State v. CompasState v. Compas
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- Before:
- Gray
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶ 1 Defendant Lori Compás (Compás) appeals from the judgment entered by the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, on its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order convicting her of two counts of
¶2 We address the following restated issues:
¶3 1. Does sufficient evidence support the convictions?
¶4 2. Does
¶5 Chan and Pam Libbey (the Libbeys) developed, own and operate thе Yellowstone Edge RV Park (RV Park) located in the Paradise Valley of Montana. The RV Park is situated eighteen miles south of Livingston on land wedged between U.S. Highway 89 and the Yellowstone River. The Libbeys opened the RV Park in the summеr of 1994, after complying with the required public hearing process and obtaining the necessary state and local permits.
¶6 Once the Libbeys started renting RV and camping spaces on the river, they began to exрerience repeated horn honking from vehicles traveling on the highway past the RV Park. The honking amounted to “someone just laying on the horn” the length of the RV Park. Several Park County residents described the RV Park as a scar on the Paradise Valley’s landscape and the newspaper in Livingston reported that the RV Park had become a “persistent source of controversy” due to its location on the Yellowstone River.
¶7 While in the campground office on the evening of May 6,1995, the Libbeys heard a loud, long horn honk consisting of three continuous blasts from a vehicle traveling north on Highway 89. Due to the ongoing horn honking problem, Chan left the RV Park in Pam’s car and pursued the vehicle from which the honking emanated. He followed the vehicle, a white Toyota extended cab pickup, until he was close enough to get the license plate number. He then passed the pickup and obtained a physical description of the driver, a male with long straight blond hair, and one passenger, a female with short hair. Chan then returned to the RV Park. Several RV Park guеsts asked Pam why someone was holding down his or her horn while passing the campground.
¶8 The next morning the Libbeys again heard three long horn honking “blasts” from a white Toyota pickup as it traveled south on the highway past the RV Pаrk. Chan again followed the vehicle in Pam’s car and confirmed that it was the same Toyota pickup from the night before, driven by the same male; this time he was accompanied by two passengers, a malе and a female. Chan identified the female passenger as the woman from the prior night’s horn honking incident. The RV Park guests complained about the horn honking noise. The Toyota’s description, its license plate number and the descriptions of the driver and passengers were provided to the Park County Sheriffs Office after each incident.
¶9 Compás subsequently was charged by complaint in the Park County Justice Court with two counts of disorderly conduct in violation of
¶ 10 At Compás’ de novo bench trial on May 5,1997, she admitted to the District Court that she frequently honked as she traveled past the RV Park and that she did, in fаct, honk the Toyota’s horn on the dates in question. Compás testified that it was her “personal policy to honk every time [she] drove by the place” because she wanted to protest the RV Park and its locаtion on the Yellowstone River. In Compás’ view, the RV Park was an eyesore which destroyed the view from the road and the river.
¶11 The District Court subsequently entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order finding Compás guilty of two counts оf disorderly conduct, making loud or unusual noises, in violation of
¶12 1. Does sufficient evidence support the convictions?
¶13 We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense bеyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Granby (1997), 283 Mont. 193, 199, 939 P.2d 1006, 1009 (citation omitted). The same standard applies to our review of judge-made findings relating to a criminal conviction as to jury-made findings. Granby, 283 Mont. at 199, 939 P.2d at 1010 (citation omitted).
¶14 Compás was convicted of committing the offеnse of disorderly conduct set forth in
¶15 The defendant in
Ytterdahl
was convicted of the offense of disorderly conduct under
¶16 Here, Compás contends that no evidence of record supports the District Court’s finding that her horn hоnking resulted in a breach of the peace as we defined that term in
Ytterdahl.
Compás fails to recognize, however, that our definitions of breach of the peace in
Ytterdahl
were in the context of an alleged violation of subsection (g) of
¶17 Moreover, we expressly limited application of
Ytterdahl
to disorderly conduct charges brought under
¶18 In this case, the District Court found that Compás’ horn blasts disturbed the Libbeys and the guests of the RV Park. It further found that the horn honkings caused аn immediate disturbance to the Libbeys and their guests and thereby disturbed their
¶ 19 When viewed in the light most favorable to the рrosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that Compás knowingly disturbed the peace by making loud or unusual noises. We hold, therefore, that sufficient evidence supports the District Court’s conviction of Compás of two counts of disorderly conduct.
¶20 2. Does
¶21 Compás filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the disorderly conduct charges on the basis, in part, that her horn honking actions were protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which could not be criminally sanctioned. The District Court orally denied the motion, concluding that Compás had not established an infringement of her free speech rights. Compás asserts error, contending that
¶22 A trial court’s decision to deny a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a conclusion of law which we review de novo. State v. Cooney (1997), 284 Mont. 500, 502, 945 P.2d 891, 892 (citation omitted). Our review of a trial court’s determination on a question of constitutional law also is plenary. State v. Schnittgen (1996), 277 Mont. 291, 295, 922 P.2d 500, 503 (citation omitted).
¶23 Compás contends that her horn honking activities were “expressive conduct” which has long been recognized as protected speech under the United States Constitution. She cites to no authorities which support her position, however. To prevail on her “as applied” chai
lenge to
¶24 Nor is Compás’ reliance on Ytterdahl in this regard well placed. There, we emphasized that the defendant’s actions involved protesting to his government an allegedly unlawful act of his government. Ytterdahl, 222 Mont. at 262, 721 P.2d at 760. Compás’ conduct in the present case is of an entirely different type. She was not exercising her right to protest to her government and she was not protesting any allegedly unlawful act by her government or, indeed, by anyone. Thus, Ytterdahl does not support Compás’ position here.
¶25 The right to free speech is not absolute. City of Billings v. Batten (1985), 218 Mont. 64, 69, 705 P.2d 1120, 1124 (citation omitted). Indeed, “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems.” State v. Lance (1986), 222 Mont. 92, 102, 721 P.2d 1258, 1265 (citation omitted). One of those classes of speech not protected by the First Amendment is activity intended to embarrass, annoy or harass. Helfrich, 277 Mont. at 460, 922 P.2d at 1164 (citations omitted).
¶26 Here, Compás’ horn honking activities clearly annoyed and harassеd the Libbeys and their guests at the RV Park and, on the face of it, could not have been intended otherwise. Thus, while Compás asserts that her intent was “to protest the location of the RV Park,” her actions did not constitute а protest to government of government acts which would be entitled to protection under the First Amendment. Moreover, under these circumstances, Compás’ “protest” — aimed at the Libbeys — had precisely the еffect she intended: it disturbed their peace and that of their guests.
¶27 We conclude that the District Court correctly concluded that Compás did not establish a violation of her free speech rights. Therefore, we hold that the District Court did not err in denying Compás’ motion to dismiss the disorderly conduct charges.
¶28 Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, JUSTICES NELSON, REGNIER and LEAPHART concur.