Lead Opinion
{¶ 3} Subsequently, on October 16, 2007, Appellant filed an application to seal his criminal record pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 5} II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INCLUDE ANY DESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME OF WHICH THE APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED INVALIDATES HIS CONVICTION AND SENTENCE."
{¶ 7} Initially, we address the threshold issue of whether the judgment entry for the underlying conviction which Appellant now seeks to expunge was a final, appealable order. Under Ohio law, appellate courts have jurisdiction to review the final orders or judgments of the inferior courts in their district. See, generally, Section
{¶ 8} CrimR. 32(C) governs imposition of sentence and requires the following with respect to judgments of conviction:
"(C) Judgment[.] A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the sentence. * * * The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by the clerk."
Thus, in order to satisfy Crim. R. 32(C), a judgment entry must to contain Appellant's plea, the court's verdict, the sentence, and must be signed by the judge and journalized by the clerk. See State v.Lupardus, Washington App. No. 07CA46; State v. Johnson, Scioto App. No. 06CA3066,
{¶ 9} Despite Appellant's arguments to the contrary, we believe that the judgment entry complied with CrimR. 32(C) and is a valid judgment. Here, the judgment entry shows that in case number 00CRB585-1, which contained only one charge, that being sexual imposition, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 10} Appellant argues that because the judgment entry did not specifically state the crime committed or the code section violated, that it did not comply with Crim. R. 32(C). Appellee counters by arguing that the entry need not include the specific code section violated. We recently considered similar arguments in State v. Lupardus, supra. InLupardus, we held that the judgment entry at issue did not comply with Crim. R. 32(C) because it did not specify which section of R.C.
{¶ 11} The present case is factually distinguishable fromLupardus in that here, there was only one charge brought against Appellant, and that was for sexual imposition. Appellant was charged with the single crime of sexual imposition, a misdemeanor of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2906.07. Although Appellant suggests that he may have entered a plea to a lesser offense, such a conclusion would be mere speculation and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that this was the case. Although the better practice would have been for the trial court to specifically state the crime for which Appellant was entering a plea, we can glean from the record1 that the plea was to the only pending charge, sexual imposition, not sexual battery or persistent disorderly conduct, as suggested by Appellant. See, generally, State v. Miller, Medina App. No. 06CA0046-M,
{¶ 12} We next address Appellant's first assignment of error. In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in applying the terms of R.C.
{¶ 13} We have already determined, in connection with our analysis of Appellant's second assignment of error, that the trial court, in case number 00CRB585-1, found Appellant guilty of sexual imposition, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 14} Thus, R.C.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Notes
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 15} I cannot agree that the judgment of conviction in this case satisfies CrimR. 32(C). The majority relies on State v. Baker,
{¶ 16} "A judgment of conviction shall set forth . . . the verdict or finding, and the sentence . . . (.) See CrimR. 32(C). Implied in those requirements is the necessity of identifying the crime that the defendant is being found guilty of and being punished for. The majority says we can glean the identity of the crime from the entire record. ButBaker is clear in holding that the judgment is a single document, not a conglomeration of entries. Baker at ¶ 15. Moreover, how is any reviewing court to know with certainty from looking at such a judgment that a no contest plea did not result in the court finding the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense? And how would a court use such an entry where the crime is enhanced because of prior convictions? The obvious answer to these questions is that it can't. Only if the judgment of conviction contains a reference by name or statute can it fulfill the implicit requirements of Crim. R. 32(C). Because the judgment here fails to do that, I dissent. *11
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Marietta Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
*1Harsha, J.: Dissents with Dissenting Opinion.