STATE of Louisiana v. James H. COMPTON
No. 62795
Supreme Court of Louisiana
January 29, 1979
Rehearing Denied March 5, 1979
367 So. 2d 844
MARCUS, Justice.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Eddie Knoll, Dist. Atty., Jeanette Theriot Knoll, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
MARCUS, Justice.*
James H. Compton was charged in the same information with four counts of carnal knowledge of a juvenile in violation of
Subsequently, at a consolidated sentencing hearing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty to the charges. After a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion and sentenced defendant to serve three years at hard labor on each of the four counts of carnal knowledge of a juvenile and six years at hard labor on the charge of aggravated rape reduced to carnal knowledge of a juvenile. The trial judge expressly directed that the sentences be served concurrently. Sentences imposed were in accordance with the plea bargain stated at the time the guilty pleas were entered. On appeal, defendant relies on four assignments of error for reversal of his convictions and sentences.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
Defendant contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty. He argues that he is innocent of the charges and that he pled guilty solely because he feared spending the remainder of his life in prison. He further argues that his motion should have been granted because one of his alleged victims recanted her testimony at the preliminary examination that he had engaged in sexual activities with her.
The record reflects that, prior to accepting defendant‘s pleas of guilty, the trial judge questioned defendant extensively to determine whether the pleas were voluntarily and intelligently made. He informed defendant of the various rights he would forego by pleading guilty and ascertained that defendant fully understood the nature of the sentences negotiated pursuant to his plea bargain. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas at the consolidated sentencing hearing. At the hearing, defendant testified that he was innocent of the charges against him and that he had pled guilty against his better judgment on the advice of his then court-appointed attorneys. He further stated that, when he was told by these attorneys that he could not withdraw his guilty pleas, he retained new counsel for this purpose.1 Mr. Harold J. Brouillette, one of defendant‘s original court-appointed attorneys, testified that he consulted with defendant several hours over a period of three weeks before defendant decided to enter guilty pleas pursuant to a plea bargain. He further stated that defendant entered the guilty pleas with a full understanding of the consequences despite the fact that he maintained his innocence and expressed reservations both before and after the pleas were entered. The testimony of Mr. Michael Kelly, defendant‘s other court-appointed attorney at the time the guilty pleas were entered, was essentially the same as that of Mr. Brouillette. In addition, he stated that several days after defendant pled guilty, he received a telephone call from defendant advising him that he wanted to withdraw his guilty pleas because he felt he had made a mistake and also because he had new evidence, the substance of which he declined to divulge. Mr. Kelly further testified that he made an appointment with defendant to discuss the matter but defendant failed to show up for the conference. As a result, he wrote defendant a letter stating that he presumed defendant no longer was interested in withdrawing his guilty pleas and that he would proceed with the matter accordingly.
In the instant case, the trial judge extensively interrogated defendant prior to accepting his pleas of guilty. He informed defendant of the various rights he would forego by pleading guilty to the charges and ascertained that defendant fully understood the nature of the sentences negotiated pursuant to his plea bargain. Defendant had ample assistance of counsel in making his decision to plead guilty to the charges. Based upon the record before us, we find that the guilty pleas are valid in that they were both voluntary and intelligent. Nor do we find that the otherwise valid guilty pleas were rendered involuntary merely because they were entered to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized by law. Hence, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas grounded on his argument that he pled guilty solely because he feared spending the remainder of his life in prison.
Defendant‘s second argument that his motion should have been granted because one of the alleged victims recanted her testimony at the preliminary examination relates only to the guilty plea to the charge of carnal knowledge of that victim. In view of our discussion under Assignments of Error Nos. 2, 3 and 4, consideration of this argument is unnecessary. Moreover, this argument has no merit relative to the guilty pleas entered to the other charges involving different victims.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 2, 3 AND 4
Defendant contends the trial judge erred at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas by instructing defendant to avoid questioning X, one of the alleged victims, about testimony she gave at the preliminary examination held in connection with the charges of carnal knowledge of a juvenile and aggravated rape. He argues that this limiting instruction violated his constitutional rights to compel witnesses on his behalf, to present a valid defense and to obtain effective assistance of counsel (Assignment of Error No. 2).
At the preliminary examination, four girls under the age of seventeen, including X, testified that defendant had engaged in sexual activities with them. Subsequently, in his motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty, defendant stated, inter alia, that X had visited the office of defendant‘s attorney, Mr. Laborde, and volunteered the information that she had lied at the preliminary examination. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty, defendant called X to the stand. He established that she had come to his office two days before to discuss the testimony she had given concerning defendant at the preliminary examination. Before she could answer, the trial judge interrupted and called a recess during which he conferred with X and her parents. At this consultation, the trial judge carefully warned them of the possible consequences of X‘s testifying that she had lied at the preliminary examination. He told them that this would subject X to possible legal action for perjury. He then asked X‘s parents to confer with their daughter and to decide whether, considering his warnings, they approved of her giving incriminating testimony. After they had conferred privately, the judge reiterated his warnings and informed them that X was not required to testify and that he would provide them with an attorney if
Based upon the record before us, we do not find that X asserted her privilege against compulsory self-incrimination (
The remaining assignments of error are directed toward allegedly improper rulings of the trial judge at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea to the charge of carnal knowledge of juvenile X. In view of our remand for a new hearing, consideration of these assigned errors is unnecessary.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the trial judge‘s denial of defendant‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of carnal knowledge of juvenile X is set aside and the case is remanded for a new hearing, reserving to defendant the right to appeal any adverse ruling; defendant‘s convictions and sentences for the other offenses are affirmed.
SUMMERS, C. J., dissents.
PER CURIAM.
The application for rehearing is denied.
The defendant has filed affidavits in this court on application for rehearing which indicate the other two complaining witnesses now wish to recant.
Our decree in the original opinion should not be limited to a hearing (on the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty) as to only one complaining witness.
BLANCHE, J., not participating.