{¶ 3} The court held a hearing on appellant's motions on March 29, 2006, after which the court denied the motions. Appellant then entered a no contest plea to each of the charges and was found guilty. In Case No. 470651, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of twelve months on each of the drug possession charges, three years on each of the drug trafficking charges, and nine months on the charge of possession of criminal tools. In Case No. 471730, he was sentenced to *4 one year on the merged firearms specifications to run consecutive to concurrent sentences of six months on the charges of possession and trafficking of crack cocaine and one year on the charge of trafficking in marijuana, two years on the charge of having a weapon while under disability and nine months on the charge of possession of criminal tools. The sentences in the two cases were to run concurrent with one another.
{¶ 4} At the hearing on the motions to suppress, the court first addressed the motion in Case No. 471730. Appellant's counsel advised the court that appellant had been shot at by an unknown male who fled the scene. The resident of another apartment called police. When the police arrived, they entered the apartment from which the shots had been fired and found guns and drugs. The court stated that, assuming the facts as stated by appellant, the police had probable cause to enter the appellant's apartment to ensure the safety of the residents after they received a report that shots had been fired.
{¶ 5} With respect to Case No. 470651, East Cleveland Police Officer Benjamin Taddesse testified that he was dispatched to check on a 9-1-1 call which originated from appellant's apartment. When he arrived, there were two males and two females sitting on milk crates in front of the building. Officer Taddesse entered the building and began to go upstairs to appellant's apartment. One of the females who had been sitting outside came up the stairs and asked him what he was doing there. She proceeded up the stairs and entered appellant's apartment and tried to *5 close the door. Officer Taddesse smelled a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the apartment. He told the female that he needed to check on the welfare of the people in the apartment because of the 9-1-1 call. She then opened the door. From the doorway, he observed marijuana, scales and plastic bags on a table. He then entered the apartment and secured this property. He found two males in the apartment who were not responsive to his inquiries. Appellant then came into the living room and declared that "this is my weed."
{¶ 6} Appellant's sister, Tamara Conley, also testified. She was the female who let Officer Taddesse into the apartment. The court found her testimony was not credible. The court concluded that the officer had a duty to investigate as a result of the 9-1-1 call, to ensure that no one had been injured. Furthermore, once the door was open and he smelled marijuana and saw it on the table, he had probable cause to enter the apartment. Therefore, the court overruled appellant's motion to suppress.
{¶ 8} With respect to case No. 470651, appellant argues that Officer Taddesse's observation of illegal drugs in the apartment did not give him the right to enter the apartment to seize them. The trial court found that both the 9-1-1 call and the observation of marijuana in plain sight justified the police in entering the apartment. Therefore, we will examine both of these justifications.
{¶ 9} Exigent circumstances may allow police to enter a private home without a warrant. Thus, a 9-1-1 call may justify the police in entering the premises to ascertain that the residents are safe and assist any injured parties. See Mincey v. Arizona (1978),
{¶ 10} A warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation." Terry v. Ohio,
{¶ 11} The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress in Case No. 471730 without hearing. "Crim.R. 12(E) does not mandate an evidentiary hearing on every motion to suppress. State v. Johnson (Apr. 2, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 60402, citing Solon v. Mallion (1983),
{¶ 12} In this case, appellant's motion alleged the following facts: "On July 1, 2005 at the Midnight Hour, East Cleveland Police responded to a shots fired call at 1283 E. 125th St.[,] East Cleveland. Upon arrival, they were met by an unidentified female in Apt[.] #1 who reported several males shooting a gun upstairs. There are four apartments upstairs. They went into Apt[.] #3 which they apparently knew of from prior incidents. They detained a Chandra Conley, Tamara and DeMario *8 Conley. Several weapons and drugs were found in the apartment." At the hearing on the motions to suppress, the court gave appellant an additional opportunity to provide facts supporting the motion. Appellant's counsel informed the court that "we'll have testimony that will indicate that my client, Mr. Conley, was shot at by an unknown mail [sic] who actually fled the scene. And that this information was conveyed to the police, and apparently they decided to go up to search the apartment building where there were four units. And this was without any specific articulable reason to believe that this particular apartment where my client's family lived, that there wasn't any probable cause to think that a felony was being committed, or in the progress at the apartment." Counsel argued that, given that the gunman had fled the scene, the police had no probable cause to enter.
{¶ 13} We agree with the trial court that the facts as alleged by appellant demonstrated exigent circumstances warranting police entry onto the premises. Although the police may have been told that the assailant fled, the police were objectively justified in checking on the safety of the occupants where the gunfire had occurred and determining that the assailant was gone. See Brigham City v. Stuart (2006),
Affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
*9The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
*1COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, P.J., and CHRISTINE T. McMONAGLE, J., CONCUR