigatory stage to the accusatory stage.” He cites Vandegriff v. State
In Vandegriff, the state argued that the statements made by the accused were not the product of custodial interrogation; and, as a result, the officer was not required to give the Miranda warnings before interviewing the accused. The Supreme Court, relying upon the language contained in Escobedo
We take this statement to mean that once the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory, the constitutional rights of the defendant come into play. It is clear from the record in the case before us that at the time these statements were elicited from the defendant, the investigatory process had focused upon the defendant and became, at that point, accusatory....
Once it is established that the admissions of the defendant were made after the law enforcement process had shifted from investigatory to accusatory, there remains a question of whether or not the admissions were voluntarily made... .28
The Supreme Court concluded that due to the accused’s condition at the time he made the admissions, the admissions were not voluntarily made. The court said: “It cannot be doubted, on this record, that at the time of these inculpatory statements, the defendant had, in substantial part at least, been shorn of his volition. His statement could not have been ‘the product of a free intellect.’ ”
This Court’s decision in Nakdimen is clearly distinguishable upon the facts. There, the accused had talked to his attorney before voluntarily going to the station house. When the interrogation began, the officer advised the accused of the Miranda warnings. However, the accused refused to sign a written waiver of the right to counsel. He told the officer that his attorney “had advised him by telephone, earlier that morning, not to sign anything or provide information beyond his name, address and telephone number.”
It is interesting to note that this Court did not mention or allude to Vandegriff in cases decided before and after Nakdimen. In State v. Stapleton,
It is clear that the defendant was requested to come to the police station, that he went to the police station voluntarily, that he remained there voluntarily, that he wandered around at will, that he was not confined or questioned even behind closed doors, although on occasion, a door may have been closed to the interrogation*765 room. He was permitted to, and did wander into the hall, to the restroom which was adjacent to an outside door, outside exit; he could have left at any time. Again the defendant saw himself as a witness helping the police so as to pass the suspicion, or point the finger of guilt to someone else.35
Although the Miranda warnings were not given to the accused prior to the interview, this Court held that the statements were admissible. This Court predicated its holding on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Mathiason.
State v. Davis
As the appellee candidly admits, our Supreme Court has rejected the “focus” rule. In State v. Brown, the Supreme Court said: “ ‘Focus’ was explicitly repudiated as a basis for determining whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda in Beckwith v. United States ....”
The court’s apparent conclusion that Stansbury’s Miranda rights were triggered by virtue of the fact that he had become the focus of the officers’ suspicions, see ... State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d 106, 120 (Tenn.1985), cert. denied,*766 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3308, 92 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986) ..., is incorrect as well. Our cases make clear, in no uncertain terms, that any inquiry into whether the interrogating officers have focused their suspicions upon the individual being questioned ... is not relevant for purposes of Miranda.45
The Court also stated that “[e]ven a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest.”
In summary, the appellee’s argument is predicated upon a false premise. The standard enunciated in Escobedo v. Illinois, namely, a shift of the process from the investigatory stage to an accusatory stage, often referred to as “focus,” was abandoned many years ago in Miranda v. Arizona. Escobedo is no longer the law in this jurisdiction, although the trial and appellate courts continue to pay lip service to it.
Today, the test for determining whether the Miranda warnings should have been given by a law enforcement officer in this state is whether there has been a “custodial interrogation.” As previously stated, the United States Supreme Court has defined this phrase as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
Applying the applicable standard, it is clear that the statement given by Cooper is admissible as evidence. Cooper was not in custody when he was questioned by Wilson. Cooper arrived voluntarily, he was not required to talk to the investigator, he was free to leave at any time, and he was permitted to leave after the interview. The statement of the investigator regarding the evidence that he possessed did not convert the interview into a custodial interrogation. Nor did the fact that the investigator was seeking an admission from the appellee convert the interview into a custodial interrogation. When an officer or investigator interviews a suspect, the object of the interview is to determine what the suspect knows and, if possible, to obtain an admission of guilt.
.This opinion is captioned "State of Tennessee v. William L. Cooper, also known as Billy Cooper.” This is the way the appellee’s name appears in the indictment. It is the policy of this Court to caption the opinion the same way the accused’s name appears in the indictment.
The parties have captioned their respective briefs "State of Tennessee v. William L. Cooper.” The transcript of the evidence is captioned "State of Tennessee v. William Cooper.” The pleadings contained in the technical record do not have a uniform caption. The various pleadings randomly contain all three captions mentioned herein-above. However, all of the captions refer to the same person named in the indictment and appearing as the appellee in this Court.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. It is the policy of this Court not to use the name of a minor who is alleged to have been the victim of sexual abuse.
. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966).
. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-707.
. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992); State v. House, 743 S.W.2d 141 (Tenn. 1987), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 912, 111 S.Ct. 284, 112 L.Ed.2d 239 (1990); State v. Davis, 735 S.W.2d 854 (Tenn.Crim.App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1987); State v. Stapleton, 638 S.W.2d 850 (Tenn.Crim.App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1982); State v. Timothy Blackburn, Henderson County No. 2, 1991 WL 50197 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, April 10, 1991).
. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706.
. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1279.
. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) (an accused was not entitled to the Miranda warnings when special agents of the Internal Revenue Service questioned him in the dining room of his home).
. 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).
.429 U.S. at 493, 97 S.Ct. at 713, 50 L.Ed.2d at 718.
.429 U.S. at 493, 97. S.Ct. at 713, 50 L.Ed.2d at 718.
. 429 U.S. at 495-496, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at 719 (emphasis in original).
. 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983).
. 463 U.S. at 1124-1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1279-1280 (citations omitted).
. 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984).
. 465 U.S. at 430-431, 104 S.Ct. at 1144, 79 L.Ed.2d at 421 (citations omitted).
. 465 U.S. at 430-431, 104 S.Ct. at 1144, 79 L.Ed.2d at 421 (citations omitted).
. See State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 569-571 (Tenn.1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 417, 130 L.Ed.2d 333 (1994); Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 545-546; House, 743 S.W.2d at 147; Davis, 735 S.W.2d at 855; Stapleton, 638 S.W.2d at 859; Blackburn, slip op. at 3-4.
. 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn.1992).
. Henderson County No. 2 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, April 10, 1991).
. Blackburn, Henderson County No. 2, slip op. at 2.
. 219 Tenn. 302, 409 S.W.2d 370 (1966).
. 735 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1987).
. 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964).
. 219 Tenn. at 307-8, 409 S.W.2d at 373.
. 219 Tenn. at 309, 409 S.W.2d at 373.
. Nakdimen, 735 S.W.2d at 801.
. Nakdimen, 735 S.W.2d at 802.
. Nakdimen, 735 S.W.2d at 803.
. 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
. 638 S.W.2d 850 (Tenn.Crim.App.), per. app. denied (Tenn.1982).
. 735 S.W.2d 854 (Tenn.Crim.App.), per. app. denied (Tenn.1987).
. Davis, 735 S.W.2d at 855.
. Davis, 735 S.W.2d at 856.
. Davis, 735 S.W.2d at 856.
. 836 S.W.2d at 546 n. 11.
. 703 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3308, 92 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986).
. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 300-301 (1994) (per curiam).
. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d at 120 (emphasis added).
. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d at 120.
. 511 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1530, 128 L.Ed.2d at 300-301. The appellate courts of this state continue to refer to the "focus” test and use the "focus” test in the determination of confession issues notwithstanding the decisions of the United States Supreme Court to the contrary. See, for example, Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 570; Hartman, 703 S.W.2d at 120; State v. Mosier, 888 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994); State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631, 639 (Tenn.Crim.App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1990); Nakdimen, 735 S.W.2d at 803.
. 511 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1530, 128 L.Ed.2d at 300.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706.
. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1279 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at 719). Beheler is quoted in Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d at 298.