STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Bobby COOPER, Appellant.
No. 36,830-KA
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit
March 5, 2003
839 So. 2d 995
Before BROWN, GASKINS and KOSTELKA (Pro tempore), JJ.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Jerry L. Jones, District Attorney, Geary Aycock, J. Michael Ruddick, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
GASKINS, J.
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Bobby Cooper, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment without benefit of probation, рarole or suspension of sentence. The defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
FACTS
On the night of November 7, 1997, the 18-year-old victim, Earl Williams, borrowed a car belonging to his friend, Derrick Handy. He later returned to the Handy residence where he spent the night. Since the victim forgot to return the car keys before he left the next morning, Derrick‘s 11-year-old brother, Johnny Handy, said he would go get the keys.
The victim ate breakfast at home with his mother, Linda Williams, on the morning of Saturday, November 8. He then left the house on a bicycle.
Robbie Jenkins, a cousin of Derrick Handy, walked to a local store at about 8:30 or 9:00 a.m. She observed the defendant driving a white car up and down Girod Street and around the neighborhood; he was accompanied by two other persons who she identified as Teese and Kelo. The car was proceeding very slowly. When she was walking home at about 10:00 a.m., she saw them again, driving on Girod.
Angela Smith resided in the Carver Homes area of Monroe. As she and her daughter walked to the store, she also saw a white car driving slowly. They saw it once on the way to the store and once on the way back. She remarked to her daughter that the occupants appeared to be looking for someone. As Ms. Smith and her dаughter walked down Girod Street at about 11:00 a.m., she saw a bicyclist approaching her. At this point, the white car was behind her. Suddenly, the boy on the bicycle jumped off and began running. Ms. Smith observed no gestures or words by the bicyclist toward the car occupants. He had no weapon in his hand. The driver of the white car stoрped the vehicle and jumped out, running after the bicyclist. She then heard more than two gunshots. The driver returned to the car and got in on the passenger side; the white car left. Ms. Smith saw the bicyclist lying on the ground, bleeding.
Lucille Young was driving down Girod Street when she saw a boy on a bicycle ahead of her. He dropped thе bike in the street in front of her car and began running. Ms. Young then saw the driver of a
Johnny Handy was with two friends near a gate on Girod. He saw the victim riding a bicycle toward them; he then saw the white car. The victim jumped off the bike and rаn, yelling at Johnny and his friends to run. The young boys ran through a gate; the victim was behind them. Johnny testified that he heard four gunshots. When it was quiet again, he came out of hiding behind a porch and saw the victim lying on the ground, bleeding from his mouth. The victim told Johnny to get his mother.
Johnny went to the victim‘s house and told Ms. Williams that the victim had been shot. She testified that her son was still alive when she arrived at the crime scene.
By the time the police arrived, a crowd had gathered. The officers found Derrick Handy‘s car keys on the ground near the victim. None of the witnesses observed a gun or knife near the spot where the victim was lying. One of the first officers on the scene detected no pulse when he checked on the victim‘s condition. Emergency personnel arrived and began CPR. The victim was transported to a hospital where he died from a gunshot wound that entered on the far left flank, near the back. However, the police initially believed that the victim had been shot twiсe.
The police began taking statements from witnesses. One witness described the shooter as wearing a dark jacket or shirt with red trim.
That afternoon, Detective Roderick Jackson received a telephone call from Ms. Williams. She had received information that the defendant was the shooter; she sаid that members of her family were out looking for the defendant and might harm him. Detective Jackson knew the defendant‘s father, Bobby Cooper, Sr. He called Mr. Cooper and advised him that his son was a possible suspect in a shooting and that people were looking for him to harm him. He asked Mr. Cooper to try tо locate the defendant and bring him to the police station.
The defendant, who lived with his father, arrived at the home of his mother, Lagunda Foster, looking “frightened.” He went to a bedroom and laid down. Mr. Cooper arrived to get the defendant to take him to the police station; Ms. Foster accompanied them. En route to the police station, they were stopped by Detective Jackson, who then followed them to the station.
Following their arrival at the police station, Detective Jackson sat with the defendant and his parents in the lobby area of the detective squad room. They waited for the аrrival of Detective William Webb; since this was Detective Jackson‘s first homicide investigation as a detective, he asked Detective Webb, a more senior detective, to assist in taking the defendant‘s statement. Detective Jackson testified that while they waited, he advised the defendant of his rights; the parents disputed this at trial and testified that he told them that the defendant didn‘t need a lawyer.
After Detective Webb arrived, the 20-year-old defendant accompanied the detectives to an interrogation room; his parents waited outside. The defendant was advised of his rights; he initialed and signed a rights waiver form. According to thе detectives, their general procedure is to first talk informally with the person, then request permission to take a recorded
The detectives аsked the defendant to give them a recorded statement. He refused. At this time, the defendant was placed under arrest and booked on one count of second degree murder.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to the police. A hearing was held on the motion on November 4, 1998. Detective Jackson was the only witness to testify at the hearing. The motion was denied.
Following a jury trial in July 2001, the defendant was convicted as charged. He was sentenced to the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. A timely motion to reconsider sentence was denied. In July 2002, the defendant was granted an out-of-time appeal.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police.
Law
The purpose of a suppression hearing is to determine if evidence should be prеsented at trial. State v. Murray, 36,137 (La.App.2d Cir.8/29/02), 827 So.2d 488. At a hearing on a motion to suppress a confession, the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the free and voluntary nature of the confession. State v. Hills, 354 So.2d 186 (La. 1977); State v. Roddy, 33,112 (La.App.2d Cir.4/7/00), 756 So.2d 1272, writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.5/11/01), 791 So.2d 1288. Before the state can introduce an inculpatory statement made in police custody, it bears the hеavy burden of establishing that the defendant received Miranda warnings and that the statement was freely and voluntarily made and not the product of promises, threats, or duress.
A defendant‘s right to counsel is guaranteed in
The determination of whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel is an objective inquiry. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); State v. Payne, XXXX-XXXX (La.12/4/02), 833 So.2d 927. Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a
The admissibility of a confession is a question for the trial judge, whose conclusions on the credibility and weight оf testimony relating to the voluntariness of a confession for the purpose of admissibility should not be overturned on appeal unless they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Richardson, 33,272 (La.App.2d Cir.11/1/00), 779 So.2d 771, writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.10/26/01), 799 So.2d 1151. We place great weight upon the trial court‘s factual determinations because of its opportunity to observe witnеsses and assess credibility. State v. Roddy, supra.
Discussion
At the motion to suppress, Detective Jackson testified that he advised the defendant—a 20-year-old adult—of his rights in front of his parents and then again in the interview room after another detective arrived to assist with the interview. He testified that he made no promises to the defendant in return fоr talking to him. He did not threaten or coerce the defendant. The defendant signed and initialed a rights waiver form. At trial, the defendant‘s parents identified their son‘s signature on the form.
The detective also testified that after he first advised the defendant of his rights in front of his parents, the defendant‘s father made a comment that they might want an attorney later. Detective Jackson testified that he told them that they had that right.
The record supports the trial court‘s finding that the state met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the free and voluntary nature of the defendant‘s statement to the police. The testimony of the deteсtive demonstrated that the defendant was adequately advised of his Miranda rights and that he waived those rights. No evidence was presented that the defendant acted under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises. Furthermore, the trial judge obviously found that no request for an attorney was made on the defendant‘s behalf prior to questioning. The comment of the defendant‘s father that they might want a lawyer later falls woefully short of an unambiguous request for counsel which is sufficiently clear so that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would have understood the stаtement to be a request for an attorney.1 Since the trial court‘s ruling on the motion to suppress is supported by the evidence, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of testimony relating to the voluntary nature of the confession will not be overturned on appeal.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
STATUS AT TIME OF STATEMENT
In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court
At the suppression hearing, the defense asked Detective Jackson twice whether the defendant would have been released if he had refused to make a statement. The first time the state objected because the question called for speculation and оn the basis of relevancy; the second time as to relevancy. The objections were sustained, and defense counsel requested that his objection to the court‘s ruling as to the second instance be noted. However, the defense then went on to elicit from the officer that the defendant was not handcuffed and that he was informed, by way of the rights waiver form, that he was not under arrest. Thus, it cannot be said that the defendant was not allowed to explore his status at this hearing.
During the testimony of the defendant‘s father at trial, defense counsel elicited his version of what transpired before Detective Webb arrived. Mr. Cooper testified Detective Jackson did not advise his son of any rights in his presence. The state initially objected when Mr. Cooper began to recount Detective Jackson‘s response to his question about what would take place next. The state then stipulated that Detective Jackson said hе was going to call Detective Webb to come in and take a statement.2 Thus, the defendant obtained the information he sought despite the state‘s initial hearsay objection.
Furthermore, at trial, both Detective Jackson and Detective Webb were asked on cross-examination about the defendаnt‘s status. Detective Jackson, the lead detective on the case, testified that the defendant was not under arrest, that he was told he was not under arrest prior to the interview, and that he could have left. Detective Webb, whose only apparent involvement in the case consisted of assisting with the defendant‘s interview, testified that he assumed that the defendant was free to go; to the best of his knowledge, the defendant was not under arrest.
Under the circumstances presented here, we find that the defendant was allowed to adequately explore the totality of the circumstances surrounding his statement. This assignment of error has no merit.
CONCLUSION
The defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.