182 Iowa 1236 | Iowa | 1918
“Q. You telephoned your wife that day, did you not? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you told her you were through at that time? A. Yes.”
Thereafter, he neither visited her nor paid any attention to her. This made out a prima-facie case, under Section 4775-e, Code Supplement, 1913, declaring that:
“Proof of the desertion of wife * * * in destitute or necessitous circumstances or of neglect to furnish such wife * * * necessary and proper food, clothing or shelter, shall be prima-facie evidence that such desertion or neglect was willful.”
“Every person who shall, without good cause, wilfully neglect or refuse to maintain or provide for his wife, she being in a destitute condition, * * * shall be deemed guilty of desertion and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than one*1239 year, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months.”
If her conduct has been such as to constitute a ground for divorce, this would be good cause, as might sickness such as to disable him from maintaining or providing for his wife, or inability, on reasonable effort, to obtain employment or earn wages, or other insurmountable obstacle to discharging his marital obligations. State v. Dvoracek, 140 Iowa 266.
The evidence in behalf of the State tended to show that defendant, prior to leaving his wife, earned $50 per month, though he occasionally lost a day, owing to an injured ankle.' This was in no manner met, save by his testimony that, for eight days after his departure, he did not work, for that he did not have his working clothes. It seems that these were in his trunk, and that, when the drayman called, on the day of his departure, the trunk was gone; and, upon inquiry, his wife told him it was at a named grocery; and he did not take the trouble to go there for his clothes. During the next four days, he earned $9.00. On the fifth day, the condition of his ankle prevented him from working, and on the next day, he was discharged; and, ihough he made two applications, he found no further employment during the, month. On the day he left, he gave her $3.00 of the $4.50 he then had, and, after paying the drayman, had but $1.00.
“As to what constitutes 'good cause,’ you are instructed that ‘good cause’ means a legal cause, and relates to the conduct or relations between the parties. And you are instructed that the testimony of the defendant in this case shows no legal cause for deserting his wife, if you should find that he did so desert her, or refuse to maintain or provide for her.”
The offense sought to be punished is denominated “desertion;” but this is really a misnomer, for it is defined as neglecting or refusing to maintain or provide for wife. Desertion of wife is involved only as it may or may not constitute a good cause for not maintaining or providing for the wife, and, as previously pointed out, is not sufficient excuse unless a ground for divorce. So far, the instruction is correct. But, as previously said, there may be other good causes for nonsupport. The State’s testimony disclosed that defendant had been employed at $50 per month prior to the return of the indictment, that of this he turned over to his wife, to meet their expenses, $23 or $24 out of the fortnightly payments, and that he gave her, on the day of his departure (and he was indicted the same day), $3 out of the $4.50 he then had, and that, when she demanded that he search for a job where he could earn more money, he responded that he Avas doing the best he could. The record Avas such that a jury might have found that he was “doing the best he could,” and that, if he neglected to maintain or provide for his wife, this was through no fault of his. The court was mistaken in saving that “good cause,” as found in the statute, “relates to the conduct or relation betAveen the parties.” On the contrary, it concerns the conduct of the husband only. That he “willfully neglect or refuse to maintain or provide for his wife when in destitute circumstances” will not alone warrant his conviction, nor constitute the crime of desertion. It
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.