STATE of Maine v. Sandra E. COOMBS.
1998 ME 1
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
January 2, 1998.
704 A.2d 387
Argued Sept. 5, 1997.
[¶3] Aldus also contends that the statements she made to the arresting officers should have been suppressed as they were made in the context of a custodial interrogation prior to her being apprised of her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Whether Miranda is applicable and requires the suppression of statements is a matter of federal constitutional law. State v. Gardner, 509 A.2d 1160, 1163 (Me.1986).
[¶4] As the Supreme Court explained in Miranda, a person in custody and subject to interrogation must be advised of her rights against self-incrimination in order for her statements to be admissible against her in a criminal case. State v. Jalbert, 537 A.2d 593, 594 (Me.1988). The trial court determined that Aldus committed the civil offense of possession of drug paraphernalia for which a forfeiture of not more than $200 may be adjudged.
The entry is:
Judgments affirmed.
Gail E. Peabody (orally), Orr‘s Island, for defendant.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, RUDMAN, DANA and LIPEZ, JJ.
WATHEN, Chief Justice.
[¶1] Sandra E. Coombs appeals from the judgment of conviction entered in the Superi-
[¶2] The facts set forth in the record may be briefly summarized as follows: On December 16, 1995, L.L. Bean store detective Keane McGarvey responded to a possible theft. A man had attempted to return a woman‘s sweater for a refund, claiming that it had been purchased a week earlier. The man was unable to produce a receipt and the store‘s inventory system indicated that the sweater had been placed on the sales floor that day. Concluding that the sweater had likely been stolen, McGarvey questioned the man. The man said that the sweater belonged to a friend, and that the friend and Coombs were waiting for him in the parking lot.
[¶3] After contacting the Freeport Police Department, McGarvey and another store detective located the friend and Coombs in a car in the parking lot. The two detectives watched the car until Freeport police Sergeant Terry Carter arrived. Sergeant Carter approached the vehicle, asked for the registration, and observed Coombs open the glove compartment, revealing a small bag of marijuana. Sergeant Carter confiscated the bag and McGarvey asked Coombs if she would return to the store to discuss the sweater incident. Coombs agreed and voluntarily accompanied McGarvey to the store. McGarvey did not physically restrain Coombs.
[¶4] At the store, Sergeant Carter performed a records check and discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for Coombs’ arrest for failure to pay fines. When informed of the warrant, Coombs began to cry and said that she did not want to go to jail. Pursuant to the warrant, Sergeant Carter arrested and handcuffed Coombs. He did not ask her any questions or try to elicit incriminating responses from her.
[¶5] Sergeant Carter transported Coombs to the Freeport police station and placed her in an interrogation room. He then read Coombs her Miranda rights. Coombs indicated that she understood her rights and was willing to answer questions. During the interrogation, Sergeant Carter intermittently left and re-entered the room, telling Coombs that the other man being questioned had implicated her in the theft of the sweater. Coombs was handcuffed to a horizontal pole running through the center of the room while Sergeant Carter was out of the room. She was handcuffed for 15-30 minutes and was able to sit down during that time.
[¶6] Although Coombs cried periodically throughout the interrogation, she did not tell Sergeant Carter that she wanted the interrogation to cease. After a two- or three-hour interrogation, Coombs confessed her involvement in the theft of the sweater. Sergeant Carter then asked her to make a voluntary written statement and she agreed, preparing a signed, written confession that was consistent with her verbal statements. Following the denial of a suppression motion, the confession was admitted at trial and the jury returned a guilty verdict. Defendant now appeals, and argues that we must review both suppression rulings de novo.
Voluntariness of the Confession
[¶7] Whether a confession is voluntary is primarily a question of fact, see, e.g., State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 908, 911 (Me. 1995); State v. Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598, 600 (Me.1977), and we review the suppression judge‘s determination for clear error. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 1997 ME 112, ¶ 6, 695 A.2d 1180, 1182; State v. Smith, 615 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Me.1992); State v. Pinkham, 510 A.2d 520, 522 (Me.1986). The suppression judge must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a confession is voluntary, State v. Smith, 615 A.2d at 1163,
[¶8] Although findings of fact are reviewed deferentially, the application of legal principles to those findings is reviewed independently. See State v. Cefalo, 396 A.2d at 240 (noting that trial court‘s legal conclusions, drawn from findings of historical facts, are “subject to the independent examination and judgment of the Law Court.“); State v. Arnheiter, 598 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Me.1991) (reviewing trial court‘s factual findings for clear error and trial court‘s legal conclusions for error); State v. Johnson, 413 A.2d 931, 933 (Me.1980) (“Since the challenges here are to the legal conclusions of the Superior Court Justice, and not to his findings of fact, the clearly erroneous standard is inapplicable.“). Independent appellate review of legal conclusions is appropriate because the reviewing court “is in as good a position as the trial judge to determine whether the historical facts warrant a legal conclusion....” State v. Cefalo, 396 A.2d at 239. The rationale that demands deferential review of the trial court‘s findings of historical facts does not require that we accord the same level of deference to the trial court‘s conclusions of law.
[¶9] This bifurcated approach to the standard of review is supported by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. For example, the issue presented in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), was whether a state-court determination of the voluntariness of a confession was a factual issue entitled to a presumption of correctness pursuant to
the nature of inquiry itself lends support to the conclusion that “voluntariness” is a legal question meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Although sometimes framed as an issue of “psychological fact,” the dispositive question of the voluntariness of a confession has always had a uniquely legal dimension.
Id. at 115-16, 106 S.Ct. at 452. The court cautioned, however, that
subsidiary questions, such as the length and circumstances of the interrogation, the defendant‘s prior experience with the legal process, and familiarity with the Miranda warnings, often require the resolution of conflicting testimony of police and defendant. The law is therefore clear that state-court findings on such matters are conclusive on the habeas court....
Id. at 117, 106 S.Ct. at 453. Thus, Miller established a two-pronged standard of review: clear error for findings of fact and de novo or independent review for conclusions of law. We agree that the dispositive issue of the voluntariness of a confession, although based on all the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession, is a legal issue warranting independent appellate review.
[¶10] A confession is admissible in evidence only if voluntary, State v. Philbrick, 481 A.2d 488, 494 (Me.1984), and the State bears the burden of establishing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Snow, 513 A.2d 274, 276 (Me.1986). “A confession is voluntary if it results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all the circumstances its admission would be
[¶11] A confession motivated by a promise of leniency by a person with apparent authority to execute the promise is involuntary and inadmissible. State v. Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598, 601 (Me.1977). At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Carter testified that he did not promise Coombs anything in exchange for her confession and, although he conceded that he flushed the marijuana down the toilet, he denied telling Coombs that she would not be charged with possession if she confessed to the theft.3 Although Coombs testified to the contrary, the suppression judge, as the fact finder, was free to accept Sergeant Carter‘s testimony over Coombs‘. See State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349 (Me.1984); State v. Knights, 482 A.2d 436, 442 (Me.1984). The trial court‘s finding is based on competent evidence and is not clearly erroneous.4 See State v. Navarro, 621 A.2d 408, 413 (Me.1993).
[¶12] We also reject Coombs’ argument that her confession was coerced. The length of the interrogation was not inherently coercive, see State v. Gosselin, 594 A.2d 1102, 1105 (Me.1991) (holding that under the circumstances three hour interrogation did not amount to coercion), nor does the fact that Coombs was crying and upset during interrogation, without more, render her confession involuntary. See State v. Durepo, 472 A.2d 919, 921 (Me.1984). Sergeant Carter testified that he did not threaten Coombs, that Coombs voluntarily confessed to the theft, and that she agreed to sign a written confession after he informed her that she was not required to do so. Coombs was not interrogated continuously and was handcuffed to the pole only when Sergeant Carter left the room. Sergeant Carter estimated that she was handcuffed to the pole no longer than thirty minutes. Under these circumstances, the suppression judge did not err as a matter of law by concluding that Coombs’ confession was voluntary.
Waiver of Miranda Rights
[¶13] We have previously held that a suppression judge‘s findings regarding Miranda issues are reviewed for clear error. See State v. Cooper, 617 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Me.1992); State v. Leone, 581 A.2d 394, 397 (Me.1990); State v. Barczak, 562 A.2d 140, 144 (Me.1989). Whether a defendant has validly waived her Miranda rights depends on the factual circumstances of the interrogation. State v. DeLong, 505 A.2d 803, 808 (Me.1986). Although the trial court‘s resolution of those factual issues is reviewed for clear error, the ultimate issue of waiver has a “uniquely legal dimension,” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 116, 106 S.Ct. at 452, which merits independent appellate review. See United States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 549 (4th Cir.1997); United States v. Mills, 122 F.3d 346, 350-51 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Anderson, 79 F.3d 1522, 1525 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 819, 826 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Chirinos, 112 F.3d 1089, 1102 (11th Cir.1997).
[¶14] Coombs contends that her confession should have been suppressed because she did not validly waive her Miranda rights prior to giving the confession. Coombs concedes that Sergeant Carter read to her the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and that she understood those warn-
[¶15] “[T]o constitute a valid waiver, a defendant‘s conduct must amount to an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.‘” State v. Knights, 482 A.2d at 440. An explicit oral or written statement is not an essential component of a valid waiver of Miranda rights. State v. DeLong, 505 A.2d at 808 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 375-76, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 1758-59, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)). The State bears the burden of establishing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Snow, 513 A.2d 274, 276 (Me.1986).
[¶16] Sergeant Carter testified that, at the police station, he read Coombs her Miranda rights from a printed form taped to the desk in the interrogation room. He also testified, and Coombs concedes, that she stated that she understood her rights and did not invoke her right to counsel. Sergeant Carter also testified that Coombs told him that she was willing to answer any questions he had for her. The trial court‘s factual finding that Coombs did not tell Sergeant Carter that she wanted to terminate the questioning is supported by Sergeant Carter‘s testimony, and therefore is not clearly erroneous. As to the ultimate issue of waiver, under these circumstances, the court did not err by concluding that Coombs made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of her Miranda rights. See State v. Snow, 513 A.2d at 276 (holding that defendant validly waived Miranda rights when defendant indicated he understood the warnings and wanted to talk about the incident).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, RUDMAN, and LIPEZ, JJ., concur.
DANA, J., dissents.
DANA, Justice, dissenting.
[¶17] I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the Court‘s recognition of the propriety of a bifurcated approach to reviewing questions of the voluntariness of a confession and the waiver of the rights protected pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), I cannot, in these circumstances, join in the Court‘s affirmance of the District Court‘s finding that Coombs’ confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.
[¶18] The State bears the burden of proving a confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before it can be admitted in evidence against the defendant. State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 908, 911 (Me.1995). The suppression court‘s factual findings regarding voluntariness will be upheld unless the evidence compels a contrary inference. See State v. Simmons, 435 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me.1981). In my opinion, the totality of the circumstances, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, compels a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of Coombs’ confession.
[¶19] Coombs, while in custody after being arrested on a bench warrant for failure to pay a fine, was subjected to a three-hour interrogation regarding a completely unrelated offense, intermittently handcuffed, not allowed to make a phone call, and her request to be informed as to her bail on the outstanding fine went unheeded. She was crying, denying the theft charge, and expressing her fear of going to jail. Sergeant Carter could not even recall providing her with a glass of water, a tissue, or the use of the bathroom over the three-hour period, although he testified that she cried easily, was emotional, and needed breaks to gain her composure (during which he handcuffed her to a pole running through the interrogation room). Sergeant Carter admitted that he told Coombs that he would “in all probability be charging her with [possession of marijuana].” Coombs testified that Sergeant Carter said, “I could take two charges of theft and possession of marijuana or I could confess to the theft and he‘d flush the marijuana.” It is undisputed that immediately after Coombs signed a confession to the theft of a sweater, Sergeant Carter
[¶20] The court did not find that no promise was made to Coombs.6 It did state that there had been “no promises which would give rise to a constitutional infirmity.” The Court‘s reference to State v. Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598 (Me.1977) and its bright line rule that any promise renders a confession involuntary forces the Court to assume that the District Court found that no promise was made. See supra note 4. The Court‘s reliance on Tardiff, which based its holding on Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), fails to account for the Supreme Court‘s recent limitation of Bram. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1251-52, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (recognizing that the current standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession is the totality of the circumstances test). The District Court may have concluded, incorrectly in my view, that despite a promise by Sergeant Carter, under the “totality of the circumstances” test Coombs’ confession was still voluntary.
[¶21] Sergeant Carter‘s destruction of evidence immediately after obtaining Coombs’ confession, in the absence of any rational explanation for his action, is sufficient to compel a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of Coombs’ confession. I would therefore vacate the conviction.
Notes
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State ... were parties ... shall be presumed to be correct, unless ... (8) ... the Federal court ... concludes that such factual determination is not supported by the record as a whole.